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The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to issue, in the 
public interest, a new and enlarged edition of Fuller Employ 
ment with Less Inflation, which first appeared as an Institute 
staff paper in January 1969. The continuing timeliness of the 
original title attests to the potential value of the incorporated 
essays to students of the contemporary economic scene. The 
contents should prove of interest not only to professional 
economists and statisticians but also to legislators, govern 
ment policymakers, and the general public.
This edition adds six essays to the four that made up its 
predecessor. Two of the six (Nos. 6 and 8) have been printed 
earlier under the Institute's auspices. The author's prepared 
statement and answers to supplementary questions on the 
report of the Kerner Commission (No. 6) were published as a 
staff paper of the Institute in 1969 as well as in hearings of 
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. The 
other essay (No. 8) served as the introductory chapter to a 
volume based on the twentieth anniversary conference of the 
Institute; the volume was published by Augustus M. Kelley 
in 1967 by arrangement with the Institute, which also holds 
the copyright.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent the positions of the W.E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research.
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The ten essays comprising this enlarged edition of Fuller 
Employment with Less Inflation are presented in reverse 
chronological order of their preparation. Four of the ten 
(Nos. 5, 7, 9, and 10) constituted the original 1969 edition. 
These four and two others (Nos. 6 and 8) were written and 
published while I was a staff member of the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute (1965-70) located at its Washington office. The re 
maining four essays (Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4) are of more recent 
vintage; and, of these, the first (No. 1) was prepared 
especially for this enlarged edition.
From the beginning of my professional career, I had been 
interested in inflation and employment as separate areas of 
research; then, during my years with the Eisenhower Council 
of Economic Advisers (1953-60), I found good reason to join 
the two. In 1934-36, under the tutelage of Professor Willford 
I. King, I became acquainted with the histories and statistics 
of major inflations, both old and new—in the American col 
onies, the United States, Great Britain, and continental 
Europe. In 1936-39, as a statistician with the WPA National 
Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Re 
cent Changes in Industrial Techniques, I was initiated into 
the mysteries of productivity measurement and learned 
about problems and data relating to employment and 
unemployment. I continued work in these areas at the Na 
tional Bureau of Economic Research and the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in 1939-43, until my entry into military ser 
vice. In the course of my further graduate studies at Colum 
bia in 1939-41, I benefited from association with Professors 
James W. Angell, Milton Friedman, Carter Goodrich, 
Frederick C. Mills, and Leo Wolman. As a member of the 
senior economic staff of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
for which position I was recruited by Dr. Arthur F. Burns, I
Vll
participated in the preparation of eight Economic Reports of 
the President, daily pondered the optimal implementation of 
the Delphic declaration of policy (Section 2) of the Employ 
ment Act of 1946, and witnessed the emerging phenomenon 
of coexisting high rates of unemployment and price advance.
In the interval between the last essay (1966) and the first 
(1980) in this new volume, the original title of 1969 has 
freshened rather than staled. With the passage of the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, which extensively revised 
the Employment Act of 1946, inflation became an explicit 
concern of federal economic policy, coordinate with employ 
ment. Furthermore, the 1980 elections convinced politicians 
that the general public, after enduring a decade and a half of 
the New Ordeal, really perceived an "issue" in chronic price 
rise with chronic joblessness and hungered for a credible pro 
mise of corrective action.
Considered together, the ten essays that follow represent a 
"time core," or chronological sampling, of my views on the 
inflation-unemployment syndrome of 1965-80. They reflect 
an early and continuing eagerness to arrest or cure the 
disease while it was easier to do so and while many promi 
nent economists remained calmly indifferent, routinely op 
timistic, or disdainfully aloof. The essays repeatedly address 
the problems of designing (1) appropriate statistics for the 
benign administration of wage-price guidelines with com 
pany self-monitoring; and (2) appropriate auxiliary 
measures for mitigating the unemployment side-effects of a 
necessary resort to monetary leeches and fiscal tourni 
quets—the crude remedies that are universally prescribed for 
draining a systemic inflationary fever.
The auxiliary measures that are sketched in several essays 
would provide incentives for individuals to abandon infla 
tionary behavior voluntarily. In particular, they would offer 
protection via tax credits or low-interest bonds redeemable at
Vlll
public convenience of the real earnings of wage and salary 
workers who accept pay rises no greater than the projected 
near-term rate of gain in national productivity (or zero rises 
if this rate is negative). The same principle of protection 
could be adapted to personal savings and to the profits of 
price-restraining firms. In short, I believe that it is possible 
to design, and that it would be foolhardy to reject out of 
hand, "bridging" programs for encouragement of quick and 
substantial (1) restraint of unit labor cost and (2) increase in 
the ratio of non-inflaters to witting or unwitting inflation- 
mongers. It is not necessary for a society to court inadvertent 
death by unemployment in the shorter run through zealous 
and exclusive concentration on the standard remedies for 
avoidance of death by inflation in the longer run.
The essays that make up this volume should, like those in 
cluded in the first edition, appeal on different levels to a wide 
spectrum of readers. Two, Nos. 3 and 6, were prepared in 
response to invitations from the Joint Economic Committee 
of the U.S. Congress, which I served as a member of its ad 
visory panel in 1967-72; and two others, Nos. 4 and 9, were 
reprinted by this Committee. The Congressional Record also 
reprinted two—Nos. 4 and 5. In the new political setting, 
more readers are likely to take seriously the proposal of in 
centives for noninflationary pay behavior if it is tendered as 
part of a "supply-side tax package" than as a variant "in 
comes policy."
I am grateful to Dr. E. Earl Wright, Director of the W.E. 
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This essay, which briefly surveys the nation's recent 
economic performance and the variety of informed opinion 
concerning needed corrective policy, is intended particularly 
as background reading for the nine essays that follow it. All 
of the nine have been published previously. Indeed, four of 
them comprised the slimmer 1969 edition of this book. The 
original title of 1969 has been retained for this new enlarged 
edition because it has become even more apt with the passage 
of time.
In the interval between the two editions, politicians, 
policymakers, and professional economists in general have 
come to recognize the durability of a phenomenon that they 
had been inclined to regard as transient: the coexistence of 
high rates of unemployment and of wage-price increase. Of 
ficeholders learned in the 1976 and 1980 election campaigns 
that the waggish "misery" or "discomfort" index, which 
merely summed together the unemployment and inflation 
rates, could change from a toy to a dangerous weapon in the
2 Looking Backward & Forward (1980)
hands of officeseekers. 1 Zealous economic fac 
tions—monetarists, rational expectationists, supply-siders, 
and post-Keynesians—have emerged to challenge and mock 
the "neoclassical synthesis," the paradigm that reigned 
supreme in macroeconomic textbooks since the end of World 
War II yet failed
to suggest how the goals of full employment and 
price stability could be achieved conjointly, thus 
avoiding the need to make a Phillipsian choice be 
tween the two—or even to explain how recession 
and inflation could occur simultaneously, as they 
did throughout the 1970s. 2
The Phillips curve itself started as a simple statement of 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation, but it has 
had to undergo extensive reformulation for continuing ser-
1. The "discomfort" designation is often attributed to A.M. Okun. Candidate Carter used 
the adjective "misery" in taunting incumbent Ford in 1976; in 1980, incumbent Carter was, 
in turn, the target.
Instead of simply adding the annual percentage change in prices to the average annual 
rate of unemployment, some index makers have proposed (1) the introduction of weights 
and (2) the inclusion of the annual percentage in Gross National Product as a third compo 
nent with a negative weight. See, for example, a letter to The Economist (London), 
November 29, 1980, p. 6.
2. A.S. Eichner, "Introduction," in A.S. Eichner, ed., A Guide to Post-Keynesian 
Economics, M.E. Sharpe, White Plains, 1979, p. 10.
The attack on ruling doctrine is well described in a special issue of The Public Interest, 
1980, entitled "The Crisis in Economic Theory," especially these four articles: J.W. Dean, 
"The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus," pp. 19-34; A.H. Meltzer, "Monetarism 
and the Crisis in Economics," pp. 35-45; M.H. Willes, " 'Rational Expectations' as a 
Counterrevolution," pp. 81-96; and Paul Davidson, "Post Keynesian Economics: Solving 
the Crisis in Economic Theory," pp. 151-173. Another informative paper is by Brian Kan- 
tor, "Rational Expectations and Economic Thought," Journal of Economic Literature, 
December 1979, pp. 1422-1441. It should be noted, in passing, that Keynes was too broad 
and complex a thinker to be characterized as a "Keynesian" in the sense in which this ad 
jective has commonly been used since his death in 1946. On this point, see, for example, 
T.M. Humphrey, "Keynes on Inflation," in 1980 Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, pp. 5-16.
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viceability as a tool of analysis and econometric estimation. 3 
In 1978, the Employment Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-304), which 
expressed a federal resolve "to promote maximum employ 
ment, production, and purchasing power," was at last revis 
ed to include the additional explicit resolve of promoting 
"reasonable price stability."
The remainder of this essay is organized into four sections. 
The first reviews the nation's experience of unemployment 
and inflation since the end of World War II in context with 
the Employment Act and the law that drastically amended it 
in 1978, the (Humphrey-Hawkins) Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act (P.L. 95-523). The second section ex 
amines the sources of the inflation that has persisted since 
the mid-1960s and that has occasioned the preparation of the 
two editions of this book. The third section samples the 
views of economic and other experts on the prospects and 
methods of disinflation and the restoration of wholesome 
growth. The concluding section comments on the need—and 
a way—to mitigate the unemployment side-effects of a prob 
able major campaign to achieve disinflation.
By design, this essay is confined to literature and other 
public information available in 1980. Accordingly, it does
3. Illustrative of the writings on the evolving Phillips curve are: two papers by Milton 
Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, March 1968, pp. 
1-17, and "Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, June 1977, pp. 
457-472; E.S. Phelps, "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation, and Optimal Employ 
ment Over Time," Economica, August 1967, pp. 254-281; G.L. Perry, "Slowing the Wage- 
Price Spiral," in A.M. Okun and G.L. Perry, eds., Curing Chronic Inflation, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, 1978, pp. 23-55; G.L. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," 
in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1980, pp. 207-241; Philip Cagan, Persistent 
Inflation: Historical and Policy Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, 
especially Chapter 8 on "The Reduction of Inflation and the Magnitude of 
Unemployment," and Chapter 9 on "The Relation of Inflation to Slack Demand"; Gen- 
nifer Sussman, "A Summary and Critique of the McCracken Report," an appendix to 
C.E. Beigie, Inflation Is a Social Malady, British-North American Committee, March 
1979, pp. 60-72; T.M. Humphrey, "Changing Views of the Phillips Curve," in his Essays 
on Inflation, 2d ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1980, pp. 62-73; and idem, 
"Some Recent Developments in Phillips Curve Analysis," ibid., pp. 74-82.
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not presume to predict or prejudge the final economic agen 
da of the new Reagan Administration. It does, however, take 
some cognizance of viewpoints and proposals that have ac 
quired greater political authority as a result of the November 
elections.
Between—and Behind—the Acts
Although the declared purposes of the Employment Act 
and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act have commonly beer 
characterized as "commitments" or "mandates," they are 
better described as unfulfillable "resolves" or breakable 
"pledges." The first pair of words have a solemn and uncon 
ditional ring already belied by initial experience in ad 
ministration of the 1978 law—as well as by the long history 
of argumentation over the practical meaning of the 1946 law. 
Reality stands in no awe of congressional or executive 
rhetoric, and nowhere has it flouted federal fiat more plainly 
than in the quest for high-level employment with stable 
prices.
The heart of the landmark Employment Act of 1946 was a 
single 11-line sentence constituting a "Declaration of 
Policy" (Section 2), and the arms were a new Council of 
Economic Advisers (which would assist the president in 
preparation of an annual report) and a joint congressional 
committee (which would receive and review the report). The 
single sentence asserted, but with eager qualification, a 
"continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal govern 
ment" to promote the three objectives already cited. Despite 
the minimal machinery and the omission of any explicit 
reference to stable prices, no president in office between 
1946 and 1978 ever felt inhibited from taking steps to deter 
or counteract inflation. If authority were deemed necessary, 
it could always have been read into the notion of maximum 
"purchasing power."
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The Humphrey-Hawkins Act announced quantitative 
unemployment and disinflation objectives and dates for 
substantial progress toward them. Thus, as provisional 
unemployment goals for 1983, it specified reduction of the 
jobless rate for the labor force as a whole to 4 percent and of 
the rate for persons 20 years old and older to 3 percent; and 
it also aimed for moderation of the rise in the Consumer 
Price Index to 3 percent by the same year. Furthermore, it 
contemplated achievement of still lower unemployment rates 
corresponding to "full employment" by some unstated later 
date; and it called for a "zero" price rise by 1988. But the 
law has a loophole: It allowed revision of the indicated 
schedules, and the president (and the Congress) exercised the 
permitted option to defer at the earliest opportunity! The 
1978 commitment, then, is no firmer than the 1946 resolve; 
and, although jobs and prices seem to have become twin 
pillars of public policy, they also remain the horns of a 
dilemma of policy.
Historically, it is as easy to explain omission of price 
restraint from the 1946 charter for federal involvement in the 
functioning of the economy as to explain inclusion in the 
1978 amendments. During World War II, formal controls 
masked the inflationary potential that would burst into being 
in the aftermath. Meanwhile, full or overfull employment 
was discovered to be feasible—a welcome contrast to the 
idleness of the 1930s, when price "reflation" was also deem 
ed healthier than further price reduction. Before 1946, the 
bear and the bull were the best-known members of the 
popular and professional economic bestiary, and the spoor 
of "stagflation" was not yet suspected. Existence of the new 
brute was hinted in the 1950s and 1960s but did not become 
confirmed until the 1970s.
Funny things can—and do—happen to a bill on the way 
through a quorum, as anyone acquainted with our nation's
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legislative process is aware. S. 380, wishfully called the "Full 
Employment Act of 1945," lost its adjective and its principal 
parts in a familiar rite of passage. It was replaced by the far 
less ambitious Employment Act of 1946, which represented 
the maximum consensus attainable at the time. 4 This law has 
often since been miscalled the "Full Employment Act of 
1946"—out of defiance, nostalgia, or simple ignorance. On 
the other hand, some of the strong supporters of S. 380 later 
came to recognize that its failure to become law was prov 
idential to the reputation of economists and that the 
Employment Act of 1946 was not a hollow mockery after 
all. 5
With the unexpected maintenance of high-level employ 
ment after World War II, attention soon shifted to the prob 
lem of price moderation in the decontrolled economy. How 
many of the unhappy warriors who would not forgive or 
forget the Capitol crime against S. 380 have remembered 
that President Truman called the Congress into special ses 
sion in November 1947 to consider a 10-point program for 
dealing sternly with the post-control price explosion? 
Truman's phrase, "do-nothing Congress," still lingers in the 
ear; but who recalls that the plausibility of this bit of cam 
paign hyperbole rested in part on the failure of a second 
special session to accept the president's anti-inflation pro-
4. The evolution of S. 380 into the Employment Act has been recounted by S.K. Bailey, 
Congress Makes a Law, Vintage Books, New York, 1964.
5. Robert Lekachman refers in The Age of Keynes, Vintage Books, 1966, p. 173, to the 
"unwitting service to the reputation of economists" done by the Congress in rejection of 
the "key section" of S. 380. J.K. Galbraith adds, in Money: Whence It Came, Where It 
Went, New York, Bantam Books, 1976, p. 323: "It is doubtful if those who participated in 
the first drafting of S. 380 . . . would, in the light of later history, have asked for much 
more." Contrary to a common impression, L.H. Keyserling, who had served in the 
Truman Council of Economic Advisers, did not share in the "liberal" enthusiasm for S. 
380 and also considers the Employment Act preferable; see his "The Council of Economic 
Advisers since 1946: Its Contributions and Failures," Atlantic Economic Journal, March 
1978, pp. 17-19.
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posals in June 1948? 6 Furthermore, how many of today's 
"liberal" admirers of Truman know that his Council of 
Economic Advisers was already expressing concern that col 
lective bargaining imparted an upward bias to prices?
In the 1950s, the increasing inflation-proneness of the 
economy was concealed only temporarily by the strict wage- 
price controls prompted by the Korean conflict. Before the 
end of the first Eisenhower term and well into the second, 
upthrusting industrial prices caused considerable official 
alarm. The practice of "fiscal prudence" and the preach 
ment of wage-price-productivity truisms had little evident ef 
fect; but, at high cost in unemployment (which could have 
influenced critically the outcome of the 1960 presidential 
election), tough monetary measures did help to rein in prices 
by the end of the decade. Some economists were coming to 
see that inflation was the head of a price coin and deflation 
the tail of an employment coin, so that both of these faces 
could show simultaneously.
The price bulge manifested in the middle Eisenhower years 
was negligible compared to the uptrend of 1965-80, but it 
provoked sharp and quick dismay—as did also the price up 
surge that followed the lifting of World War II controls. The 
slow public responsiveness after the 1940s and 1950s need 
not show that the nerves improve with the aggravation of the 
inflationary disease. Rather, it may be another sign of the 
ease with which a wealthy, developed country could, at last 
irreversibly, turn into another volatile and frenetic manana 
republic.
In the 1960 and 1961 Economic Report of the President, 
the last two of the Eisenhower Administration, the earlier 
price bulge was still remembered: The suggestion was made
6. J.G. Knapp, Edwin G. Nourse—Economist for the People, Danville, IL, Interstate 
Printers and Publishers, 1979, pp. 263-64 and 280-81.
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that the Employment Act be amended to include reasonable 
price stability as a fourth explicit objective. Perhaps, it is not 
irrelevant that two of the three members of the Council of 
Economic Advisers at the time had experienced the 
disastrous German hyperinflation of the early 1920s.
The 1960s began with great expectations of a New 
Economics on a New Frontier, proceeded to inauguration of 
a Great Society, and ended in a New Ordeal of inflation that 
still rages. In the first half of the decade, unemployment was 
reduced dramatically with little price advance—thanks to the 
legacy of Eisenhower slack, to the adoption of wage-price- 
productivity "guideposts" and their occasional reinforce 
ment with presidential threats, and to the bold and 
overcelebrated tax cut of 1964. In the second half of the 
decade, while the New Economics was still congratulating 
itself, fiscal discipline broke down; increasing involvement in 
Vietnam, the expansion of "uncontrollable" expenditures 
for social welfare, and rising private demand required some 
reversal of the 1964 tax cut, but a new levy could not be 
enacted promptly. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, the practi 
tioners of economic activism found that it was easier to turn 
on the fiscal taps than to turn them off.
In the 1970s, unemployment and inflation finally became 
recognized by the media and political leaders as inseparable 
and significant "issues." Recessions engineered during the 
decade through monetary actions clearly destroyed jobs but 
failed to reduce the rate at which unit production costs were 
advancing. Unemployment, furthermore, was worsened by 
intense foreign competition on our own terrain as well as in 
markets abroad. Robust productivity gains could no longer 
be expected to diminish the labor-cost impact of unabating 
wage rises. A serial revolution in the price of petroleum im 
ports, crop failures, and material shortages also contributed 
to the upward pressure on costs.
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Two presidents felt required to try to block the tide. In 
August 1971, mandatory wage-price controls were suddenly 
and surprisingly instituted; in 1973, they were inopportunely 
dismantled. Another try at restraint was initiated in October 
1978, the same month that the Humphrey-Hawkins Act was 
signed into law; but the new voluntary curbs have proved as 
ineffectual as their timid and flawed design foreshadowed.
In its 22 discursive pages, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 
1978 seeks "to strengthen and supplement the purposes and 
policies of the Employment Act of 1946." Its Section 102 
lengthens the 11-line sentence constituting Section 2 of the 
1946 law into a 17-line sentence plus 9 largely redundant ex 
planatory paragraphs. The extended sentence upgrades the 
original employment and production objectives from "max 
imum" to "full," translates the ambiguous goal of "max 
imum purchasing power" into "increased real income," and 
finally adds the goal of "reasonable price stability." It 
grandly asserts still other economic goals of the heart's 
desire: "balanced growth, a balanced federal budget, ade 
quate productivity growth, proper attention to national 
priorities," and "achievement of an improved trade balance 
through increased exports and improvement in ... interna 
tional competitiveness."
Although the rest of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act offers 
hints as to priorities and preferences as to procedures, any 
conscientious administrator could distill only equivocal and 
incomplete guidance therefrom. The trouble is that the many 
stated objectives have long proved difficult to attain, singly 
as well as in combination, in the refractory world in which 
we are obliged to live. In such a world, one might be tempted 
to dismiss the 1978 Act as a mere manifesto, a "Son of S. 
380," a hodgepodge of compromise. Taken seriously, the 
Act represents no more of a mandate and no less of a resolve
10 Looking Backward & Forward (1980)
than its 1946 predecessor. 7 Willy-nilly, implementation 
would have to proceed selectively, judiciously, but with eyes 
dutifully fixed on all gauges; and different good-faith mixes 
of emphasis are conceivable and inevitable. A plausible case 
could be made, for example, for heavy reliance on ex 
perience gained in administration of the Employment 
Act—for accent, accordingly, on attainment of the "best" 
practicable combination of near-term jobless and inflation 
rates without prejudice to achievement of more distant target 
rates. Alternatively, an earnest administrator could start 
with the view held by many legislators over the years—that 
the Employment Act had "failed" because joblessness has 
persisted at intolerable rates, especially for certain visible 
categories in the labor force. Accordingly, emphasis would 
be placed on "structural" measures, as outlined in Title II of 
the 1978 law, for training and placement of disadvantaged 
minorities, youths, and other potential or actual members of 
the hard-core unemployed, even at the risk, perhaps, of 
perceptibly enlarging a few successive federal budgetary 
deficits.
The Carter Council of Economic Advisers and the surviv 
ing primary cosponsor of the 1978 law have disagreed sharp 
ly on the strategy of implementation, taking, roughly, the 
two opposing positions just described. The divergence is 
especially striking since the Council actively assisted in the 
framing of the law. In the 1979 and 1980 Economic Report 
of the President, the law was interpreted as a resolve to con 
centrate on both unemployment and inflation while 
cognizance is taken of other stated economic desiderata.
7. The chairman of the National Commission for Manpower Policy, Eli Ginzberg, refers in 
a paper published in 1979 to the "great many compromises" required by the Humphrey- 
Hawkins Act "in the final effort to obtain passage" (Clark Kerr and J.M. Rosow, eds., 
Work in America: The Decade Ahead, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, p. 84). In 
another reference to the same Act (p. 261), a prominent labor journalist, A.H. Raskin, 
speaks of "this belated effort to make real the commitment so artfully fudged in the 
Employment Act of 1946"—"the right to a job for everyone willing and able to work."
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From this view, the practical meaning of the law is that it ex 
plicitly adds a price dimension to Employment Act goals, re 
quires the design and discussion of future numerical paths, 
and properly brings the Federal Reserve into the game. As 
soon as Section 304 of the law permitted, the president defer 
red achievement of the original 1983 target unemployment 
rates to 1985 and of the original 1983 target rate for inflation 
to 1988 8—by which time the Consumer Price Index had 
originally been scripted to be level. Although no new later 
date was given for this leveling, the event has obviously been 
postponed to the 1990s.
The surviving principal cosponsor of the 1978 law did not 
have to wait for the revision of dates in the 1980 Report to 
claim 11 "violations." 9 He found a basis for his charges in 
the contents of the 1979 Report and a Budget Message and in 
the actions of the pertinent congressional committees. Ac 
cording to his interpretation, the reduction of unemploy 
ment has a unique near-term priority that cannot be com 
promised by any immediate concern for inflationary "trade 
off and that must be supported by structural measures 
without regard to budgetary consequences. The scenario 
calls for full production and full employment first, with 
subsequent price stability and budget balance thereby 
rendered more achievable. A later statement by the same 
congressman ignores the 1980 timetable revisions but renews 
charges of wholesale violation of the law and insists on the 
need for a budget that is "highly stimulative rather than
8. Economic Report of the President, January 1980, pp. 9-10, 90-97. In The 1980 Joint 
Economic Report, Senate Report No. 96-618, 1980, p. 75, the Joint Economic Committee 
remarked: "While the necessity of revising these goals is certainly unfortunate, it is equally 
necessary to preserve the validity of the Humphrey-Hawkins process by making the 
timetable more realistic, particularly in light of long-term economic problems for which 
there are no easy short-term solutions."
9. "Optimum Growth, Price Stability and Full Employment," an undated statement issued 
"from the office of Congressman Gus Hawkins."
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restrictive." 10 A still later pre-election rebuke of the Carter 
Administration for failure to implement the law as a 
blueprint for full employment was planned but not carried 
out; it was recognized to have much less chance of changing 
the president's position than of changing the minds of some 
voters. 11
The incoming chairman of the Joint Economic Commit 
tee, a veteran congressman who fared better than his party in 
November, made a post-election statement reaffirming jobs 
and prices as the twin pillars, rather than opposing poles, of 
policy and asserting the dominance of both in voter 
judgments:
The aim of economic policy is full employment 
without inflation. The Democrats have failed to 
achieve this aim, and that's why we were thrown 
out of office. 12
Genesis of the New Ordeal
As a prelude to examination of the variety of proposed 
remedies, we note the rather consistent views of the experts 
on the etiology of the economy's inflation-unemployment 
disease. In November 1980, the month of critical change in 
national leadership, unemployment stood at about 7.5 per 
cent of the labor force, the "core" or "underlying" rate of 
inflation13 was at or above 9 percent, and a still higher prime
10. Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. 126, No. 63, April 23,1980. The 
same general position is taken by Congressman P.J. Mitchell in The 1980 Joint Economic 
Report, pp. 106-10.
11. Washington Post, September 27, 1980.
12. Washington Post, November 14, 1980.
13. The "core" rate, referring to price increases attributable to increases in trend costs of 
labor and other inputs to production, is distinguished from the contributions of external 
"shocks" and excess or deficient "demand." See, for example, Otto Eckstein and Robin 
Siegel, "More on Core Inflation," Data Resources U.S. Review, June 1979, pp. 1.19-1.24; 
and The 1980 Joint Economic Report, pp. 34-37.
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interest rate that had not yet peaked threatened to throttle a 
nascent recovery. For all of its results, the "moral equivalent 
of war" to which the nation had been summoned earlier by 
President Carter could just as well have been called "oral.'*
Authoritative economists of all persuasions tend to agree 
that the nation's economic health began to deteriorate 
seriously in the mid-1960s. The patient soon lapsed into an 
"age of the second derivative;" 14 hope of stabilization of the 
price level was lost, and mere stabilization of the rate of price 
increase came to be regarded as a "cure." Errors of neglect, 
diagnosis, and treatment were many; but there is also ample 
evidence of the poverty and primitiveness of the healing arts, 
with doctors not knowing what to do as well as unable to 
agree. Here is a retrospective comment offered early in 1980 
by a Nixon economic adviser:
Much of our failure to control inflation over the 
past fifteen years can be laid to a lag in perceptions. 
Inflation first became serious in 1965, but we did 
not realize how dangerous it was and so failed to 
adopt strong enough measures to restrain it. As 
people caught on to the fact that the action was in 
adequate, they came to expect prices to go even 
higher. These expectations helped fulfill the 
prophecy. A self-reinforcing process began that has 
made inflation more fearsome and difficult to 
bring down . . . , 15
14. Inflation has accustomed economists, and taught the general public, to shift attention 
from changes in price (and wage) levels to changes in the rates of increase. See the remarks 
by Herbert Stein, "Achieving Credibility," in William Fellner, Project Director, Contem 
porary Economic Problems, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1980, p. 46; and by M.N. Baily, in a comment on the first Perry paper cited in 
footnote 3 (p. 126).
15. Herbert Stein, "The Failure of Carter's Anti-Inflation Policy," Fortune, March 24, 
1980, p. 50.
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A statement offered at about the same time to a congres 
sional committee by the only chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers who has also headed the Federal Reserve 
System assigns heavy responsibility to the federal govern 
ment for the "present virulent inflation." He cites the 
government's bias toward stimulus, its interference with 
market forces, and its "needlessly expensive ways" of pursu 
ing worthwhile improvements in the quality of living. Con 
cerning the first of these, he said:
Undue stimulus through fiscal and monetary policy 
tends to generate inflationary pressures by causing 
the aggregate demand for goods and services to rise 
above the level that can be supplied at existing 
prices. This is how the current inflation was 
precipitated in the fatal year 1965, when our 
government sought simultaneously to fight a war in 
Vietnam and to launch the Great Society at home 
while reducing tax rates instead of raising them. 16
He recalled the "unprecedented effort" of the New 
Economics "to accelerate the growth of an already expand 
ing economy by a massive cut in business and personal in 
come taxes." The gambit "was initially counted as a brilliant 
success":
But as our economy was pressed to its limits by ex 
pansionist policies, it became highly inflation- 
prone; and the rest is history. 17
A prominent "liberal" economist, from the vantage point 
of 1975, saw an ironic parallel in the 1968 Economic Report
16. A.F. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, Reprint No. 110, Washington, American Enter 
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 1980, pp. 5-6.
17. Ibid., p. 4. Additional pertinent observations by A.F. Burns are scattered through 
various papers included in his Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker, Speeches and 
Congressional Statements: 1969-1978, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1978.
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of the President and the State of the Union message sent by 
Coolidge to the Congress in December 1928; both documents 
exuded satisfaction in discovery of the keys to prosperity. He 
discusses "four serious flaws" of the New Economics that 
are "now wonderfully clear"—the fallibility of forecasting 
as a basis for action in advance of need, the inadequacy of 
machinery for dealing with excessive market power of cor 
porations and unions, the undependability of fiscal policy 
for inflation control via tax increase and expenditure reduc 
tion, and a misplaced faith in monetary policy. 18
The 1979 Report acknowledged that "the current inflation 
has been gathering momentum for over 10 years," at 
tributing the acceleration to the addition of Vietnam 
pressures to "an economy already approaching high employ 
ment." It noted the role of stimulative fiscal and monetary 
policies in setting the scene for restrictive actions that bring 
recession. But the purgative power of recession, far from 
restoring prices to an earlier level, may be overwhelmed by 
the power of pro-inflationary behaviors encouraged by prior 
inflationary experience:
Once under way, a high rate of inflation generates 
responses and adaptations by individuals and in 
stitutions that perpetuate the wage-price spiral, 
even in periods of economic slack. Expectations 
develop that wages and prices will continue to rise 
at a rapid rate. . . . The formal and informal adap 
tations'to a long-standing inflation exert a powerful 
force tending to sustain inflation even after the 
originating causes have disappeared. 19
In June 1977, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development published Towards Full Employment and
18. Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 326 ff.
19. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, p. 55.
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Price Stability, the report of a "group of independent ex 
perts" headed by a former chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. 20 The introduction to the report 
observes that "disquietingly high" rates of unemployment 
and inflation have followed the unprecedented growth that 
the Western nations enjoyed in the quarter century after 
World War II. The title of the first chapter asks "what went 
wrong," and the first sentence proceeds to answer:
Going back to the 1960s, in the United States, 
failure adequately to finance the war in Vietnam 
and major new social programmes through higher 
taxes led to increasing excess demand, despite 
monetary restraint.
The chapter continues with a doleful synopsis of events and 
actions in the United States and Europe up to the fragile 
recovery of mid-1975. It concludes that the inflation of the 
1960s originated in labor markets while the inflation of the 
early 1970s originated in product markets (especially for 
petroleum and various crops); that the combination of 
"policy errors" (fiscal and monetary excesses) and supply 
"shocks" has built up stubborn inflationary expectations 
and hampered the growth of output and employment.
In an article published in 1980, a Kennedy economic ad 
viser made some observations that seem appropriate not only 
for concluding this section but also for introducing the next. 
He suggested "two interpretations of U.S. inflationary 
history since 1965" that lead in different policy directions:
One blames mistaken demand-management 
policies—they aimed at overfull employment, ac 
commodated too readily existing inflation and in 
flationary shocks, intervened too promptly and
20. The so-called "McCracken Report," to which reference was made in a work cited in 
footnote 3.
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energetically to arrest recessions and speed 
recoveries. According to this thesis, correct policies 
can bring price stability plus realistically full 
employment.
The other interpretation depends on the view that 
the price- and wage-setting institutions of the 
economy have an inflationary bias. Consequently, 
demand management cannot stabilize the price 
trend without chronic sacrifice of output and 
employment unless it is assisted, occasionally or 
permanently, by direct incomes policies of some 
kind. According to this second thesis, there is little 
hope that monetary and fiscal disinflation alone 
will cure the current stagflation. 21
While conceding "important elements of truth" in the first 
interpretation of developments since 1965, he finds it "very 
difficult to reject the hypothesis of structural inflationary 
bias." 22
"Redeem the Dream"
The threat posed by unchecked inflation to the efficiency 
of our economy and to the viability of our political system 
and society has stimulated considerable thought and writing 
on remedies. The prescribed regimens for draining the infla 
tionary fever vary in emphasis, details, and feasibility; in 
time requirements; in the kind, extent, and socioeconomic 
distribution of the sacrifices still demanded and in their pros 
pects of success. As might be expected, some plans solve by 
assumption various subproblems that other plans consider to 
be critical. It is also true that, in general, and for lack of 
knowledge rather than lack of concern, the goal of full
21. James Tobin, "Stabilization Policy Ten Years After," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Policy, 1:1980, p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
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employment is temporarily subordinated or ignored in belief 
that disinflation is the prerequisite to the possible attain 
ment. Explicitly or implicitly, furthermore, the Humphrey- 
Hawkins interpretation of the paramountcy of the employ 
ment goal, even in current circumstances, is rejected or 
unaddressed. On the other hand, proposals for disinflation 
tend to minimize or overlook the possible need to deal with 
concomitant increases in the incidence and severity of 
unemployment. A sampling of the views expressed in the 
very recent literature follows.
In a 1980 essay, the Nixon economic adviser cited in the 
preceding section reviewed four strategies and expressed his 
strong preference for the fourth, which he calls "committed 
gradualism." The other three involve: improbable and risky 
"shock treatment," an attempt to enforce zero inflation or 
something like it by sudden and drastic reduction of the 
growth rate of the money supply or of nominal (i.e., current- 
dollar) Gross National Product; restoration of some sort of 
linkage of the money supply to gold; and adoption of a con 
stitutional amendment imposing restraints on fiscal and 
monetary management. The one-time Nixon adviser 
observes that, in our country, "gradualism" (an intent to 
disinflate over a period of uncertain duration in which 
unemployment would remain a bit above the "natural rate") 
has "lost credibility" only because it has not been pursued 
"with the necessary persistence." The trick is to substitute 
"committed gradualism"—a five-year program of determin 
ed fiscal and monetary actions, undertaken with strong 
presidential leadership, bipartisan congressional support, 
and cooperation of the Federal Reserve, that could, if car 
ried out without digression or dilution, lead to an annual rate 
of price increase that is below 2 percent and to an annual rate 
of increase in the nominal Gross National Product that is, 
say, 4 percent. Changes would be required in budgetary pro 
cedures, but the program would eschew any explicit effort to
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restrain prices or wages or to meet a predesignated 
unemployment target rate. The former Nixon aide concedes 
that the opportunities for abandonment of "commitment" 
and for reversion to "short-run politics as usual" cannot be 
ruled out. 23
In the same 1980 testimony that was cited in the preceding 
section, a former Federal Reserve chairman likewise ex 
presses impatience with the familiar "gradualism," which 
calls for "mild measures over a period of five to ten years" 
but is vulnerable to "premature suspension or abandonment 
in practice." For "real headway," it is "essential to rout in 
flationary psychology," toward which end he proposes four 
kinds of action. The first is to revise the budget process so 
that Congress takes more responsibility for the legislation of 
deficits. (It should now consider cutting federal expen 
ditures, especially by weakening the role of "indexing" in 
Social Security and other entitlements.) The second is to at 
tenuate the cost-increasing effects of regulation. (He refers 
to the Davis-Bacon Act and laws concerning environment, 
health, and safety.) The third is congressional endorsement, 
by concurrent resolution, of Federal Reserve efforts to com 
bat inflation by monetary means. The fourth is reduction of 
business taxes over a five- to seven-year period (small in the 
first two) to stimulate capital expansion and productivity 
growth. 24
Kindred proposals were made in a paper issued by a 
distinguished Committee to Fight Inflation in June 1980. 
They include a curb on deficit-proneness of the Congress, 
support of the Federal Reserve's counterinflationary disposi 
tion, inhibition of government tendencies to raise prices by 
interference with the competitive process and by subjection 
of industry to excessive or overzealous regulation, tax relief
23. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., pp. 68-73.
24. Burns, The Perils of Inflation, pp. 9-10.
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for business, other measures to raise productivity (e.g., in 
crease in outlays for research and development and establish 
ment of intracompany productivity councils), and en 
couragement of domestic energy production and conserva 
tion by rapid decontrol of oil prices and addition of con 
sumption taxes. 25
The same Committee to Fight Inflation was encouraged by 
the Reagan election to issue another policy statement in 
December 1980. 26 In view of "significant changes ... in the 
political and social environment," it proposed a nine-point 
program that contemplated:
1. Reduction of projected federal expenditures for fiscal 
year 1981 (including off-budget outlays) by at least 2 per 
cent.
2. Stimulation of "productivity-enhancing" capital in 
vestment through reduction of business taxes for calendar 
year 1981 and through additional tax and expenditure cuts 
for fiscal year 1982.
3. Requirement of budget balance beginning with fiscal 
year 1983 unless a deficit is authorized by a majority in each 
house of Congress.
4. Establishment of a commission to explore ways to 
reduce the cost increase of entitlement programs.
5. Support of monetary policies that would constrain 
growth of the money supply over the next three or four years 
to rates "consistent with a stable consumer price level."
6. Adoption of youth differential in the minimum wage 
and rescission or amendment of the Davis-Bacon Act.
25. A Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, June 23, 1980. 
(Available from American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.)
26. Second Policy Statement, Committee to Fight Inflation, Washington, December 24, 
1980. (Also available from American Enterprise Institute.)
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7. Revision of environmental, health, and safety regula 
tions to ensure achievement of "basic national 
objectives ... at minimum feasible cost."
8. Promotion of labor-management cooperation at the 
company level on behalf of productivity improvement.
9. Early decontrol of prices of oil and natural gas in the in 
terest of increasing domestic energy production.
A prescription offered in 1980 by a venerable Nobel 
economist residing in Britain unintentionally illuminates two 
of the dangerous social challenges that would confront na 
tions desirous of quickly descending from an inflationary or 
bit to the preferred ground of stable prices. One major 
challenge would arise from intense unemployment during an 
indefinitely "short" period of, say, a half year. The second 
involves exacerbation of intergenerational conflict, not only 
over the distribution of burdens and benefits but also over 
the tolerable length of the adjustment period. The renowned 
economist favors drastic monetary and fiscal measures to 
halt inflation in its tracks. He opposes gradualism as ineffec 
tual, especially in the presence of strong unions. At least for 
Britain, he regards an unemployment rate of 20 percent for 
six months as politically more feasible than a rate of 10 per 
cent extending over three years. He would not heed com 
plaints about high interest rates and would welcome 
bankruptcies that weed out weak managements and ineffi 
cient firms. He is against government intervention to help 
channel investment funds into ailing basic industries, such as 
automobiles and steel. Cautious about the claim of "supply- 
side" economics that a large marginal tax cut would induce 
substantial revenue increase, he is "afraid it may lead to 
large budget deficits and more inflation." 27
27. From interviews with Friedrich von Hayek reported in Business Week, December 15, 
1980, p. 110, and Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1980.
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A controversial line of attack on "rational expectations" 
of continuing brisk inflation rates acquired prominence dur 
ing the 1980 presidential campaign. The centerpiece of this 
program would be a three-year series of substantial reduc 
tions in federal tax rates. These cuts would be accompanied 
by sharp curtailment of nondefense expenditures, en 
couragement of business outlays to increase capital invest 
ment and revive productivity, and alleviation of the burden 
of regulation on industry. The scenario also envisages a con 
genial monetary policy. The program is supposed to reduce 
the interest rates demanded by lenders and to raise 
dramatically the propensity to save. Many economists fear 
that attempts to carry out the program will actually ag 
gravate the inflation. In any case, a transition period of 
dislocation and unemployment cannot be skipped before 
"normalcy" is restored. 28
The program just described is rooted in "supply-side" 
economics, which has an appealing optimistic cast. Thus, 
even before the election month in 1980, the majority and 
minority members of the Joint Economic Committee were 
able to issue a unified annual report emphasizing "supply- 
side" measures rather than continuing efforts at demand 
management. They envisaged a coordinated attack on infla 
tion and unemployment by adoption of a pro-growth 
package of "consistent and mutually reinforcing" policies. 
Thus, inflation would be fought by gradual and sustained 
slowdown in the expansion of the money supply and by 
gradual reduction of the federal share of the Gross National
28. "Reagan's Top Problem: Braking Inflation Expectations," Business Week, December 
1, 1980, pp. 104-10.
It appears from a new Louis Harris poll that "a clear 55-to-41 percent majority of 
Americans opposes any cut in the federal income tax"—"despite the high priority that the 
incoming administration of Ronald Reagan has given to a 10 percent federal tax cut." The 
public's reluctance reflects belief that "such a cut would be inflationary." On the other 
hand, the same poll shows a 63-to-29 percent majority in favor of tax incentives for 
business investment. (Reported in Washington Post, December 1, 1980.)
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Product. General unemployment would be fought by 
stimulation of economic growth through tax reductions that 
offer incentives to invest, save, work, and produce. Struc 
tural unemployment would be fought by realistic on-the-job 
training in the private sector. 29
In May 1980, a tax expert who is a strong advocate of 
"supply-side" economics told the Joint Economic Commit 
tee that incentives could be used skillfully to combat both 
unemployment and inflation—as the Committee had already 
decided in its review of the President's Economic Report. He 
would shift the focus of attention in policy from aggregates 
to the marginal decisions of individuals, households, and 
firms in response to changes in relative prices. More 
specifically, he denied the validity of the Phillips curve and 
the Keynesian multiplier as policy tools and counseled tight 
money and significant tax cuts to induce behavioral changes 
in behalf of greater price stability and fuller employment. 30
Testifying on a presidential anti-inflation message in 
March 1980, the current Federal Reserve chairman not only 
showed disfavor of overreliance on monetary macho but also 
balked at the idea of early tax cuts, even for the stimulation 
of business investment. The times required a "coordinated" 
credible approach to inflation control that included fiscal 
restraint (preferably, an attempt to balance the 1981 budget) 
and energy policy as well as a tight rein on the money 
supply. 31
29. Based on summary remarks by Representative C.J. Brown, The 1980 Joint Economic 
Report, p. 5.
30. See testimony of N.B. Ture at a Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee on 
Forecasting the Supply Side of the Economy, May 21, 1980, pp. 61-74.
31. P.A. Volcker, in Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee on the President's 
New Anti-inflation Program, March 17, 20, and 27, 1980, pp. 102 ff; and Washington 
Post, December 4, 1980.
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A Wall Street economist whose pronouncements are 
highly respected in the investment community has, like the 
Federal Reserve chairman, expressed skepticism concerning 
the economic scenario that has strong support in the new 
Reagan Administration. In his judgment, the intent to cut 
taxes sharply while also raising defense spending sharply will 
keep interest rates high and fail to puncture the inflationary 
expectations of investors and workers. Continuing rises in 
energy and food prices, he observed, hold forth the prospect 
of continuing pro-inflationary wage advances. 32
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve was thought to have 
embarked on a more extreme "monetarist" course as it 
shifted emphasis toward restriction of the growth of the 
money supply with less regard for the stability of interest 
rates. The stage for this shift had been set by the failure of 
government to achieve occasional budget balances or 
surpluses in recent times. The shift is also consonant with 
legislative requirements of 1975 (House Concurrent Resolu 
tion No. 133) and 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins Act, Section 
108) that quarterly and annual target rates of money growth 
be publicly declared. Attainment of the near-term targets, 
however, has proved difficult. Professional opinion is far 
from unanimous on the most relevant money aggregate, the 
sensitivity of output and prices to change in this aggregate, 
the lead times, and the preferred strategy of restraint 
(gradualism versus shock). Other factors also suggest that a 
clearcut test of the efficacy of "monetarism" is not at 
hand—the Federal Reserve's position as stated above, its 
conflicting requirements to manage the money supply and to 
accommodate the Treasury in deficit-financing, popular and 
political concern for business solvency and jobs, and the
32. Henry Kaufman, in Washington Post, December 10, 1980.
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unhappy experience of Britain in its current wrestling with 
"slumpflation." 33
The best-known advocate of monetary monism—the 1976 
Nobel laureate in economics—has stated his credo on "the 
cure for inflation" in a chapter of this title in a new popular 
book. 34 He asserts "five simple truths" by way of conclu 
sion: that "inflation is a monetary phenomenon arising from 
a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in out 
put"; that government essentially controls the money sup 
ply; that the "only cure for inflation" is to slow the growth 
of this supply; that time is required for cure even as it was re 
quired for development of inflation; and that "unpleasant 
side effects" of the cure, such as substantial unemployment, 
are "unavoidable." A choice between unemployment and 
inflation, in his view, is an "illusion": "The real option is 
only whether we have higher unemployment as a result of 
higher inflation or as a temporary side effect of curing infla 
tion."
A leading econometrician associated with the Brookings 
Institution reported in a 1980 paper that his "model" at 
tributes the recent "dismal record of the * discomfort 
index* " to "exogenous shocks and a large upward shift in 
the inflation norm." To slow this shift, he suggests six 
possibilities. The first is to maintain high unemployment, 
and the second, which entails the first, is to keep fiscal and 
monetary policy "tight." The third is to announce and
33. On this paragraph, see Volcker's testimony (footnote 31); J.A. Davenport, "A Testing 
Time for Monetarism," Fortune, October 6,1980, pp. 42-48; two articles in Burns' Reflec 
tions, "Money Targets and Credit Allocation," pp. 367-78, and "The Independence of the 
Federal Reserve System," pp. 379-85; "The Redefined Monetary Aggregates," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 97-114; Milton Friedman, "Inflation and Unemploy 
ment," cited in footnote 3; T.M. Humphrey, "The Persistence of Inflation," Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, September-October 1979, pp. 3-15; and The 
Economist, November 29, 1980, pp. 11-13 and 19-23.
34. Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, New York: Har- 
court Brace Jovanovich, 1980, pp. 237-270.
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adhere to a "credible restrictive policy," and the fourth is to 
"reduce prices relative to wages without squeezing normal 
margins"; the intent of both would be to moderate infla 
tionary expectations. The fifth is to offer tax incentives for 
wage and price moderation, and the sixth is to impose direct 
restraints, ranging from guidelines to strict controls. A 
preference is expressed for use of a workable tax-based in 
comes policy to complement slack-inducing macroeconomic 
policy. 35
Many other economists see a supportive role for penalty or 
reward systems, or even for stricter controls, in larger pro 
grams aimed at disinflation. The purpose is to alleviate the 
unemployment that would be induced by demand-restraining 
measures. Despite much discussion of incomes policies in the 
past decade or longer, there is little agreement on ap 
propriate design and administration; some of the varieties 
appear to have been influenced in their details by emanations 
from the ghosts of Lewis Carroll and Rube Goldberg. 36 In 
1978, the Carter Administration proposed "real-wage in 
surance" as an inducement to unions to honor the pay target 
set in the new stabilization program. 37 Despite the cogency of 
the concept, the scheme was poorly crafted and poorly pro 
moted; by protecting inflaters, it would have legitimized an 
"underlying" inflation rate already intolerably high and re 
quiring reversal, not reinforcement.
The writings thus far sampled seem hopeful, though 
guarded; but some others, even when compatible with opin-
35. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice," he. cit., pp. 239-41.
36. Various tax-based incomes policies are discussed in essays by L.S. Seidman, A.P. 
Lerner, and L.L. Dildine and E.M. Sunley in the Brookings volume already cited, Curing 
Chronic Inflation; in Sidney Weintraub, Keynes and the Monetarists, New Brunswick, 
Rutgers University Press, 1973; and in papers by A.P. Lerner and Sidney Weintraub in 
J.H. Gapinski and C.E. Rockwood, eds., Essays in Post-Keynesian Inflation, Cambridge, 
Ballinger, 1979.
37. Economic Report of the President, January 1979, pp.9 and 82-84.
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ions already cited above, sound less reassuring. For example, 
a Princeton professor told the Joint Economic Committee in 
May 1980 that we need "patience," a quality "sadly lacking 
in past economic policy." In any case, it appears that "we 
must face up to the fact that an inflation problem that has 
been building for 15 years may take just as long to be 
cured." He proposed a "long-term policy" of "moderate 
slack, coupled with whatever * supply side' initiatives we can 
dream up to improve productivity growth"—the "only anti- 
inflation medicine that is not pure snake oil." 38
A well-known monetary economist, contributing to a 
volume published in 1979, ventured that his profession 
"does not have much to say about how to extricate oneself 
without great difficulty from an inflationary process," so he 
would be "very happy" if his fellow-contributors "could 
reach a consensus, not perhaps on how to eliminate inflation 
completely, but at least on how we can lessen the rate of in 
flation." Having had "the sad experience of seeing many 
different efforts at combating inflation fail," he is skeptical 
of "any simple scheme." He does suggest, however, that an 
anti-inflation program has to be a "combined and determin 
ed effort carried out along many different fronts." A curb 
on government spending is necessary, "but this action must 
be combined with wage policy and with other policies which 
at least will provide a period of adjustment during which 
people can be led to change their expectations about future 
inflation." 39
Writing in 1979, a distinguished economist who has been 
president of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science as well as the American Economic Association 
came to "a rather pessimistic conclusion that the prospects
38. A.S. Blinder, in Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 
United States, May 28 and 29, 1980, p. 40.
39. Don Patinkin, "The Inflationary Experience: Some Lessons from Israel," in Essays in 
Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 133-34.
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for control of inflation are not very good." Although he 
thinks that "a full-employment, anti-inflation policy is feasi 
ble," he hastens to add that it demands "more knowledge 
than we now have, a somewhat different data base, and a 
very different political image and will." In particular, his 
policy would involve drastic federal intervention "in existing 
financial contracts." Since "politically we are simply not 
prepared to do this," he expects the inflation to continue. 40
Finally, a post-Keynesian school of economists that seeks 
to replace inadequate "orthodox" theory offers an uncom 
mon diagnosis of inflation and arrives at an uncommon pro 
posal for remedy. According to this school, inflation arises 
not from excess demand or too rapid growth of the money 
supply but from conflict over the distribution of available in 
come and output. Restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
limit the available totals and thereby intensify the struggle 
for shares. An incomes policy, which is nowadays proposed 
as a means of mitigating the unemployment accompanying 
restrictive anti-inflationary measures, is seen instead by the 
new school as the proper fruit of a prior national consensus 
covering all categories of claimants. This consensus, 
established by a social and economic planning organ in 
which all interest groups are represented, "would finally per 
mit government to pursue a maximum growth or 'full 
employment' policy without having to fear the inflationary 
consequences." 41 It is safe to surmise that this paragraph will 
not influence the approach taken by the hew Administration 
and the new Congress in the quest for fuller employment 
with less inflation.
40. K.E. Boulding, "Inflation as a Process in Human Learning," in Essays in Post- 
Keynesian Economics, especially p. 30.
41. Eichner, "A Look Ahead," in ,4 Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 174-84. See 
also, in the same volume, Eileen Appelbaum, "The Labor Market," pp. 117-19.
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New Era—or Error?
The dramatic shift of political power signaled by the 1980 
elections provides a basis for hope of more resolute and 
more effective leadership against inflation. A successful ear 
ly outcome should not be taken for granted, however, in 
view of the dreary economic history of the decades since the 
end of World War II; the origins, later sources, and long life 
of the current inflation; and the diversity of authoritative 
opinion regarding appropriate strategy and tactics. Further 
more, even if the struggle against inflation were eventually to 
succeed, any predesigned program of disinflation would 
most likely have to be revised extensively along the way. The 
original timetable, too, would probably prove overop- 
timistic. Accordingly, whatever the exact nature of the 
disinflation program that will be formulated initially by the 
new Administration, the remarks that follow should retain 
some relevance for evolving government policy. It should be 
recalled, for the sake of perspective, that the current 
fashionable revulsion against Keynesianism was preceded by 
a fashionable bipartisan tolerance; that the Nixon Ad 
ministration adopted wage and price controls despite profes 
sions of ideological abhorrence of such intervention.
Of special interest for this book is the near certainty that a 
determined attack on inflation would entail a concomitant 
substantial rise in the general level of unemployment. Such a 
rise is suggested by the inevitability of a central role for 
monetary restraint. Furthermore, workers in particular in 
dustries, regions, and localities may be expected to ex 
perience prolonged idleness as a result of fiscal retrench 
ments, the unwillingness or inability of state and local 
governments to fill gaps in federal outlays, the limited 
geographic and interfirm mobility of older disemployed per 
sons, and so forth. Although stimulative tax changes and 
new defense spending could favorably affect some area
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economies and assist some industries damaged in fierce inter 
national competition (e.g., automobiles and steel), they 
could hardly arrest the worldwide shift in manufacturing ac 
tivity, reverse the decline of major central cities, or reduce 
decisively the high rates of joblessness for young persons.
Assignment of top priority to the mastery of inflation need 
not, of course, imply repudiation of the earlier federal 
resolve to promote "maximum employment." All the objec 
tives stated in Section 2 of the Employment Act, as amended 
in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, remain appropriate, 
whatever party is in the ascendant. While the objectives re 
main fixed, the weights assigned to the various desiderata are 
alterable in the light of changing economic conditions and 
perceptions. As for the specific milestones of the Humphrey- 
Hawkins Act, precedent for benign neglect has existed from 
the very beginning. Continued neglect would be much less 
provocative than a gratuitous alternative course that has 
recently been proposed: "repeal" of the Act in toto or, at 
least, of the "unrealistic" prescription of a 4 percent goal for 
unemployment. 42
Only an economic flatworm would be satisfied to view the 
processes of inflation and disinflation simply in terms of 
rates of change in prices, output, and the money supply. 
Government leaders unfortunately have to recognize and 
take due account of the social and political dimensions of the 
two phenomena. The conduct of a serious disinflation pro 
gram is bound to expose and sharpen the intergroup dif 
ferences, tensions, rivalries, and conflicts that contributed to 
the buildup of inflation in the first place. 43 In particular, 
stern counterinflationary action could sufficiently aggravate
42. Stein, "Achieving Credibility," loc. cit., p. 73.
43. For sophisticated discussions of the noneconomic aspects of inflation, see the essays in 
Fred Hirsch and J.H. Goldthorpe, eds., The Political Economy of Inflation, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978.
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unemployment to the point of threatening national 
cohesiveness and public order.
The latent danger to social and political stability counsels 
the desirability of offering incentives that would shorten the 
disinflation process and reduce its human pain. Specifically, 
a disinflation package might well provide, through tax 
credits or low-interest bonds redeemable at public conve 
nience, for protection of the purchasing power of the earn 
ings of wage and salary workers who agree to forgo pay in 
creases in excess of the prospective national rate of produc 
tivity advance. The offer of protection to such workers 
would have the double merit of increasing the ratio of 
noninflaters to witting or unwitting inflaters and of 
discouraging the "pre-indexation" of unit labor cost that 
prolongs upward pressure on prices into the future.
Four additional comments elucidate this proposal for con 
structive enlistment of employees in the fight against infla 
tion:
1. The proposal is not just another member of the motley 
family of "incomes policies" that political leaders disen 
chanted with "controls" are inclined to eschew categorical 
ly. It does not require enforcement by company 
managements acting as gendarmes or deputies for the state. 
Indeed, it is consistent with the notion of economic freedom 
that the new Administration wishes to enlarge. By appealing 
to selfish interest, it seeks to motivate voluntary behavior for 
the larger public good.
2. As a "supply-side" instrument, the proposal promises 
far less ambiguous counterinflationary benefit than does, 
say, a preset multiyear reduction in marginal tax rates for all 
income earners.
3. The proposal should not be confused with the Carter 
concept of "real wage insurance" that it might have in-
32 Looking Backward & Forward (1980)
spired. The latter was intended to protect workers getting 
pay increases up to 7 percent—far above the expected na 
tional rate of productivity advance. This idea could only 
have made the inflationary result of the annual union game 
of "catch-up chicken" easier to forecast; it was not aimed at 
ending the game.
4. The same criterion of purchasing-power protection is 
appropriate for workers in both the private and public sec 
tors. (In earlier years of the current inflation, the federal 
government missed an opportunity, as the nation's largest 
and most concerned employer, to set an example for others 
to follow by restricting its pay increases to the national rate 
of productivity gain. Adjustment of federal pay instead for 
so-called "comparability" with the private sector was never 
technically sound and has served as a mechanism for prop 
agation of "wage inflation.")
Finally, the notion just elaborated for encouragement of 
voluntary wage restraint is also adaptable to other disinfla 
tionary programs—for example, the stimulation of net new 
personal saving. Thus, instead of hoping that a sizable 
multiyear income tax cut would significantly increase net 
savings, the federal government could provide a direct incen 
tive in the form of a tax credit.
In the course of preparation of this introductory chapter 
to a new edition of a work that began to take shape in the 
very dawn of the New Ordeal, a passage in a poem by the 
eminent Victorian, Matthew Arnold, often came to mind:
We do not what we ought; 
What we ought not, we do; 
And lean upon the thought 
That Chance will bring us through.
May our nation's quest for fuller employment with less infla 




On Statistics and Policy for 
Wage-Price Monitoring
Another Try
As I did at two previous meetings held while guideline pro 
grams were in effect (Nixon's in 1972 and Johnson's in 
1968), I offer some observations that I consider pertinent to 
the design of yet another—a future—program. I was con 
vinced on those past occasions that strong inflationary 
pressures would persist and would, regrettably, inspire new 
ventures in nonpermanent wage-price control. My remarks 
here are addressed either to a new installment in a serial sally 
against today's robust and elusive inflationary dragon; or, if 
this dragon is somehow overcome, to the hunt of a successor 
dragon that will need to be checked, captured, or killed. I 
present my observations under three heads: the efficacy of 
guidelines, their self-enforceability, and statistical needs for 
administration. The opinions I express certainly cannot be 
attributed to any organization with which I have been 
associated; they derive from a professional interest that 
began, however, with my service on the senior staff of the 
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers in 1953-60.
Reprinted with minor changes from the 1979 Proceedings of the Business and Economic 
Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association.
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Efficacy of Guidelines
Despite a common lay and professional belief, guidelines 
do not represent a sort of exceptional failure among govern 
ment programs. Granted that the record of prices since in 
auguration of the present guideline effort in October 1978 is 
dismal; that distortions have been introduced; that inequities 
have been exacerbated; that the groundwork for other future 
(even pro-inflationary) troubles has been laid. But how suc 
cessful have other ambitious government initiatives turned 
out in comparison to proclaimed official objectives and 
engendered public expectations? Look around almost 
anywhere—nuclear power, the Alaska pipeline, the Depart 
ment of Energy, defense, social security, Medicare, welfare, 
CETA, reintegration of Vietnam veterans, public housing, 
administration of justice, antitrust, international 
trade—and, if you know enough and care enough, you will 
find ample reason for frustration and dismay.
The special difficulty presented by failure in the wage- 
price area is that intense psychic disequilibrium ensues. Once 
the inflationary menace has become even more real than 
television, as personal and immediate as gasoline lines, the 
failure to check or eliminate it leads to keen and widespread 
apprehension. People sense that the minor unequal sacrifices 
already exacted will be followed by more serious levies of 
unknown cost, incidence, duration, and outcome. Surely, 
not every worker looks forward, after a season of travail, to 
the comprehensive and mandatory controls that AFL-CIO 
again proposes in the July 1979 American Federationist as 
alternatives to the present flaccid "voluntary" guidelines. 
Surely, not every white-collar employee of Business Week is 
cheered by the editorial call of August 13, 1979 for 
"euthanasia" of the current program without any indication 
as to how else the nation might fare any better. These 
employees have surely read in their own journal that the con-
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ventional unwisdom, already driven beyond wit's end, 
knows only to prescribe "monetary hemlock" and the crea 
tion of "unemployment in the public interest." So why 
should the large public that retains reliance on jobs and 
credit for its well-being not suffer "malaise"?
Disappointing experience and fear for the future could 
easily lead to the mistaken conclusion that guidelines have 
"no effect" at all. They do, indeed, have effects, and not 
only adverse side effects and aftereffects. Why should the 
market-oriented gambits of government be judged inherently 
inconsequential when those of a cartel, a monopoly, or a 
bellwether oligopolist are automatically believed to be effec 
tive? I think that the poor opinion of guideline efficacy is an 
overreaction to the failure to achieve as much as promised or 
expected.
What can be said of a constructive nature in behalf of 
guidelines? Even when backed by mere publicity, occasional 
jawboning, and the threat of sanctions, they obviously in 
fluence private decisions and bargains respecting wages and 
prices within a discretionary range. Their net effect is a tilt 
toward moderation, especially since contracts typically have 
some duration and since initial outright noncompliance is 
relatively rare. I am well aware that the tilt is less than would 
be desired; that announced ceilings tend to become floors 
also; that norms lose dispersion; that targets tend to accom 
modate, rather than seriously to counteract, inflationary 
pressures. Nevertheless, I believe that, in the absence of 
guidelines, speculative and disorderly surges and subsequent 
retreats would ratchet up wages and prices faster than the 
rates actually experienced. Even the accommodative pro- 
inflationary ceilings that are set under guidelines have to be 
breached "legally" and in the sight of government ad 
ministrators and price vigilantes; and such breaching may re 
quire stewing and relatively slow journeys through a 
bureaucratic mill.
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Common sense suggests that, once adopted, guidelines 
ought to be used most constructively to the limit of their 
meager potential—and here the role of government leader 
ship is critical. Guidelines that are timidly conceived in the 
name of "realism" have a weak counterinflationary bite at 
best, but this is not their only frailty. The important fact to 
consider is that whatever restraining influence they do exert 
is bound to be short-lived. Sooner or later, they degrade 
through self-poisoning with compromises and exceptions; 
and then they are stabbed in the back by initial exemptions 
from coverage and by noncompliance emboldened by ex 
amples of defiance with impunity.
Accordingly, guidelines must be viewed as part of a larger 
policy package; and, just like a "freeze," they have to be 
viewed also as a bid for time. During the early phase of 
credibility when they less ambiguously tend to slow wage- 
price metabolism, guidelines can buy time for the rest of the 
package. Beyond systemic monetary and fiscal maneuvers, 
this package has to include fundamental attacks on the 
specific supply-demand imbalances that also underlie infla 
tion. Indeed, the efficacy of guidelines might be reinforced 
and extended if it were clear that the government is diligently 
working to correct such imbalances. Accommodative 
guidelines cannot, by mere adoption, provide basic supply- 
demand correctives; they can even make the imbalances 
worse. Ironically, in the absence of these additional 
measures relating to resource supply and use, more comes to 
be expected of aging guidelines and more grievous seems 
their failure to do what they cannot do.
My preference is for government leadership, from the very 
start of a "fight against inflation," to respond unequivocally 
to its own bugle. Neither the public nor the dragon should be 
cajoled with catnip policies into believing that coexistence is 
possible or desirable, with the dragon simply to be put under 
house arrest as a fatted live-in pussycat. I prefer the an-
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nouncement of "unrealistic"—i.e., truly counterinfla- 
tionary and hard-to-achieve—wage and price goals with in 
centives for voluntary fulfillment; and simultaneous, or even 
much earlier, announcement of other determined undertak 
ings to rectify basic supply-demand imbalances that also feed 
inflation. If "realistic" pro-inflationary "interim" 
numerical targets have to be set, they should be advertised as 
warnings of the dangers still faced by the nation if the incen 
tives provided are not used for better counterinflationary 
performance and if the corrective supply-demand actions are 
not bold and timely enough.
Unqualified "realistic" targets that specify inflationary 
wage and price increases as allowable confer an economic 
and social respectability on a state of affairs that needs to be 
rendered "unrealistic." They, unfortunately, subtly change 
the agenda from the defeat of inflation to an exercise in fine- 
tuning it. I prefer that government not offer purchasing- 
power protection for wages that rise much more rapidly than 
productivity. I prefer the official reassertion of the 
"unrealistic" algebraic truth that wage increases in excess of 
productivity prospects raise unit labor cost and the 
"unrealistic" empirical truth that unit labor cost is strongly 
correlated with product price. Were a political Micawber 
having major responsibility for guideline redesign and ad 
ministration to ask me what he could do for the country 
rather than it for him, I would suggest that he do more than 
read my papers; I would advise him to take what I have just 
said to heart and to risk becoming a political kamikaze on 
the job, "in the national interest."
Self-Enforceability of Guidelines
Years before the tip of TIP (tax-based income policies) 
became visible, I was on record as favoring wage-deferment 
bonds or tax offsets as incentives for workers to accept mere
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productivity-warranted pay increases. I did not at all view 
this incentive as a new "loophole," as just another "tax ex 
penditure" that ought, in a misguided spirit of "equity," be 
negated by extension to farmers and others. Rather, I meant 
this protection of the earnings of cooperating workers to be 
an explicit income transfer from the large body of witting 
and unwitting inflaters. I also hoped that the purchasing- 
power guarantee would look like a good deal, would accord 
ingly swell the ranks of noninflaters in short enough time, 
and would finally encourage unions and other institutions to 
join in a meaningful "social compact" of restraint.
Although I kept writing "letters to the editor" and sought 
through other correspondence as a private citizen to en 
courage consideration of my idea, the scheme for "real wage 
insurance" that surfaced in 1978 struck me as absurd, so I 
was pleased at its demise in Congress. In a letter published in 
Business Week of December 4, 1978, about a week after I 
was temporarily assigned by the Department of Commerce 
as a "detailee" to the Council on Wage and Price Stability, I 
wrote that "the protection of the wages of workers getting 
increases up to 7 percent amounts to a codification of infla 
tion." I proposed instead that "a true anti-inflationary stan 
dard would limit protection to workers getting increases no 
greater than the productivity trend rate, say 2 percent." I 
recognized, of course, that economic colleagues and assorted 
political sophisticates would immediately dismiss this pro 
posal as "unrealistic." On the other hand, I ventured that 
"it is also unrealistic to fight a fire by recalibrating the ther 
mometer" or by aiming just to contain the fire "at a two- 
alarm level." Yes, I prefer the "unrealism" of harassing the 
dragon to the "realism" of accepting its recent ravage as a 
norm.
The concept of self-enforceability of guidelines is ap 
plicable in some degree to prices as well as wages. The discre 
tionary range of a company might be compressed downward
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by the offer of some protection to the presumptive purchas 
ing power of its after-tax earnings. The protection ought to 
be limited to companies showing a significantly better record 
of price restraint than other companies in the same industry 
or product line.
Savers too should be encouraged. In support of guidelines 
(as well as economic sense in general), more honest interest 
rates ought to be available to savers—higher than the in 
crease in cost of living. If such rates cannot be paid, then 
some degree of purchasing-power protection should be pro 
vided through the tax system. The protection should be con 
fined to net additional savings of a specified percentage of 
the income of persons earning up to a specified amount.
Statistics Needed for 
Guideline Administration
Whatever the shape of the next monitoring program, 
statistical gaps are bound to be discerned and deplored. 
When the Nixon guidelines were in effect, a strong need was 
felt for generally absent company productivity information. 
The current guideline effort, according to my own brief ex 
perience as a "detailee," could have benefited if, from the 
outset, companies had been encouraged, and had also been 
properly instructed, to establish price indexes and to main 
tain them in inspectable form for review on demand. The 
program could also have benefited from application of the 
price standards to each company division or other major 
component rather than to a company as a whole.
Even as experience under the Nixon program must have 
stimulated company interest in productivity statistics, 
backroom and boardroom ruminations over the revised 
Wage and Price Standards of December 1978 must have 
motivated companies to ponder the arts of price-index con 
struction. After all, a company's strategy for compliance
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could have depended on what such an index showed. Com 
pany statisticians must already have known, or could easily 
have learned by test computations, that alternative allowable 
modes of measurement need not agree on the show of com 
pliance or noncompliance. Accordingly, they could have 
guided their principles in the selection of favorable indexes.
In the event that company productivity information is re 
quired" for a future monitoring program, it may be comfort 
ing to know that many circumstances have helped improve 
the statistical outlook. (The present program, incidentally, 
makes very limited call for such information.) Ubiquitous 
computers and "management information systems" already 
provide primitive productivity measures for many companies 
in the monthly welter of printouts. The pressures of continu 
ing inflation and intensifying foreign competition on com 
pany survivability, autonomy, and profitability have 
multiplied the number of seminars offered to business of 
ficials on productivity measurement* and related topics. The 
growth of employment in government and in private service 
industries and service activities has, meanwhile, had the 
salutary accompaniment of breaking down past inhibitions 
against productivity measurement on a "subproduct" basis, 
which many economic statisticians conventionally demean as 
a form of "work measurement." (I first touched on the sub- 
product method in a paper of June 1944 in the Journal of the 
American Statistical Association.)
Although it is expedient to administer wage guidelines 
separately (even within a single agency), the two processes 
have to be pursued compatibly and their results have to be
*During my years at the Department of Commerce, I actively engaged in the presentation 
of lectures on the why, what, and how of such measurement. Since this paper was written, 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research has published a little book of mine on 
Company Productivity: Measurement for Improvement (1980).
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examined and evaluated in a common framework. For such 
integration, I noted in my 1972 American Statistical Associa 
tion (ASA) paper* the potentials of the Leontief input- 
output system, so I am pleased to see that the system has 
been informally utilized in the current program. On the other 
hand, another integrative statistical device proposed in my 
1972 ASA paper (and in earlier publications) has not been 
applied in guideline administration—the construction of 
algebraically consistent and symmetric index numbers for 
the key macrovariables that are relevant to monitoring.
For example, we may start with a verbal identity connec 
ting average hourly earnings to three other variables of in 
terest in monitoring. Such earnings are expressible as the 
product of (a) the ratio of payroll to output value, (b) pro 
duct price, and (c) output per man-hour. This expression 
could then be used as the template or module for construc 
ting symmetric indexes from data for the corresponding 
microvariables—for translation of the initial "verbal 
algebra" into stricter "literal algebra." The product of (a) 
and (b), incidentally, is a compatible index of unit labor cost, 
also highly relevant to a guideline program. The system ob 
viously makes heavy data demands, so approximations and 
compromises would be required in any serious attempt to 
convert the formulas into numbers.
Fortunately, we may do much better with a simpler ap 
proach that deals only with aggregates rather than index 
numbers and that does not directly involve productivity. 
This alternative approach, moreover, has two special merits: 
(a) it is well suited to advancement of the cause of selfi 
monitoring for inflation abatement, and (b) it also facilitates 
coordination of wage-price and monetary policy. Ideally, 
each company should try to satisfy this inequality, 
Scjq! 1 2c0qi, where a q stands for output of a product 
and a c is its unit labor cost. The sum on the left is the payroll
*See essay no. 4 in the present volume.
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for the target period 1, and the sum on the right represents 
the output of period valued in unit labor costs of base-period 
0. Since a certain amount of inflation may have to be 
recognized as allowable, the sum on the right could be 
multiplied by (1 + k). A different k is specifiable for different 
classes of companies, or a uniform k could be set for all the 
covered companies. Incidentally, if both sides of the ine 
quality are divided by the right-hand member, it becomes 
clear that the criterion relates to a Paasche index of unit 
labor cost.
As I indicated in my 1972 ASA paper and earlier pub 
lications, additional inequalities may be invoked for exten 
sion of the monitoring process to value added or to total 
value of output or both. Thus, an inequality like 
£ vjqj ^ £v0qi(l + m) could be applied as a standard for net 
(all-factor) price; and an inequality like 
XPiqi ^ £PoQiO + n) could be set up as the criterion for 
total price (or price excluding profit). If desired, some rela 
tionship could be specified for k, m, and n; or all might be 
required to be equal (as well as positive).
Finally, the last inequality or a variant of it could be used 
in coordinating monetary and wage-price policy. Thus, as 
has often been discussed, a rule could be established that the 
increment of the nation's money supply in period 1 should 
not exceed a certain percentage of the gross national product 
as measured in prices of period 0.
In short, a wage-price program could get by with a 
minimum of statistical baggage and of a kind already 
familiar to cost-conscious companies. This does not mean, 
of course, that the required detailed unit-cost, total unit- 
cost, unit-profit-margin, and unit-price information for in 
dividual products already is universally available. The 
burden imposed by the construction of the hierarchical ine 
qualities (by the way, these could be recast into incremental
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form) is relatively small, however, and should be 
manageable without heroics by any firm that practices cost- 
accounting. Quarterly (retrospective and projective) com 
putations could be made as firms move through the target 
year. I think the approach affords a flexibility that ought to 
have wide appeal. Within the constraints of the inequalities, 
resource substitutions would not need to be watched from 
the outside; and different constants could be introduced into 
the inequalities for different industries. Companies would be 
able to navigate according to internally-generated informa 
tion.
In closing, I add that the Paasche indexes implied by the 
algebraic expressions presented in the preceding paragraphs 
could be replaced by Laspeyres measures—or, better still, by 
averages of the two, such as Edgeworth indexes. For exam 
ple, we could replace Sqqj S Sc0qi by Xciq0 ^ 2c0q0, 
which implies that a Laspeyres index of unit labor cost 
should not exceed unity. Alternatively, we could combine the 
two expressions to obtain Scjfao + qj) = £c0(q0 +qi), 
which implies an Edgeworth criterion. Similar substitutions 




Price Reduction Via Productivity
Supergains: Principles,
Prospects, and Programs
My assignment is to identify "potential areas of price 
reduction"—presumably, a subset of those industries 
characterized by better-than-average productivity gains. In 
addition to reporting here on a review of the recent produc 
tivity experience of numerous industries, I shall take some 
notice of correlative price changes. But I want to go beyond 
a statistical account since, even if it were rendered by a whole 
institute, it would still do less than full justice to the assign 
ment. I feel required to say something also about the 
"theory" of productivity-warranted price cuts and about 
practical mechanisms for translating potentials into realities. 
The range of my discussion is indicated by the three nouns of 
the subtitle, which serve as divisional headings for the re 
mainder of this paper.
Principles
I discuss "theory" first. Under its own name and behind 
such masks as "profitability," "efficiency," and
Reprinted from Hearings on Price and Wage Control: An Evaluation of Current Policies, 
Part 2, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1972.
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"technological progress," productivity has long been 
recognized by businessmen, by economists, and by ad 
ministrators of planned societies to be relevant to price 
policy and behavior. I briefly comment on three patterns of 
relationship among productivity, wages (or incomes), and 
unit labor (or all-factor) cost that have been imagined or 
prescribed on behalf of downward price flexibility.'
Even before I describe the three patterns, I wish to insert 
three caveats which themselves belong in the "theory" of 
productivity-warranted price reduction. First, not one of the 
three patterns is automatically realizable through the opera 
tion of existing markets. Second, productivity change is not, 
and should not be reckoned as, the only valid determinant of 
price change. Third, insofar as productivity performance 
does indeed bear on opportunities for price reduction, pro 
ductivity prospects are far more relevant than productivity 
history over the recent or longer past.
These caveats need not long detain us. With respect to the 
first one, monopolistic and oligopolistic forces—including 
the action of unions—probably tend toward achievement of 
rising, rather than stable or declining, prices in the economy 
at large. With respect to the second caution, price changes 
are properly influenced by numerous circumstances in addi 
tion to productivity change and market imperfections. 
Among these many extra influences are capital needs, 
weather, custom, tastes, governmental regulations, and the 
intensity of foreign competition. The arithmetic of averages 
need not be satisfied, of course, by the behavior of each firm
1. Reference is usually made to wages (per hour or per worker) in the rest of this paper, but 
only for convenience and not with the intent of ruling out a comprehensive incomes policy. 
If all income paid to persons and property is covered by a comprehensive policy, the con 
ventional labor productivity concept has to be replaced by another that is equally com 
prehensive in scope. Similarly, it would no longer do to speak of unit labor cost; the proper 
concept becomes all-factor cost per unit of output.
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or industry included in a comprehensive measure. As for the 
third caveat, costs vary throughout the business cycle, so re 
cent past experience regarding productivity and profits is not 
routinely extrapolable; and, taking a longer perspective, we 
should not expect a maturing, stagnating, or revitalizing firm 
or industry to recapitulate in the future its earlier record of 
productivity and cost changes. Inflation, unfortunately, 
seems not to care a fig for the opinion of economists and 
others regarding the braking power of productivity trends 
observed here or there in the economy over the past x or y 
years. Before the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts, the 
Eisenhower Economic Reports properly stressed the produc 
tivity outlook. I hope the reader bears this paragraph in 
mind as I try to simplify my presentation by the use of time- 
neutral language in my references below to productivity.
The first model envisages the distribution of all, or almost 
all, of the benefit of rising productivity in the form of price 
reduction. That is, hourly wages would not increase at all; 
but the purchasing power thereof would rise as generally fall 
ing unit labor cost is generally translated into price cuts. This 
pattern for, say, private-sector averaged permits deviations, 
of course; it is compatible with the registration of price rises 
for individual firms or industries that are characterized by 
productivity decline and advancing unit labor cost in a 
regime of typical wage stability.
In his final book, Competition as a Dynamic Process, 
J.M. Clark recalled that this model, representing "hardly a 
thinkable condition," was advocated by such old stalwarts 
of The Brookings Institution as Moulton and Nourse. All 
people would benefit in their role as consumers; wages would 
not rise for workers, and prices would fall for nonworkers as 
well. "Inequalities in the diffusion," Clark observed, 
"would result only from the fact that products in which in 
creased productivity has caused more than average decline in
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prices may play a larger part in some consumer budgets than 
in others." 2
Although this model featuring vigorous price competition 
may not be realistic for the economy at large, innovative 
companies and industries do experience or anticipate 
substantial productivity gains and can use these gains as a 
partial basis for price reduction. Profit per unit could well 
decline, but a price cut itself may engender a compensatory 
gain in sales volume. Clark says:
Sometimes the process may uncover possibilities 
of profitable sales expansion unanticipated by the 
more conservative members of the industry. This is 
most likely to happen when a young product is ex 
ploring new potential uses. 3
Clark's remark can be extended to new users, too. It 
reminds me of Ford's example, which still has counterparts 
outside the automotive field, as we shall observe in the next 
section of this paper. The Model T first sold for $1,200, but 
later sold for as little as $295. Ford recognized a relation be 
tween price reduction and sales expansion; and he asserted 
that the reduction of price even served as a spur to cost- 
saving in design and manufacture:
When we first reduce the price to a point where, 
we think, more sales will result, then we go ahead 
and try to meet the price. The new price will force 
the cost down. 4
2. J.M. Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process (Washington, The Brookings Institu 
tion, 1961), pp. 79, 441.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
4. Quoted in Caret Garrett, Henry Ford: The Wild Wheel (New York, Pantheon Books, 
1952), p. 108. See also pp. 12, 107, 109.
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The second wage-price-productivity model reflects a newer 
conventional wisdom which Galbraith himself tends to 
mistake for reality in The New Industrial State. This model, 
mentioned in the Eisenhower Economic Reports and more 
fully elucidated in the Kennedy-Johnson Reportst opts for 
general price stability with wages rising in step with produc 
tivity. Since differential wage adjustment appears imprac 
ticable from industry to industry, unit labor cost would not 
remain level everywhere; so price increases required in some 
industries would need to be offset by price reduction in in 
dustries with better-than-average productivity gains.
This is a model that is commonly favored for our society; 
it is not a mirror of what actually happens. Writing more 
than a decade ago, Clark opined that the aim of price stabili 
ty with "equitable" wage adjustments would "not prove 
feasible." He foresaw wage gains generally outstripping pro 
ductivity gains and prices consequently trending upward:
What we are likely to get, wages and prices being 
determined as they are, is a third form of diffusion, 
in which wages in the more dynamic industries rise 
as much or more than the better-than-average rate 
of increase of productivity in these industries, 
wages elsewhere follow this rate of rise as closely as 
they can, rising more than productivity in the less 
dynamic industries, average wages rise more than 
average productivity, raising average unit costs, 
and prices rise to offset this, approximately main 
taining the proportionate share going to profits. 
The indicated result is a "creeping inflation," 
financed by an elastic credit system that is under 
pressure to furnish the monetary resources to han 
dle the increased volume of business, on^penalty of 
being held responsible for precipitating a recession. 
Fixed dollar incomes shrink in real value, real in 
terest is less than nominal interest, and conven-
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tional depreciation reserves fail to provide funds 
for full physical replacement. 5
Obviously, Clark's variant, which Sumner Slichter had 
visualized earlier, 6 is not a model that is amicable to price 
reduction. Besides, he regarded this variant as a mirror of 
reality. He noted the buoyant roles of unions and govern 
ment in the passage cited; and, elsewhere in his book, he 
devoted considerable attention to company practices (such as 
product differentiation, "full-cost pricing," and the quest 
for "target returns" on investment) that also seem to limit 
the opportunity for price cuts.
Clark*s pessimism remains warranted. Even during the 
present Phase II, a period of wage-price monitoring, we may 
encounter reports of the use of "price discipline," not for 
competitive price-cutting, but to enforce rises. Note the O. 
Henry twist and the complacent tone of this news item, 
which appeared in a prominent business publication at the 
beginning of 1972:
Demand for steel has started to pick up, and the 
Price Commission has given its blessing to price in 
creases for sheet steel. So this would not seem a 
likely time to cut prices. But U.S. Steel Corp. did 
just that this week, with decreases of $5 to $25 per 
ton on more than half its products, including pipe, 
bars, structural, and most sheet products. The 
reason: old-fashioned industry price discipline. In 
land Steel Co. had quietly begun allowing quantity 
discounts of $1 to $8 a ton, and U.S. Steel ap 
parently is aiming its lower prices at these, with the
5. Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process, p. 80.
6. A succinct, advanced version of S.H. Slichter's argument may be found, for example, in 
his paper on "Labor Costs and Prices," in Wages, Prices, Profits, and Productivity, 
American Assembly (New York, Columbia University, June 1959), pp. 167-180. In the 
same year (March 1959), Slichter testified before the Joint Economic Committee in the 
hearings on "The American Economy."
Price Reduction Via Productivity Gains (1972:1) 51
goal of forcing competitors up to the levels approv 
ed by the Price Commission. 7
The third model that entails price cuts is algebraically close 
to the second one described above, and it acquired a promi 
nent place in Soviet thought and practice long before wage- 
price-productivity controversy became a commonplace of 
our own economic scene. Instead of aiming at general price 
stability with wages rising in step with productivity, this rule 
seeks a more moderate wage advance and, a fortiori, declin 
ing unit labor cost. The object is to facilitate, not only price 
reduction, but also a shift of factor-input composition in the 
direction of capital. In an originally-classified monograph 
that I wrote two decades ago, I stated the Soviet concept and 
compared it to prevailing United States opinion in this man 
ner:
The ultimate dependence of high real wages on 
high labor productivity has, of course, been 
recognized by Soviet leaders from the very begin 
ning. . . . Out of the struggle against leveling 
tendencies and the victory of planned investment, a 
conscious wage policy has evolved. This policy, 
often stated in garbled or elliptical form in Soviet 
and satellite literature, amounts to the following: 
The rate of productivity advance should exceed 
(1) the rate of increase of average real wages, so 
that a sufficient surplus should accrue to the state 
for capital expansion, defense, and educational ser 
vices; and (2) the rate of increase of average 
nominal wages, so that unit labor cost would fall 
and money prices of commodities could also be 
reduced. If planning in terms of resources were 
perfect, the first relationship would be achievable 
without difficulty. If fiscal planning were correct,
7. Business Week, January 8, 1972, p. 26.
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the second would be realizable, too. In U.S., where 
government "full" employment policy would have 
to be implemented by indirect means (like compen 
satory spending), there is more excuse for error.
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that pro 
ponents of economic stabilization in the U.S. have 
generally recommended maintenance of a static 
price level over time and the increase of wages at 
the same average rate as productivity. Since the 
price level would be stable, however, real and 
nominal wages would be almost proportional (not 
exactly proportional because relative prices need 
not remain fixed). The difference between this 
wage policy and that of the USSR is the difference 
between the productionist and consumptionist 
philosophies. 8
In concluding this section, I want simply to mention that 
the patterns of relationship here discussed can advantageous 
ly be recast in terms of aggregates. I do believe that a 
criterion stated in terms of output and payrolls is easier to 
grasp than an equivalent statement in terms of such averages 
as productivity, hourly pay, and unit labor cost. When the 
next peacetime monitoring effort is required, a shift to ag 
gregates should be considered.
Prospects
Turning to the available statistics, I take account below of 
two compilations reflecting the variety of productivity gains 
recorded in manufacturing in recent years. One set, showing 
the average annual trend rates of productivity change in 
1958-1969, was promulgated by the Price Commission on
8. I.H. Siegel, Soviet Labor Productivity (Chevy Chase, MD, Johns Hopkins Operations 
Research Office, May 1952), pp. 19-20. An accompanying footnote translates the discus 
sion into algebraic form.
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May 3, 1972. The other set, showing annual productivity 
series and corresponding price movements for 1958-1970, 
was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for use in 
the preparation of this paper. In the remainder of this sec 
tion, I refrain from expressing and pursuing my usual in 
terest in the quality of the data used and in the details of 
measurement. 9
The Price Commission needs productivity rates for 
guiding the calculation of approximate change in a com 
pany's unit labor cost, but the language still used in the 
monitoring instructions could easily confuse the earnest 
businessman or his professional consultant. 10 The Commis 
sion's reliance on trend rates implies that they are inter- 
pretable as near-term forecasts. It does appear that, in their 
derivation, an effort was made to give them greater relevance 
to the economic prospect. 11 Nevertheless, it remains 
reasonable to entertain reservations concerning the 
equivalence of computed rates for a past decade or so and 
unknown preferred rates for the year or two immediately 
ahead.
If the reservations are themselves unwarranted, the Com 
mission's productivity figures do disclose industries that 
might merit further examination for price-cutting potentials. 
The weighted average of the hundreds of published annual 
trend rates is between 3 and 4 percent. 12 Taking 5 percent or
9. These are discussed in Roger Bezdek's paper "Conceptual and Empirical Problems in 
the Measurement of Prices and Productivity," which was prepared, like the present paper, 
at the request of the Joint Economic Committee.
10. If a second-order term is ignored, the percentage change in unit labor cost is approx 
imated by the difference between the percentage change in hourly wages and the percentage 
change in productivity. This truism is stated like a policy decision, and obscurely besides, 
in, for example, How to Compute Productivity Gains, Internal Revenue Service Pub. 
S-3020, revised to June 1972. The title is misleading; the pamphlet focuses mainly on the 
computation of change in unit labor cost and gives the unfortunate impression that all in 
creases in such cost are "allowable."
11. "A New Productivity Yardstick," Business Week, May 13, 1972, p. 122.
12. According to the source cited in footnote 11, the 433 industry rates, weighted by sales, 
average 3.3 percent; and the manufacturing rates average 3.6 percent.
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more as the criterion of better-than-average productivity 
gain, we may isolate many candidates for closer study. Since 
wage adjustments tend to be more uniform than productivity 
change from industry to industry, better-than-average pro 
ductivity rises will often signal the decline of unit labor 
cost. 13 Such a decline affords an opportunity for, but hardly 
guarantees, price reduction.
Falling below the adopted productivity standard of 5 per 
cent per year are many familiar targets of complaint by the 
antitruster and the consumer. Thus, on productivity grounds 
alone, the prospects of price reduction would appear un 
promising for, say, contract construction as a whole, iron 
and steel (3312), automobiles (3711), machine tools (3541, 
3542), primary aluminum (3334), and bread and cake 
(2051). 14 Whoever balks at the inclusion of automobiles 
here, however, might be tempted to lower the productivity 
criterion; this industry's trend rate, 4.1 percent, is above the 
weighted average for the Price Commission's list.
Rates above 5 percent per year for the period 1958-69 are 
shown for many industries (some of them sizable) in that list. 
Thus, a gross screening according to the 5-percent standard 
would suggest that closer scrutiny for price-cutting potentials 
is warranted in these cases and some others: coal mining (an 
thracite, 111 and bituminous, 121), flour milling (2041), rice 
milling (2044), brewing (2082), distilled liquors (2085), soy 
bean oil (2092), women's hosiery (2251), tufted carpets and 
rugs (2272), tire cord and fabric (2296), veneer and plywood 
(2432), business forms (2761), industrial gases (2813), cyclic 
intermediates and crudes (2815), industrial organic chemicals 
(2818), plastics materials and resins (2821), cellulosic man- 
made fibers (2823), medicinals and botanicals (2833), phar-
13. Of course, declining unit labor cost can more easily be ascertained by comparing 
changes in payrolls and output—a point made at the end of the preceding section.
14. The numbers in parentheses refer to the Standard Industrial Classification system of 
1967. They identify more clearly the industries to which I often give only informal names.
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maceutical preparations (2834), fertilizers (2871), 
agricultural chemicals (2879), adhesives and gelatin (2891), 
carbon black (2895), petroleum refining (2911), 
miscellaneous plastics products (3079), transformers (3612), 
household refrigerators and freezers (3632), household 
vacuum cleaners (3635), radio and television receivers 
(3651), picture tubes (3672), semiconductors (3674), and 
motorcycles and bicycles (3751).
From the annual productivity series supplied by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1958-1970 (printouts dated 
July 19, 1972), a very similar catalogue is derivable. One in 
consistency, however, stands out—for synthetic rubber 
(2822). Here, the Commission trend rate is only 2.7 percent, 
or below average. In contrast, the BLS printouts show that 
output per employee man-hour increased by about two-fifths 
in all manufacturing during the span of a dozen years but 
doubled in the synthetic rubber industry.
A perusal of the accompanying price series supplied by 
BLS makes it clear that significant declines have indeed oc 
curred in many instances with the support of productivity 
supergains. In the case of synthetic rubber, the price decline 
was only slight (1.5 percent) between 1958 and 1970. In some 
other instances in which productivity doubled, however, the 
price cut was striking—e.g., plastics materials (30 percent), 
industrial organic chemicals (18 percent), cyclic in 
termediates (20 percent), medicinals and botanicals (25 per 
cent), carbon black (12 percent), electrometallurgical pro 
ducts (3313, 23 percent), air-conditioning and refrigerating 
equipment (3585, 9 percent), radio and television receivers 
(22 percent), tufted carpets and rugs (21 percent), knit fabric 
mills (2256, 25 percent), and linoleum (3996, 8 percent). For 
picture tubes, which experienced nearly a trebling of produc 
tivity, the price cut was 46 percent between 1958 and 1970.
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Even in the generally inflationary years since 1967 produc 
tivity supergains have permitted various industries to 
realize—or endure—price cuts. The BLS printouts show pro 
ductivity and price advances of 6 and 8 percent, respectively, 
for all manufacturing in 1967-1970. Against this backdrop, 
they reveal a much sharper productivity rise, 29 percent, for 
plastics materials, accompanied by a price decrease of 14 
percent. A productivity increase of nearly 15 percent is in 
dicated for synthetic organic fibers (2824), which experienc 
ed a further price decline of 2 percent in 1967-1970.
Outside of chemicals, similar combinations are also to be 
found. In the textiles group, for example, knitted fabric mills 
gained nearly 12 percent in output per employee man-hour 
during 1967-1970 while prices fell 7 percent; tufted carpets 
and rugs posted an increase of 13 percent in productivity as 
prices receded another 2 percent. For radio and television 
receivers, a smart gain of 26 percent in productivity was 
bracketed with a fall of more than 6 percent in prices. A 
more striking productivity rise for miscellaneous plastics 
products (3079), 35 percent, was linked to a price retreat of 
15 percent. Additional examples, such as picture tubes and 
optical equipment and lenses (3831), may be cited, as pro 
ductivity supergains merely supported virtually stable prices 
in still other industries—e.g., in the chemical and textile 
areas, photographic equipment and supplies (3861), writing 
pens (3951), and linoleum.
The above report of good correlations between productivi 
ty and price changes could, of course, be supplemented by a 
chronicle of contrary instances. Unremarkable productivity 
gains have occasionally occurred together with favorable 
price performance, and better-than-average productivity ex 
perience did not always entail either price stability or price 
decline.
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Without a closer analysis of circumstances, previous pro 
ductivity and price experience provides no sure clue to areas 
now ripe for price-cutting. Good past records may not be 
sustainable—in the face, say, of unusual new wage set 
tlements or intensifying foreign competition. Furthermore, 
poor past productivity-price records should not suggest 
unimprovability and should not discourage corrective action 
by, say, managements acting alone or in concert with union 
leadership or with government. In the motor vehicle group 
(3710), for example, the productivity performance in 
1958-1970 was no better than for all manufacturing; and it 
was altogether stagnant in 1967-1970, as corresponding 
prices rose more rapidly than for all manufactures. Should 
this sort of record in so important an area be accepted with 
complacency? The same challenge is raised by the BLS 
statistics for our vaunted iron and steel industry (3312). 
There, only trivial productivity gains were achieved in 
1958-1970, and a drop of 3 percent was indicated for 
1967-1970 as the price rise exceeded the percentage increase 
for all manufactures.
Programs
Since a favorable productivity basis for price reduction 
cannot routinely be achieved and sustained, and since other 
circumstances often militate against such reduction anyway, 
some continuing systemic or institutional correctives may be 
needed. Without these remedies, achievement and 
maintenance of average price stability may be out of the 
question as our nation also pursues the goal of reasonably 
full peacetime employment. The experience of price cuts 
cited in the preceding section should encourage a quest for 
ways to improve the nation's performance in this regard. It is 
not compulsory to accept the counsel of despair that so
58 Price Reduction Via Productivity Gains (1972:1)
respectable an economist as Sumner Slichter was dispensing 
by the end of the Eisenhower period:
One fact that stands out conspicuously ... is 
that ours is a producer-dominated economy—the 
consumer is the forgotten man. We have the in 
stitutional arrangements that make gains in pro 
ductivity produce higher wages and higher prices, 
but no one even speculates about the possibility of 
altering our institutions so that gains in productivi 
ty will produce lower prices. The absence of con 
cern for the consumer is understandable because 
the consumer does not demand lower prices. 15
In commenting on systemic correctives, I feel no need to 
repeat the familiar tax (and other) incentives for upgrading 
technology and for transforming it into ready physical plant 
and equipment. I wish instead here to mention again a pro 
posal I have made for reinforcing the guidelines for 
noninflationary wage behavior: Workers should be en 
couraged to forego demands for supraproductivity pay gains 
by the offer of purchasing-power protection for in- 
fraproductivity pay increases. My elaborations of this idea 
for self-enforcement have allowed roles for wage-deferment 
bonds and for tax write-offs. For symmetry, tax benefits 
could also be offered to companies that voluntarily share 
their productivity gains with the public in the form of lower 
prices.
In speaking of institutional correctives, I like to assume 
that comprehensive controls will be avoided a bit longer as 
our mixed economy continues to evolve along various lines 
into a monitored economy. Even if there is a Phase III that, 
say, confines wage-price monitoring to the private economic 
heavyweights, I look toward a Phase-Out also. This is not to
15. Slichter, "Labor Cost and Prices," p. 180.
Price Reduction Via Productivity Gains (1972:1) 59
say that another episode of peacetime wage-price 
surveillance will prove unnecessary; indeed, in another paper 
in this volume, I have predicted a "third-generation" 
peacetime effort (i.e., a successor to Phase II-III and to 
Kennedy-Johnson jawboning), but I did not set a date. In the 
meantime, as government programs proliferate for meeting 
the challenges of foreign competition at home and abroad, I 
assume that a certain amount of wage-price monitoring will 
become absorbed into the criteria for public assistance to 
private entities or for closer public-private "partnership" 
(e.g., in foreign trade).
A happy recent development suggests that government 
may acquire a new instrument for facilitating price reduc 
tion. This instrument is at once more subtle and more per 
vasively applicable than, say, the antitrust suit or the sub 
sidized "rollback" of selected prices. I refer to the sudden 
harvest of instances of both "voluntary" and "ordered" 
price-cuts required for compliance with the Price Commis 
sion's profit-margin limitations. The increasing frequency of 
news reports concerning price reductions to base levels and 
further reductions that cancel excess revenues generated by 
higher markups means that more businessmen, government 
officials, and citizens are becoming aware of the longer-term 
potentials provided by Phase II regulations.
I have recently rediscovered two institutional proposals of 
fered by the late Walter Reuther for price stabilization. To 
day, these proposals, for a Price-Wage Review Board and a 
Consumer Counsel, sound much less stringent than they did 
when presented at the Upjohn Institute's anniversary con 
ference of 1966. I quote in full the relevant passage in 
Reuther's address:
We in the UAW have long advocated the 
establishment of a Price-Wage Board of Review. 
This Board would have authority to make public
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investigation of situations in which major corpora 
tions, powerful enough to dominate key industries, 
propose questionable price increases or are believed 
to be maintaining prices at unjustifiable levels. 
Situations warranting investigation would include 
those in which dominant corporations attribute 
their proposed price increases to the collective- 
bargaining demands of their workers.
Corporations in this dominant position—say, 
those which control 25 percent or more of a key in 
dustry's sales—would have to give notice to the 
Price-Wage Review Board of any intended price in 
crease. The Board would then have power, before 
the increase could go into effect, to call corporation 
officials before it for a public hearing. At such a 
hearing, the Board would demand from the com 
pany all the pertinent facts; and, following the 
hearing, it would publish its findings and recom 
mendations and the facts supporting them.
If a corporation subject to such review alleges 
that meeting the demands of a union would force 
an increase in prices, then the union would be put 
into the public goldfish bowl along with the cor 
poration. Both parties would be required to appear 
at the hearings.
To deal with the situation where a corporation 
may already be charging extortionately high prices, 
we propose also the provision of a Consumer 
Counsel. He could initiate hearings when he has 
reason to believe that a corporation's prices are too 
high. He would also represent the consumer in 
terest at all Board hearings.
The Board would have no power to prohibit a 
price increase or to require a price cut. Its function
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would be limited to getting the facts and making 
them available to the public. If the public were in 
formed, however, with facts and figures making 
clear that a proposed price increase, or that a 
union's wage demand, is not justified, it is highly 
doubtful that the corporation or the union would 
persist. In a free society, informed public opinion 
has persuasive force. It has great power to 
discipline private, voluntary decisions that affect 
the public interest and to make them socially more 
responsible. 16
To conclude this section and my paper, I refer to S. 3970, 
which nearly achieved enactment in the 92nd Congress and 
could be adapted or interpreted to accommodate suggestions 
such as Reuther's. It provides for a Council of Consumer 
Advisers in the Executive Office and an independent Con 
sumer Protection Agency. According to Section 203, the Ad 
ministrator of the Agency "may as of right intervene as a 
party" to represent consumers in proceedings before any 
other federal agency. Presumably, he could represent the 
consumer viewpoint in wage-price hearings as a "party at in 
terest," functioning in effect as Reuther's Consumer 
Counsel. Productivity and unit labor cost would surely have 
a critical place in the briefs presented for price restraint or 
price reduction. 17
16.. From Walter P. Reuther's paper in I.H. Siegel, ed., Manpower Tomorrow: Prospects 
and Priorities, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 34-36.
17. The opinion of a Consumer Counsel or a Consumer Protection Agency Administrator 
would, of course, carry greater weight if it could be backed by a plausible threat to invoke 




Productivity Statistics for a
Third-Generation Wage-Price
Monitoring Program
This paper focuses on a future that can still be influenced. 
It looks ahead to the next—the third—program of peacetime 
monitoring of wages (or incomes) and prices in the United 
States.
At the 1968 meeting of the American Statistical Associa 
tion (ASA), I presented a paper from a similar perspective on 
a similar topic.* I reflected on the contemporary condition 
of productivity statistics (which has not changed profoundly 
since) and on the data needs of a forthcoming second "for 
mal program" of wage-price or income-price surveillance, a 
peacetime program that "would presumably have an explicit 
statutory basis, pervasive scope, and steady applica 
tion—unlike its predecessor." By "predecessor," I meant, 
of course, the pioneer monitoring venture—the Kennedy- 
Johnson version of jawboning-o/m-armtwisting, which still
Reprinted with minor changes from the 1972 Business and Economic Statistics Section Pro 
ceedings of the American Statistical Association.
*See essay no. 5 in the present volume.
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showed twitches of life in 1968 but was surely "gone in the 
teeth" as early as 1966. As for the second program to which I 
already looked forward, Phase II was hardly being incubated 
in 1968; indeed, it had not even been ovulated.
The third coming can now be safely predicted, although it 
would be foolhardy to proceed to particulars—to the trigger 
ing events, the specific objectives, the timing, the duration, 
the onerousness of the new stabilization scheme. With some 
luck, the nation should enjoy a brief respite, a brief reversion 
to a freer economy, after Phase II ends (with a bong, 
perhaps, instead of a whisper). Such an interlude would be 
all to the good, according to today's dominant mentality (in 
cluding mine), at least delaying a possible eventual slide into 
permanent surveillance. Recurring episodes of control 
presumably pose much less risk than does a continuing pro 
gram to the traditional values that still command wide loyal 
ty and that retain great functionality besides.
Candor, however, requires acknowledgment that every 
society tends to adjust to whatever happens; so permanent 
surveillance, if it does come to ours, could represent a much 
less traumatic experience than anyone may now expect. I 
remember being deeply troubled, while a staff member of the 
Council of Economic Advisers in the Eisenhower years, by 
the implications of a threatened leap from generalized 
jawboning, from "macropreachment" of the verities of 
wage-price-productivity algebra, to selective fingerpointing 
and selective armtwisting. How relieved I was that the crises 
of the time could be weathered without open and explicit 
government intervention in wage-price decisionmaking; and 
I still like to think that the 1958 Economic Report of the 
President helped to make a difference. 1 In any case, the
1. An appendix cited egregious weaknesses of productivity statistics and presented two 
(now standard) series for the private sector. These diverged sufficiently to disturb 
economists and others who wanted only one (or none).
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shocks of two peacetime monitoring programs have since 
been absorbed. In particular, when NEP* came suddenly in 
August 1971 under unlikely political auspices, the domestic 
calm could only make one wonder: Where are the noes of 
yesteryear? True, the identity of initials with Lenin's NEP 
was occasionally noted in the press, but no dire ideological 
conclusion was drawn; and I saw no reference to the fact that 
the US program came on the 50th anniversary of the USSR's 
"one step backward" toward capitalism.
The prospect of another monitoring episode is latent in: 
(1) the persistence, if not intensification, of cost-push 
pressures in the private sector; (2) the governmental prone- 
ness to outrun revenues, to make budgetary outlays "uncon 
trollable," and to match or exceed private pay scales; and 
(3) the continuing weakness of our international balance-of- 
payments position. My wise and eminent friend, Professor 
Joseph J. Spengler, has recently summarized in a different 
way this same disposition of our mixed private-public 
economy to transform itself into a governmentally- 
monitored one:
Today it is assumed that the economic circle can be 
squared; for ... it is supposed that a society may 
have guaranteed full employment, price-level 
stability, strong producer pressure groups (trade 
unions, business and agriculture groups, govern 
ment employees), and freedom from direct con 
trols. In reality, of course, it is impossible for these 
four objectives to be realized simultaneously; only 
two, possibly three, are compatible. 2
*Nixon's NEP was a "New Economic Program," and Lenin's was a "New Economic 
Policy."
2. Quoted in a "separate statement" by O.D. Duncan and P.B. Comely included in the 
1972 Report of the (Rockefeller) Commission of Population Growth and the American 
Future.
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Incidentally, when I speak of a peacetime program, I 
merely follow a current convention, ignoring the legalistic 
and semantic niceties I mastered a generation ago as chief 
economist of Veterans Administration. Specifically, a 
peacetime program need not imply the absence of war, even 
a war that has contributed to the felt need for a control pro 
gram in the first place. The important thing is that a program 
should not be part of a general mobilization scheme, a 
scheme for reallocating resources massively in the direction 
of defense. Stated positively, a peacetime effort is one that is 
directed against "unusual" and persisting pay and price up 
surges threatened by familiar concentrations of market 
power, by other constrictions of supply, and by the apparent 
fiscal casualness of government.
The remainder of this paper is intended to be nonpartisan, 
even "apartisan," but this disclaimer does not mean that I 
should welcome bipartisan neglect as benign. I am pleased to 
recall that my 1968 ASA paper was inserted into the Con 
gressional Record by Senator Proxmire; that an earlier 
paper, called "Guidelines for the Perplexed,"* was inserted 
by him, with the prefatory comment that he did "not agree 
with it in its entirety," into a volume of wage-price hearings 
of the Joint Economic Committee.
II
In the design of the third peacetime program, benefit will 
certainly be derived from the accumulating national ex 
perience in "cry©economics." 3 Not everyone will distill the
*See essay no. 9 in this volume.
3. I regard it as unlikely that the third program would be preceded by any new effort at 
"gradual" cooling of the economy through monetary means—through deliberate creation, 
in effect, of "unemployment in the public interest." In 1969,1 suggested that, if monetary 
hemlock is again administered to the economy to purge an inflationary fever, consideration 
be given to "the sterilization of repatriable dollars that inopportunely swell the money sup 
ply and the recapture for public use of 'excess profits' derived by financial institutions from 
distorted interest rates." (Joint paper with A.H. Belitsky, "The Changing Form and Status 
of Labor," Journal of Economic Issues, March 1970, pp. 78-94.)
Productivity & Monitoring (1972:2) 67
same lessons from this experience or discern in it the same set 
of additional or alternative policy implications. I want to 
state some of my own impressions since they have a bearing 
on my view of statistical needs.
First of all, I believe that any provision for the expression 
of continuing, serious, high-level, governmental interest in 
private price and wage decisions is bound to have some ef 
ficacy, whether this efficacy can be measured or not. Infla 
tion does have a psychological component (which should 
not, however, be exaggerated into all or most of the prob 
lem, or be translated instead into a mystery without 
handles). Organized groups in our society do exert market 
power, and dominant business firms in different industries 
do have some control over the prices they charge. The 
economics of the modern era has always been recognized as 
"political economy," and it becomes ever more so. In my 
opinion, even governmental exhortation has some influence 
as a form of education and leadership. Furthermore, this in 
tervention, like the more stringent alternatives of 
surveillance, can be reinforced by budgetary restraints, by an 
example of moderation in pay revision, by use of monop 
sony power, by curtailment of subsidies, and by action to ex 
pand supply of services when action is taken to create or 
enhance effective demand.
Above all, adoption of a formal program of surveillance 
should not forestall governmental action to help make pay 
and price standards self-enforcing. Indeed, by "internaliz 
ing" public imperatives, by supplying incentives for com 
pliance, we could get much better economic results while 
diminishing the danger of coercion and reducing inevitable 
inequities. For example, with all the futility at the command 
of an ordinary citizen, I have proposed in the past that pay- 
deferment bonds might be issued for protecting the purchas 
ing power of pay increments that fall within the guideline 
limit. Alternatively, and with equal unsuccess, I have sug-
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gested that tax benefits offsetting cost-of-living rises be 
allowed for rewarding the "good guys" who accept in- 
fraguideline pay adjustments—for protecting them against 
the inflation abetted by the "bad guys." I assume that the 
enlistment of Internal Revenue Service in the administration 
of Phase II will inspire some new ideas for using the tax 
system to promote greater price stability.
The remarks I have already made point to a vital distinc 
tion between the trumpeted equity for some and the muted 
justice for all. The uneven distribution of market power 
leaves the least organized citizens especially vulnerable to in 
flationary aggression and inflationary pollution by others. 
Perhaps, as the historic tendency toward organization pro 
ceeds further, a better equilibrium of forces will finally 
emerge; or, perhaps, the indecisiveness of the routine 
economic war of all against all will become clear enough to 
encourage greater cooperativeness in the common good 
under governmental aegis. Another possibility is that the 
organization of consumers, the elderly, and others may in 
crease the number of "parties at interest" seeking a voice in 
private-public wage and price determinations. For the third 
generation, however, I prefer to continue emphasizing the 
potential of incentives for self-enforcement—a bird much 
closer to hand.
In short, a monitoring effort can help to moderate infla 
tionary pressures, but its limitations and dangers counsel 
modest objectives, less than complete coverage, and nonper- 
manence. It is only one tool that has to be used in conjunc 
tion with others, and it is hardly the most important one. It is 
a gross tool also, ill-suited to fine or frequent adjustment of 
relative prices and wages. Since it cannot achieve justice for 
all, it should aim for sufficient credibility during its lifetime. 
It deals with only some of the sources and aspects of infla 
tion, diverting attention from fundamental causes and 
mechanisms to an administrative process. Beyond a certain
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point, especially if it is long-lived, it could help institu 
tionalize inflation at a rate that is more or less tolerable to 
the better-situated elements of the population. Termination, 
the end game, is difficult; but involvement of the Internal 
Revenue Service in administration may itself encourage 
public resolve to find a way and hasten the day. As for 
coverage, I like the idea of experimentation in the omission 
of various categories of firms and employees from 
surveillance; but such relaxation should be tried only after 
very comprehensive monitoring has first been installed.
At this point, I wish to add that any comprehensive 
"freeze" should do more than provide time for getting 
monitoring machinery into place. It should not merely 
change the rhythm of inflation—i.e., delay the process only 
temporarily in exchange for a subsequent compensatory 
bulge. Instead, it should slow the (average) metabolic rate, 
envisage no later speedup. Insofar as practicable, what is 
foregone should also be bygone in pay and profit; and im 
provement should be sought in the relation of output to de 
mand.
Ill
A monitoring program makes very considerable demands 
on the nation's public and private data base—demands that 
cannot really be met. This fact counsels modest objectives 
for the program and tolerant administration, too—in addi 
tion to counseling the desirability of improving data systems.
The upgrading of the private data base is especially 
necessary for the maintenance of decentralized economic 
decisionmaking. A monitored company must survive as well 
as comply. It has to live and prosper in a competitive world, 
according to the best and most relevant truth that it can 
ascertain, as well as conform to administrative truth. In par 
ticular, a monitor may act "as if a large company's current
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productivity pace is correctly reflected by the past perfor 
mance of the industries in which its activities are located; but 
the company's management needs to be aware of the actual 
state of affairs.
Having had occasion in the past 15 years to advise firms 
and other consultants on company measurement systems, I 
am impressed with the apparent dearth and the routine 
character of accessible private productivity series. I am 
aware that company officials might not wish to volunteer in 
formation that could thereafter be forced onto the bargain 
ing table as wages are negotiated. I also appreciate that more 
than one logical center of responsibility for such information 
may exist in a modern corporation—say, the accounting 
department and a vice president's planning staff—and that 
internal rivalries could keep an outsider (or an ineligible in 
sider) in the dark. Furthermore, "management information 
systems" can, in this age of computers, become so turgid 
that the crude productivity measures sometimes included in 
their welter of periodic printouts simply go unrecognized and 
unanalyzed.
Perhaps, the situation of companies will be a bit more 
comfortable under the third-generation program. The em 
phasis in Phase II on productivity figures and the limited of 
ficial guidance given for their computation must have 
stimulated company interest in such statistics. Furthermore, 
the word "productivity" has suddenly blossomed into com 
mon speech, becoming as popular and magical as, say, "R & 
D" and "automation" were not so long ago.
Above, I referred to the unlikelihood that the data 
demands of a monitoring program could truly be met. One 
thing I had in mind—other than the dearth of company 
measures of productivity—was the difficulty of expanding 
the public and private base of correlative "atomic" data on 
output, price, man-hours, and so forth. If detailed and in-
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tegrated industry information were available on a "product" 
basis, we could always derive relatively unambiguous output 
and productivity measures therefrom. We could also obtain 
symmetrical, coordinate index numbers of productivity and 
other variables deemed pertinent to a wage-price or income- 
price analysis. Resort would not be necessary to techniques 
of deflation, which commonly involve numerators and 
denominators that do not quite match, that are only obscure 
ly related in structure and content. Such techniques provide 
false comfort by meeting the requirements of verbal algebra; 
but, unfortunately, the operational meaning of an index 
number depends instead on its data content and on a strict 
literal algebra. Besides, when it is difficult even to concep 
tualize the specific "product" of an economic activity (as in 
many service areas), the results of deflation are more 
nebulous than ever.
A second serious statistical conundrum is posed by the fact 
that a monitoring program must be oriented toward the 
future rather than the past. What matters in fighting infla 
tion or its symptoms is what productivity mil be in the 
period to which a wage or price decision applies. The record 
of a recent year or of the past decade is relevant only insofar 
as it forecasts correctly what productivity will be. In a period 
of expected recovery, for example, productivity will surely 
not change as it has in a period of observed recession. In a 
period of rapid growth of output, productivity does not 
move as it does when saturation of a market is approached 
or reached. Even in some of the earliest guideline comments, 
as in the 1958 Economic Report of the President, it was ap 
preciated that productivity prospects are more pertinent than 
productivity history; but history, unfortunately, has become 
the center of concern.
These insuperable data problems—the difficulty of getting 
correlative "atomic" data for all companies, industries, and 
sectors and the difficulty of making reliable productivity
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forecasts for the same entities—should be recognized in the 
design and implementation of monitoring policy and pro 
grams. Statistical compromises, substitutes, and alternatives 
should be devised and interpreted with sufficient sensitivity 
to ideal algebraic requirements and to economic realities.
At this point, I take note of the typical separation of wage 
and price monitoring. In the third-generation program, I 
should like to see closer coordination of the two tasks. If the 
administration of wages has to remain separate from the ad 
ministration of prices, it is still desirable, and it even 
becomes necessary, to estimate the economy-wide implica 
tions of particular adjustments. In principle, at least, the 
input-output tool, identified with the name of Wassily Leon- 
tief and painstakingly developed at the Department of Com 
merce as well as at Harvard, would seem adaptable to the 
purpose. Again in principle, the input-output system could 
even provide a cumulative register of interindustry impacts 
and repercussions as additional wage and price determina 
tions are made.
Another approach to coordination would involve the 
design and construction of hierarchically and laterally con 
sistent index numbers for companies, industries, and higher 
aggregates. The difficulty of obtaining correlative "atomic" 
data, already mentioned, remains a serious practical 
obstacle. By hierarchical consistency, incidentally, I mean 
vertical compatibility—structural compatibility for aggrega 
tion (of companies into industries, etc.). By lateral consisten 
cy, I mean that the multiplicatively-related variables of in 
terest to the wage and price monitors have been treated sym 
metrically, in an algebraically similar manner. I shall say 
more about lateral consistency below.
When wage and price administration is pursued as two 
distinct tasks, two different kinds of productivity seem to be 
of interest—and they should not be confused. The wage ad-
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ministrator inevitably focuses on labor productivity; but the 
price administrator's interest in cost structure leads to all- 
input (i.e., factor and nonfactor) productivity. Of course, if 
all-factor returns are to be monitored, rather than wages 
(and salaries), all-factor productivity has to be used instead 
of labor productivity. It is a mistake to assume that produc 
tivity measures are quantitatively equivalent regardless of 
differences in the scope of the denominator.
It should also be clear that any kind of productivity 
measure can be written in two distinct ways that are 
algebraically equivalent. Each has a "quantity" form—a 
ratio of output to input. Each also has a "price" form—the 
ratio, in the case of labor productivity, of average hourly 
earnings to unit labor cost. An analogous expression holds 
for the measure of all-input productivity. I am aware of the 
administrative convenience of expressing a percentage 
change in productivity approximately as the difference be 
tween percentage changes in the numerator and denomina 
tor; and I am aware that the "price" form may be preferred 
in such usage. Whatever the form, literal algebra remains 
relevant; and it is still true that labor productivity and all- 
input productivity are not interchangeable.
If the problem of data supply did not exist, the two 
monitoring tasks could be coordinated with the aid of an 
index-number system that incorporates all of the variables of 
interest and that treats these variables uniformly. In some of 
my other papers, I have discussed the design of algebraically 
consistent index numbers for variables occurring in a com 
mon context. If sufficiently detailed data were available, one 
could devise, say, homologous Laspeyres indexes for all the 
multiplicatively-related variables. A "small" extra constant 
term could be added to each so that the product of all the in 
dexes satisfies the macroidentity that guided formula design. 
What I have just described is a generalization to more than 
two variables of the index-number system attributed to
74 Productivity & Monitoring (1972:2)
Stuvel. Other multivariable index-number systems, such as 
my generalization of Fisher's "ideal" measure, 4 are logically 
more satisfactory, but they make still heavier data demands.
Simply for the sake of concreteness, I give an idea of the 
content that might be imparted to the Stuvel-type Laspeyres 
indexes. A wage monitor might wish to focus on productivi 
ty, unit labor cost, and average hourly earnings. A price 
monitor might wish to focus on three analogous concepts 
referring to all-factor input. Both, in addition, care about 
prices—and, perhaps, output. The product of all eight 
variables (or reciprocals, as required) is the value of output. 
Accordingly, each Laspeyres measure contains eight terms in 
the numerator and eight in the denominator. When each in 
dex has been adjusted to include the proper additive term, 
the product of all of them is the value index. The system 
treats all the variables symmetrically, and the adjusted 
Laspeyres measures satisfy the proper macroidentity.*
Since data problems do exist, is there not some less de 
manding alternative? Yes. Monitoring could rest on only one 
productivity index (as in the Kennedy-Johnson program) 
and, hence, on a simpler coordinating macroidentity. The 
guidelines for prices and wages (or all incomes) could, for ex 
ample, be administered with the aid of an index-number 
system that is anchored to the value of output and 
distinguishes, say, four (multiplied) variables: prices, pro 
ductivity (labor or all-factor), the reciprocal of average hour 
ly earnings (or the equivalent for all-factor returns), and 
payrolls (or all incomes). I shall not go into various possible 
refinements—such as the matching of net (or gross) output 
with gross (or net) prices in the several index formulas.
4. I.H. Siegel, "Generalized 'Ideal' Index-Number Formula," Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, December 1945, pp. 520-523.
The algebra is shown in I.H. Siegel, "A Common Framework for the Index-Number 
Varieties," 1967 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the 
American Statistical Association, pp. 402-405.
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The search for simpler measures may fruitfully be pressed 
further—toward results that also contain hints for simplify 
ing the monitoring program itself. Specifically, the 
guidelines rules may be cast in terms of production (output) 
rather than productivity. Somewhat less mystery surrounds 
the measurement and interpretation of production, and its 
projection may be contemplated with fewer qualms. Further 
more, since properly-weighted production is additive (from 
firm to firm and industry to industry), an attractive oppor 
tunity for achievement of (approximate) hierarchical con 
sistency is also presented. Weighted production estimates are 
becoming increasingly available for components of the gross 
national product according to industry of origin; and these 
estimates for industries can be matched at the company level 
with much less inhibition than would be experienced in the 
case of productivity measurement. The work of the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce on 
industry output and on implicit deflators can provide con 
siderable guidance. Perhaps, a program of deliberate 
measurement assistance to companies would represent a 
good small public investment for future stabilization efforts 
and other national purposes.
To see how production could replace productivity in the 
monitoring process, let us start with the Kennedy-Johnson 
(and Eisenhower) precept that average hourly earnings (or 
the all-factor analogue) should rise no faster in the private 
economy than labor (or all-factor) productivity. Since the 
earnings and productivity have the same input denominator, 
this criterion is equivalent (according to verbal algebra, and 
can also be made equivalent in terms of literal algebra) to the 
rule that: Payrolls (or all-factor returns) should rise no faster 
than output. This rule, incidentally, also amounts to the 
standard that: An output-weighted index of unit labor cost 
(or of unit all-factor cost) should remain at, or fall below, 
100. If unit labor (or all-factor) cost is assumed to be critical
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to price determination, and if policy tolerates a rise of 2.5 
percent in such cost and price, then the index limit has to be 
set at 102.5 instead of 100.
Going a step further, we may envisage a third-generation 
monitoring system in which companies are asked, in the first 
instance, to steer their courses according to rules relating to 
production, factor-payment, and total-cost statistics for 
their own operations. Preferably, the statistics should repre 
sent projections for a target period (e.g., the next year). 
These are the rules to be followed by each company:
1. Target factor payments should not exceed target output 
weighted by base-period unit factor cost. (In obvious sym 
bols, Iqjfj ^Iqif0.)
2. Target total cost should not exceed target output 
weighted by base-period total cost per unit. (In obvious sym 
bols, Sq^! ^ £qit0.)
The first rule sets a rein on incomes; the second, on total cost 
expressed in "current" dollars. A third inequality, concern 
ing the difference between total cost and total factor 
payments, is implicit in these two. The rules can be adapted 
to reflect a tolerated income increase or price increase—by 
the simple insertion of the appropriate factor on the 
righthand side of the appropriate inequality.
Every company, in short, could be given greater latitude in 
regulating itself according to the guideline criteria establish 
ed for the third-generation surveillance program. Achieve 
ment of the national stabilization objective is not jeopardiz 
ed by decentralized decisionmaking if the standards are ac 
tually followed. The real problem is created by the excep 
tions—by deliberate or tolerated deviations from the 
uniform criteria. When exceptions are unavoidable, the price 
monitor and the incomes monitor should (1) make compati 
ble rulings and (2) look for other instances in which compen-
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satory constraint might be feasible. The algebra of the prob 
lem is much easier for the administrators to follow in terms 
of production aggregates than productivity averages.
Other advantages of shifting the emphasis to production 
could be cited. Much of the difficulty of measuring produc 
tivity really involves production, so explicit attention to 
issues involving the latter concept (e.g., the availability of 
suitable quantity data and the design of suitable deflators) 
may be broadly beneficial. Furthermore, stabilization is only 
one of the continuing or recurrent challenges of the domestic 
scene; and projected output growth can be related more 
naturally than productivity change to the other economic ag 
gregates with which national policy is concerned, such as the 
volume of employment and the supply of money and credit.
IV
To conclude this paper, I briefly restate a few of my points 
without weaving them into a complete "argument." I regard 
a third peacetime monitoring effort as inevitable. Although I 
expect it to have some efficacy, it will need support in the 
form of, say, fiscal "prudence." I hope that the program 
will be nonpermanent, and I prefer that the errors be made in 
the direction of liberal administration. In particular, I 
should welcome the building-in of economic incentives for 
self-enforcement—at least for voluntary restraint of wages 
and salaries. With respect to statistics, I emphasize needs for 
focusing on productivity prospects rather than history and 
for providing frameworks for coordination of income and 
price monitoring. Most important, I propose a switch of em 
phasis from productivity to production in the design of 
monitoring rules. This shift, I believe, offers a key to easier 
and more consistent guideline administration. Furthermore, 
it promises a better route toward strengthening the private 
data base. Improved statistics, featuring production, would
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allow companies to contribute more effectively to the na 
tional stabilization objective and to retain maximum 
freedom for economic decisionmaking.
1968
Wage-Price-Productivity Statistics: 
Old Gaps and New Needs
Information for Future Guidelines: 
An Uncomplacent View
This paper concerns a field of economic policy that is 
heavily laden with statistical interest. It concentrates on the 
disparity between the data and measures that would be re 
quired for the flexible or "liberal" administration of a 
future formal program of wage-price monitoring and the 
data and measures that are likely to be available instead. By 
flexible or liberal administration, we mean the permission of 
wide diversity in company and union decisionmaking. The 
desideratum is: Official tolerance, if not encouragement, of 
something like the present broad private discretion in wage 
and price determination, within the mathematical and com- 
monsense limits imposed by a national aim of aggregate 
noninflationary performance. Although we speak here of 
wage-price monitoring, we do not intend to exclude the alter 
native prospect that nonwage and nonsalary remuneration
This paper presented at the 128th Annual Meeting of the American Statistical Association, 
Pittsburgh, August 21, 1968, was published in Congressional Record, September 11, 1968, 
and also appeared in the 1968 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section 
of the American Statistical Association.
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too will come under regular scrutiny, that a comprehensive 
"incomes policy" will actually be adopted.
Our topic has obvious civic importance but may attract 
only a small fraction of the attention it deserves. Indeed, 
past and contemporary experience suggests that the subject 
may continue to be slighted even by technicians responsible 
for the compilation of data and for the derivation, applica 
tion, and interpretation of measures. In addition to repre 
senting a professional communication, this paper has lessons 
for public officials, legislators, and business and labor ex 
ecutives, all of whom help to make and carry out policy; and 
for journalists, who could serve more effectively in 
educating the larger community by becoming better inform 
ed themselves.
In the discussion that follows it is assumed that:
A. Our nation-state and national economy will survive the 
disintegrative social and political strains which have so 
dramatically become evident.
B. Continual, ever-fuller employment will become a more 
explicit federal aim, emerging as the preferred and most con 
servative route among those tried or promised for the general 
achievement of higher personal incomes and higher living 
scales.
C. Active fiscal policy in support of this extended employ 
ment objective will become incorporated in the national 
style, whatever the political party in power and whatever the 
name by which such policy is called.
D. Accompanying upward pressures on wages and prices 
will demand an institutional counterweight, and this correc 
tive will be provided sooner or later by a formal program of 
wage-price surveillance. A formal program would 
presumably have an explicit statutory basis, pervasive scope, 
and steady application—unlike its predecessor, which was
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born in 1962 and is commonly declared to have died circa 
1966, but seemed in the summer of 1968 only to have been 
sleeping on a tombstone.
The reference to " disparity" in the second sentence of this 
paper provides a clue to the position that is elucidated here. 
An examination of the present state of the public and private 
information supply, of past gains, and of portents does not 
justify confidence that a future formal program of wage- 
price monitoring is bound to be benign. Although the deci 
sion to adopt a policy commonly runs ahead of the social 
stock of data, derived measures, and knowledge, the conduct 
of a policy is critically affected, nevertheless, by the 
availability, compatibility, and diffusion of information. 
Thus, in the absence of an adequate information base, ad 
ministration could well be Procrustean, simplistic, arbitrary, 
uneven, capricious. The total statistical base is now woefully 
inadequate for liberal guideline administration, and it seems 
destined to remain so. Indeed, if the authoritarian potential 
of formal monitoring does not materialize in the future, 
credit will have to be given to factors other than the quantity, 
quality, and distribution of wage-price-productivity infor 
mation. Some possibly compensatory features of the future 
program are specified later.
This judgment goes counter to the impression conveyed by 
ubiquitous and recurrent reports of statistical improvement 
and of continual progress toward greater and even more 
precise economic knowledge. Despite the incremental ad 
vances actually being made all the time in filling various 
advertised gaps in the federal statistical system (and these 
gains and the efforts they entail are not here disparaged), a 
fundamental limitation of the data base for flexible ad 
ministration of wage-price-productivity policy persists. This 
root problem has been obvious throughout the long history 
of index-number construction. Although it is taken for 
granted by most makers and users of measures, it is not sub-
82 Statistical Gaps & Needs (1968:1)
ject, alas, to casual or incidental correction by incremental 
gap-filling progress. The data limitation continually obliges 
the derivation, application, and juxtaposition of indicators 
that may carry an intolerable wrapper of noise around an un- 
distinguishable core of message. As for the private contribu 
tion to our national information resource, companies ob 
viously have great new opportunities to enlist the computer 
in support of diversity in decisionmaking without prejudice 
to national guideline constraints. These opportunities are not 
likely to be exploited effectively or soon enough, however, 
especially in the absence of determined government leader 
ship to improve and enlarge the joint public-private data 
bank for the express purpose of compatible measurement of 
key guideline variables from the national economy down to 
the firm. Significant implementation of this purpose would 
provide an information base that also is better suited for 
solution of tomorrow's urgent measurement prob 
lems—problems yet to be defined.
The inappropriate focus of the informal guideline pro 
gram adopted in 1962 on past productivity trends obscures 
another statistical complication that will have to be faced in 
any serious future effort to restrain the inflationary 
pressures engendered by pursuit of ever-fuller employment. 
Wage criteria should be based on prospects regarding pro 
ductivity and unit labor cost, not on history—and 
forecasting must remain an unreliable art in a society that is 
still mostly open-ended. Unfortunately, the mechanical ex 
trapolation of productivity trends for the whole economy, 
for its parts, and for firms is not the same as making correct 
near-term projections. Furthermore, errors of optimism in 
projection cannot be easily undone; the Moving Finger, hav 
ing writ, cannot be lured back by political piety or 
bureaucratic wit to cancel embedded inflationary excesses.
In short, the outlook for permissiveness in a regime of for 
mal wage-price guidelines is dimmed by the improbability of
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a great leap forward with regard to the volume and sound 
ness of measures and by a need to depend, in any case, upon 
uncertain forecasting. From the statistical standpoint, Pro 
crustean enforcement would appear inevitable, as experience 
with the informal program instituted in 1962 may also hint. 
Because of data problems and conceptual difficulties, 
historical change in guideline variables cannot now be gaug 
ed unequivocally for the majority of industries and industry 
complexes; and, in many important instances, it is not now 
being gauged at all. Furthermore, the informational require 
ment for constructing guideline index numbers that are 
mutually adapted and modularly compatible from the na 
tional economy down to the firm greatly exceeds any 
reasonable prospect of supply. Indeed, an expectation of 
substantial improvement in this direction could well prove a 
silly dream. Furthermore, even if the desired measures were 
miraculously to become computable, the challenge of ac 
curate projection would still have to be met. It appears that 
to live as free men by the numbers under a new dispensation 
of formal guidelines would involve a double miracle—the 
capture not simply of unicorns but of unicorns that fly.
The presentation below of two sets of structurally matched 
index-number formulas that are especially pertinent to flexi 
ble guideline administration makes the staggering informa 
tional requirement very explicit. Each set of formulas, based 
on a common paradigm, deals equitably with all associated 
guideline variables and would permit modularly compatible 
measurement for all levels down to the individual firm. One 
of the two sets, furthermore, could assist in the conduct of 
integrated wage-price and monetary policy—a marriage 
essential to the success of any program for continual con 
tainment of inflationary forces.
Although the two index-number schemes cannot be effec 
tively implemented with the information that now exists or 
that is likely to become available in the visible future, they do
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provide helpful models—standards for practice, for criticism 
and evaluation, and for possible technical improvement. 
They offer criteria for design and analysis of constructible 
compromise measures and for appraisal of available 
measures—the measures that have to be used in conjunction 
with each other for want of better alternatives. They indicate 
desirable directions of data reform and extension, whether 
or not movement along these paths is practicable. They sug 
gest the kinds of test and experimental measures that ought 
to be approximated wherever feasible. Finally, our algebraic 
exercise is relevant, even at the present time, to an undertak 
ing announced in the 1968 Economic Report of the President 
(p. 92): "A new economic tableau that will ultimately pro 
vide comprehensive information on output, labor input, 
price, and productivity by major sectors on a quarterly 
basis."
Incrementalism and the Unpolishable Flaw
The fundamental defect in our public and private informa 
tion system, from the standpoint of measurement for liberal 
guideline administration, is easy to state. It is: The absence 
of coordinated or correlative data on a product or quasi- 
product basis for quantities and prices of outputs, of factor 
inputs, and of inputs derived from other places or time 
periods. By quasi-products, we mean definable components 
of normally identified gross products and services—especial 
ly components that, by virtue of greater homogeneity, are 
more amenable to aggregation. These components, which 
may be called "subproducts" in the case of physical output 
and "activities" in the case of services, correspond to the 
"arcs" of total output cycles. 1
1. The measurement of quasi-products has been proposed and discussed before by I.H. 
Siegel—e.g., in Concepts and Measurement of Production and Productivity, Washington, 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952; and "The Concept of Productive Activity," Journal 
of the American Statistical Association, June 1944, pp. 218-228.
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The flaw in the data base cannot be easily or significantly 
remedied, certainly not by gap-filling here and there. The 
systematic compilation and maintenance of "atomic" cor 
relative data would not only prove an overwhelming task and 
entail prohibitive costs, but it cannot even be pursued very 
far (especially in the case of nonmanufacturing industries) 
without encountering stubborn, perhaps insuperable, con 
ceptual problems. Indeed, the designation of products or 
quasi-products for such service industries as government and 
finance and for such pursuits as research and development is 
a philosophical challenge that most economists and statisti 
cians have become accustomed to shun like a direct glance at 
the Gorgon Medusa.
If coordinated basic data were generally available, it 
would be possible to do two things that are important for 
flexible guideline administration—and much else besides. 
First, structurally matched, or laterally consistent, index 
numbers could be constructed for the guideline variables. 
Second, hierarchically compatible index numbers could be 
constructed for these variables for all levels of aggregation, 
from the national economy down to individual companies. 
Furthermore, more meaningful quarterly or monthly 
measures could be devised; and the quantitative treatment of 
joint or overhead operations, inventory changes, 
multiprocess end-products, nonstandardized output, and 
services in general could be rendered more plausible. The 
measure for each guideline variable would be certain, ac 
cording to its design, to be an internal mean of 
relatives—i.e., a number lying between the minimum and the 
maximum change ratios computed (or computable) for in 
dividual products or quasi-products. The index for any 
higher level of aggregation would also be an internal average 
of the corresponding measures for lower levels. Although in 
dex numbers, or measures purporting to be index numbers, 
are usually interpreted as internal means, the presumption
86 Statistical Gaps & Needs (1968:1)
may not be warranted. Their manner of derivation frequent 
ly renders them conceptually vague and structurally 
nondescript—black boxes filled, perhaps, with black jelly.
As we look about, we may well be impressed, if not 
reassured, by the cheerful acceptance of the chasm between 
desirable and actual information for guideline use. In 
general, it is agreeably assumed that the statistical communi 
ty can and will make do; that ingenuity and cosmetics may be 
substituted indefinitely for coordinated data compiled on a 
product or quasi-product basis; that, once acknowledged, 
the fundamental flaw in the data base may salutarily be ig 
nored. Little curiosity is usually shown regarding the conun 
drums of quasi-product definition and quantification, and 
only occasional enthusiasm is registered for a frontal assault 
on these difficulties. Two decades or more ago, the industry 
and product detail of the biennial and quinquennial Census 
of Manufactures inspired the microdata approach to produc 
tion and productivity measurement. The paucity of building 
blocks was recognized; company surveys were stressed for 
augmentation of the supply, but the difficulty of significant 
further progress within and beyond manufacturing was also 
conceded. In the subsequent era of national accounting (in 
current and constant prices), the illusion has been fostered 
that indirection can generally break the data impasse. Ac 
cording to the new rites, sound statistical edifices may sup 
posedly be erected by a quick and dirty (really, very sanitary) 
application of an algebra of words. It is fashionable, for ex 
ample, to deflate thick or thin veneers of value information 
by more or less relevant, and often scrappy, price indexes. 
This technique does readily yield facades, if not solid 
buildings; and it often simulates measurement for larger 
components of the economy with much less information and 
effort than for smaller components. Strangely, the concep 
tual and structural obscurities of deflated measures and of 
others derived with the benefit of a ceremonial cancellation
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of words help them to circulate like universal coin; they are 
exempt from fine-grain scrutiny and accepted too eagerly for 
all contexts and purposes.
The challenge of liberal guideline administration should 
remind us of the continuing relevancy of the index-number 
chapters of elementary textbooks in economic or business 
statistics. Although latter-day sophistication seems to sanc 
tion routine resort to indirection and to low-grade verbal 
algebra in measurement, we still have to imagine what direct 
attempts with appropriate microdata would yield. Such 
Platonic types ever provide the standards required for ap 
proximation and appraisal. The object of computation, after 
all, is not simply to generate numbers having agreeable labels 
but, rather, to derive adequate and dependable answers. It is 
useful to know the difference between what is done and what 
ought to have been done instead. To bang with a sword upon 
the reflection of the Medusa in the shield of Perseus is not 
the same as slaying her.
The flood of public and private studies and reports offer 
ing wage-price-productivity computations or calling for im 
provements in this general area rarely addresses such fun 
damental matters as the enlargement of the stock of coor 
dinated data and the provision of laterally and hierarchically 
consistent measures. The dominance of incrementalism is as 
clear as it is natural. It is evident from a perusal of represen 
tative contributions to the literature of the past decade or 
so—e.g., a report made in 1957 to the Joint Economic Com 
mittee, The National Economic Accounts of the United 
States (especially Chapter 6); Economic Reports of the Presi 
dent for 1958 and more recent years, including 1968; the 
"Special Analysis" of federal statistics included annually in 
the Budget of the United States Government; the 1962 report 
of the President's Committee to Appraise Employment and 
Unemployment Statistics, Measuring Employment and 
Unemployment; the 1964 report of the Bureau of the Budget
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on Measuring Productivity of Federal Government 
Organizations; and numerous documents issued by the Joint 
Economic Committee, which held hearings and reported in 
1967 on "The Coordination and Integration of Government 
Statistical Programs."
Incremental statistical advance has, of course, left some 
important old gaps unplugged while also not improving our 
capacity to meet today's—or tomorrow's—fundamental 
measurement challenges. In this connection, note should be 
taken of some remarks made by the president of the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) at the end of 1967. 2 
Despite more than a trebling of government expenditures on 
statistical programs in the course of a decade, he observed 
that the outlays still amounted to "not quite one-tenth of 1 
percent of the Federal budget." Despite the technical pro 
gress made in the past, he could still list "better statistics on 
wages, productivity, and unit labor costs" as his "first plea" 
for "needed improvements" in economic measurement. In 
particular, he cited the need for a comprehensive indicator of 
hourly earnings in manufacturing, one that covers all 
employees and includes fringe benefits. He also referred to 
"the inadequacies of current measures of output per 
manhour and of labor costs per unit of output." About such 
measures, which have "highly important uses," he said:
They are needed monthly, they should be com 
prehensive as well as comparable in their coverage, 
and they should also be made available for in 
dividual industries. Progress is being made in some 
of these directions, but the results are scarcely visi 
ble. I believe there is need for a very significant im 
provement here. 3
2. G.H. Moore, "Some Needed Improvements in Economic Statistics," American Statisti 
cian, December 1967, especially p. 29.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
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This statement, of course, has remarkable implications for a 
radical revision of the national data base. The statement 
demands, in effect, a vast commitment to compile cor 
relative information for subproducts and homogeneous ac 
tivities. Such a reorientation of federal statistics, however, 
seems no more likely now than it did, say, when the present 
author explicitly noted the same need in the early 1950s. 4
More recently and in another role, the same president of 
the ASA took oblique cognizance of a persisting defect in 
manufacturing production statistics and of a dubious 
method of measuring manufacturing productivity. The 
statistical defect has been exacerbated during the past 
generation of general broad progress, and the exceptionable 
technique of deriving productivity estimates for manufactur 
ing seems to have become the norm:
The precision of the inferences drawn from 
economic data often depends crucially upon a clear 
understanding of how the data were compiled and 
what they signify. As an example, take the fairly 
common practice of obtaining a current index of 
productivity change by dividing the Federal 
Reserve index of industrial production by the man- 
hours of employment of industrial workers. Unless 
one were aware that the compilers estimate a very 
large fraction of the production index from man- 
hours of employment adjusted by extrapolated 
estimates of change in output per man-hour, one 
would not realize that the computation was to a 
considerable degree simply reproducing the 
previous extrapolations. Nor would one be con-
4. Siegel, Concepts and Measurement, p. 99.
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cerned to find out to what extent one's conclusions 
were affected by this circumstance. 5
This quotation refers, in a veiled manner, to the fundamen 
tal data flaw that creates a permanent quasi-gap in the main 
index of industrial production and leads to a most uncritical 
use of low-grade verbal algebra in productivity measure 
ment. It recalls more direct—and ineffectual—allusions 
made many times during the past two or three decades to the 
same regrettable defect of the industrial production index. 6
Identities for Measurement 
and Administration7
A central place in guideline theory and practice must be 
reserved for verbal or accounting identities. Such defini 
tional statements, especially multiplicative ones, provide 
useful frameworks for the design of mutually adapted for-
5. G.H. Moore, "Toward Precision in Economic Knowledge," in Toward Improved 
Economic and Social Measurement: Forty-Eighth Annual Report, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, New York, June 1968, pp. 16-17.
6. See, for example, Siegel, "The Concept of Productive Activity" (footnote 1), pp. 
227-228; and W.D. Evans and I.H. Siegel, "The Meaning of Productivity Indexes," Jour 
nal of the American Statistical Association, March 1942, especially pp. 109-110. In "Pro 
gress and Problems of Physical Output Measurement," an unpublished half-century review 
paper presented by Siegel at the 1950 meeting of the American Statistical Association, the 
following sentence appears: "The Federal Reserve index structure was kept standing [dur 
ing World War II] by feats of statistical carpentry which otherwise had some dubious 
aspects—like the use of man-hour series, generally with pseudo-productivity adjustments, 
for Government manufacturing facilities and for industries accounting for two-fifths of the 
private manufacturing aggregate in the prewar period."
7. This section derives from other writings of the present author—e.g., Concepts and 
Measurement; "On the Design of Consistent Output and Input Indexes for Productivity 
Measurement," in Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), pp. 23-41; "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index Numbers," 
1965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American 
Statistical Association, pp. 369-372; and Aggregation and Averaging (Kalamazoo: The 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, May 1968).
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mulas to represent the guideline variables, for a 
discriminating choice among available measures, and for a 
distinction between mere verbal algebra and the more 
rigorous requirements of literal algebra. By contributing to 
an appreciation of the difference between micromeasure- 
ment and macromeasurement, they make clear that latitude 
exists for discretion in guideline administration—that the 
prescription of macroconstraints on aggregate behavior does 
not preclude microflexibility, as though the whole economy 
were simply one firm making one product.
At the atomic level, identities are unambiguously 
translatable into numbers; but, for higher levels, the cor 
respondence between words or symbols and the magnitudes 
representing them has to be contrived. Identities, being 
definitions or tautologies, are necessarily true for the 
associated variables of individual products or subproducts. 
When we deal with combinations of products or sub- 
products, however, the congruence of words and numbers 
does not automatically obtain. Thus, verbal identities have 
to be made or kept numerically true for firms, industries, 
and higher levels of aggregation; and two general procedures 
are available for so doing, one of which is far superior to the 
other according to the viewpoint of this paper.
The less desirable method of assuring correspondence be 
tween words and numbers is the one frequently practiced in 
index-number work. "Any old" measures are accepted for 
all but one of the macrovariables associated in an identity, 
and the remaining magnitude is determined residually (e.g., 
by deflation, multiplication, addition, or subtraction). The 
nature of this residual measure depends entirely on the con 
tent and structure of its companions; and gilt may not be ac 
quired by such association. The magnitude may be volatile 
and spurious; among other limitations, it may lie outside the 
range of the relatives for products or subproducts.
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The second approach to congruence is preferable in princi 
ple but would require a fundamental overhaul of the data 
base. It takes direct account of the requirements of literal 
algebra as a matter of design. It specifies the forms and in 
gredients of the measures of the jointly considered variables 
and assures that these variables are treated equitably. It may 
also assure that the index-number formulas register changes 
intermediate in magnitude between the minimum and max 
imum relatives for individual products or subproducts; and 
that the numerical results obtainable directly are also ob 
tainable by such indirect techniques as deflation.
To give concreteness to these remarks and to provide a 
corridor to the final sections of this paper, we consider three 
examples pertinent to guideline measurement and ad 
ministration. The first identity is the familiar one connecting 
hourly compensation, unit labor cost, and productivity:
Average hourly remunerations Unit labor cost X 
Output per man-hour.
When hourly remuneration rises more rapidly than man- 
hour productivity, unit labor cost necessarily rises too, and 
this increase exerts an upward pressure on prices. But the 
pressure is not necessarily translated into a price in 
crease—for any firm or for the whole economy. Whether or 
not such translation occurs is a proper matter for observa 
tion or econometric inquiry. Certainly, the translation 
should not be forced by a guideline interpretation that insists 
on the removal of all companies from the ingenious world in 
which they actually live to a simplistic Cobb-Douglas model.
If we are not satisfied to confine attention to unit labor 
cost or if we do not regard it as properly determinative of 
price change, we may use an identity that brings price ex 
plicitly into the picture. Doing so also requires the introduc-
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tion of a term representing the share of wages in value added 
(or total factor income):
Average hourly_ Payroll 
remuneration Value added
Price X Output per man-hour.
This expression may be of greater administrative and 
analytic interest, but it would also require more information.
Returning to the first identity above, we may multiply 
both sides by man-hours and arrive at a statement that still 
focuses attention on unit labor cost, but as the link between 
two aggregates, total payroll and total output:
Payroll =Unit labor cost X Output.
This version has certain advantages over the original with 
respect to measurement and administration. It is also useful 
in joining growth and fiscal policies to monetary policy—a 
coordination greatly to be desired for price stabilization. If 
constant unit labor cost in the economy at large is deemed to 
be critical for price stability, the new statement suggests that 
total payroll should not be allowed to rise more rapidly than 
total output. According to the quantity theory of money and 
various proposals for translating this theory into practice, 8 
the increase in the supply of money and credit should be 
reasonably related to the prospect for output. Consequently, 
the joint policy standard may be stated thus: The payroll 
total should not be allowed to rise faster in the whole 
economy than aggregate net output, which in turn should 
govern the rate of increase in money and credit.
Four observations are in order:
A. Since the three verbal relations for guideline variables 
are atomic definitions that are to be preserved at higher
8. See, for example, Standards for Guiding Monetary Action, Joint Economic Committee, 
U.S. Congress (Washington: 1968).
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levels of aggregation, they need to be viewed as truisms not 
subject to negotiation. Thus, if we really mean to preserve 
price stability through constancy of unit labor cost, we are 
not at liberty to sweeten an identity with a cost-of-living ad 
justment. An identity cannot be bribed in the interest of 
equity. This remark is not a value judgment; it does not pro 
pose that equity should be subordinated politically to literal 
price stability.
B. For liberal guideline administration, it is necessary to 
concede that many different frequency distributions, many 
different patterns of company (and union) behavior, are 
compatible with stability of average unit labor cost and of 
the price level. Indeed, if every company makes a wage ad 
justment reflecting its own productivity outlook, a correctly 
projected national productivity increase could still be 
respected. That is, no upward pressure on the price level 
need arise from labor payments, a fact easily seen from the 
third identity, which features aggregates.
This preference for microflexibility within the limits of the 
macroalgebra is not endorsed by the Council of Economic 
Advisers, which asserted in the 1968 Economic Report (p. 
124):
. . . that price stability can be achieved and main 
tained only to the extent: (1) that increases in hour 
ly compensation generally conform to the average 
economywide improvement of output per man- 
hour; and (2) that changes in prices in individual 
sectors generally conform to changes in unit labor 
costs in those sectors.
These are not really necessary, or unique, conditions for 
price stability. Besides, Procrustean administration along 
these lines would not conduce to "efficient allocation of 
resources," which the Council also seeks through a guideline 
program (p. 120).
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C. To facilitate flexible administration of guidelines, to 
accommodate diversity in company (and union) behavior 
(even in the absence of ideal statistics), the future formal 
program of wage-price surveillance might incorporate cer 
tain noncoercive features for dampening inflationary ex 
uberance in the first place. Thus, the writer has proposed 
elsewhere that non-negotiable "wage-deferment bonds" of 
guaranteed purchasing power be issued to workers accepting 
less than the productivity increase set as a national criterion. 
Furthermore, syndical arrangements by government with 
labor and business might stipulate avoidance of speculative 
wage and price adjustments in consideration of the economic 
stability afforded by active fiscal policy. The coordination of 
active fiscal policy with "responsible" monetary policy 
would reinforce this argument. Again, as in the most recent 
steel industry confrontation (August 1968), the federal 
government might act energetically and more consistently as 
a self-interested monopsonist, rather than as a coercive 
public authority. Finally, an important role must be reserved 
to education of the nation with regard to guideline relation 
ships, even though such education may nowadays be derided 
as exhortation, earstroking, or macropreachment.
D. A shift of emphasis in guideline administration to pros 
pective (rather than past or recent) changes in productivity 
would require no alteration, of course, of the guideline iden 
tities. The effectiveness and the probable flexibility of ad 
ministration, however, would be affected by the ability of 
appropriate officials to make reliable national productivity 
forecasts.
Matched Index-Number Formulas: 
Wages, Prices, and Productivity
The conversion of multiplicative verbal identities into 
literal algebra is straightforward. The second of the three ex-
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pressions presented in the preceding section,
Average hourly = Payroll 
remuneration Value added
Price X Output per man-hour.
will now be developed into several variant sets of matched 
index-number formulas, and these formulas will be combin 
ed into alternative unique sets. 9
First, we rewrite the statement in symbols. Thus, we start 
with E=R* P-TT, where the meaning of the capital letters is 
obvious.
The next step is to cast this identity into a macrotruism for 
aggregative index numbers, the numerators and 
denominat9rs of which have the standard form, 2r/?7r, 
when written without time subscripts (i.e., without 0 for the 
base period and 1 for any other period). For E, we have a 
unique expression, 2 rjpj irr 1 /^Lr0p0 'rr 0 which may be 
displayed more conveniently in terms of the time subscripts 
as lll/OOO. For R, P, TT , however, we do not have unique 
measures, or even one set of measures. Indeed, six different 
sets of formulas satisfy the requirements of both verbal and 
literal algebra: m m QU
000 ~~ Oil 001 000 
111 010 Oil









9. The method here employed is discussed at greater length by I.H. Siegel, "A Common 
Framework for the Index-Number Varieties," 1967 Proceedings of the Business and 
Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association, pp. 402-405.
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Looking down each column at the right, we see that four 
distinct aggregative indexes exist for R, for P, and for TT 
Two of the four are Laspeyres and Paasche analogues, and 
each of these two occurs twice; the remaining two measures 
might be called "intermediate" varieties, since they have 
weights relating to the periods 0 and 1.
How can we harmonize the six variant sets of measures? 
One way, which is especially attractive, is to take the sixth 
root of both sides of the identities. This method treats the 
macrovariables symmetrically. Besides, the result for each 
macrovariable is a geometric mean—a generalized Fisher 
ideal index. 10 Since we can make each aggregative index an 
internal mean of relatives (by restricting it to positive terms 
only), the generalized index for each macrovariable is 
necessarily an internal mean also.
Other modes of harmonization are less satisfactory; for, 
although they preserve symmetry, they can lead to external 
means for the macrovariables. Thus, a second way to adjust 
begins with the Laspeyres or Paasche variety for each 
macrovariable and adds the same unknown constant to it; 
this constant is then determined from the identity binding all 
the macrovariables. The result for each macrovariable turns 
out to be a generalized Stuvel index. 11 A third way also 
begins with the Laspeyres or Paasche "kernel" for each 
macrovariable, but the unknown constant is a multiplier in 
stead. Still another adjustment process involves raising the 
selected kernel indexes to a constant power.
Now, we give greater specificity to the symbols. For each 
product or quasi-product, we suppose that e, r, and TT refer to 
several kinds of workers having different hourly rates; that 
output is measured net in a value-added sense; that price is
10. I.H. Siegel, "The Generalized 'Ideal' Index-Number Formula," Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, December 1945, pp. 520-523.
11. Siegel, "Common Framework for the Index-Number Varieties."
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measured gross; and that more than one variety of nonfactor 
input, each having a distinct price, has to be subtracted from 
gross output. Stripped of time subscripts, the prototype ex 





The letter S designates a sum of items corresponding to a 
product or quasi-product; it is to be distinguished from £ , 
which is used for a grand total. The symbol m stands for 
man-hours, q for a gross product, p for a gross price, Q for a 
nonfactor input, and P for a corresponding nonfactor price. 
All the terms corresponding to r, /?, and IT are normally 
positive.
Instead of taking output as net and price as gross, we may 
switch these two adjectives and make appropriate ad 
justments in the prototype aggregate. We should note, in this 
connection, that, for each product or quasi-product, total 
value added may be written not only as
p (q- SPQ\ but also as q (p- SP® \ 
\ P I \ q I
Four additional points merit mention as we bring this sec 
tion to a close:
A. The measure of net product implicit in the index system 
described two paragraphs earlier resembles, but is not the 
same as, that identified with the names of Fabricant and 
Geary (and, apparently, with the names of Svennilson and 
R. Wilson, too). Indeed, our implicit measure of net product 
requires less information; it involves, not so-called "double 
deflation," but deflation by gross price only.
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B. An output or productivity measure emerging from 
three-variable multiplication is more complex than, and need 
not show the same numerical changes as, the two-variable 
formula developed at the WPA National Research Project12 
in the 1930s and later used for guiding computations of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
C. Any change of terms in a verbal identity leads to a dif 
ferent prototype sum. The magnitudes shown by variant 
measures for a particular macrovariable can be affected 
since a change of terms amounts to a change in weighting 
pattern.
D. The amount of coordinate information required for 
each product or quasi-product exceeds the usual supply, as 
this paper has noted throughout.
Matched Index-Number Formulas: 
Unit Labor Cost
Use of a simpler identity,
Payroll=Unit labor cost X Output,
as a framework for guideline measurement and administra 
tion places a lighter load on the base of coordinated data. It 
leads to two variant sets of expressions for the 
microvariables. The payroll index on the left is again assum 
ed to be fixed; and, for each macrovariable on the right, 
Paasche and Laspeyres varieties emerge. The geometric 
mean of the two variant sets yields Fisher's ideal indexes for 
unit labor cost and output.
We may write the verbal identity in symbols as W=C • Z 
and proceed as before to obtain two sets of structurally ar-
12. H. Magdoff, I.H. Siegel, and M.B. Davis, Production, Employment, and Productivity 
in 59 Manufacturing Industries, 1919-36, WPA National Research Project, Philadelphia, 
May 1939.
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ticulated formulas. The prototype aggregate is Icz, and the 
invariant payroll index is Xcz/ 2c= 11/00.
In particular, we may specify that total output is to be 
measured net; and that all the indexes are to be "condensed" 
expressions consistent with the more complex formulas 
derived in the preceding section. The prototype sum, without 
subscripts, is
,_ SPQ\
which is obviously equivalent to
Such consistent formulas, linking two identities, would be 
especially relevant to efforts to coordinate fiscal policy and 
monetary policy.
Of course, other identities involving unit labor cost may be 
adopted as frameworks for the derivation of matched for 
mulas pertinent to guideline administration. For example, 
we may break output into the product of productivity and 
man-hours and derive another identity,
Payroll=Unit labor cost X Output per man-hour X 
Man-hours,
that requires a three-variable prototype aggregate. 
Babel, Yes; But Clamor?
This paper has focused on the inadequacy of the present 
and prospective supply of data and measures for the liberal 
administration of a future formal guideline program. 
Whatever the condition of the statistical base, continual, 
pervasive, and regular wage-price surveillance is likely to be
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adopted; and, if Procrustean or authoritarian administration 
proves avoidable, credit will presumably have to go to 
nonstatistical features of the monitoring system.
Liberal guideline administration would be decisively 
favored by the availability of projections of: (1) laterally ar 
ticulated index numbers for all guideline variables that are 
also (2) modularly compatible for all economic levels down 
to the individual firm. Such measures are easy to design 
within the frameworks of verbal or accounting identities 
especially appropriate to particular settings. Two distinct 
sets of formulas are illustrated in this paper; and, since 
variant subsets can always be harmonized, all the guideline 
variables may be treated equitably. The existence of com 
pany measures consistent with indexes for higher levels of 
aggregation would allow wide variation in the behavior of 
firms without prejudice to attainment of the macrocondi- 
tions set for noninflationary national performance.
The measures just described, however, are not implemen- 
table with the kind of information now at hand. They re 
quire the development and maintenance of a vast base of 
coordinated atomic data for products and quasi-products; 
and accomplishment of this task would not only prove pro 
hibitively expensive but also be impeded by formidable con 
ceptual and technical difficulties. Even if the data problem 
could be resolved successfully, another nasty challenge, only 
hinted in the preceding paragraph, would have to be met: the 
reasonably correct projection of guideline indexes at all 
economic levels (since prospects are more pertinent than 
history to any serious effort of wage-price stabilization).
Although the existing information system is always being 
improved, it cannot now provide, and should not be ex 
pected routinely in the future to provide, voluminous cor 
relative data compiled on a product or quasi-product basis. 
Companies should be encouraged to develop such data with
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the aid of the electronic data-processing equipment to which 
they nowadays have easy access; but any progress toward an 
articulated national system depends critically upon determin 
ed federal leadership. Advances normally made in the supply 
of published statistics are incremental, rather than fun 
damental; the typical gap-filling improvement does not in 
cidentally augment the supply of atomic data capable of 
combination and recombination in alternative ways to meet 
the recognized problems of today and the problems of 
tomorrow that are yet to be defined. Indeed, only correlative 
atomic data are truly "general-purpose'*; the index numbers 
of output, productivity, wages, and prices that are often call 
ed "general-purpose" are misnamed although their pro 
liferation and strengthening should ever be welcomed. Only 
a vast supply of coordinated atomic information would per 
mit the computation of structurally matched index numbers 
appropriate to particular contexts and uses. In the absence of 
such data, the index numbers that have to be used may yield 
results that are not altogether satisfactory; they can always 
meet the low-grade requirements of verbal algebra, but the 
demands of literal algebra are more exacting, and the risk of 
confusing noise with message is great.
We conclude with a sentence that could have served at the 
beginning as leitmotiv. Although it conies from a paper 
presented at a Conference on Research in Income and 
Wealth in October 1958, it is still timely. Early that year, the 
Economic Report of the President helped to dampen the en 
thusiasm that was building up in the business community for 
the official establishment of a numerical beacon that might 
help to moderate wage demands. The Report made its con 
tribution by phrasing the productivity criterion for noninfla- 
tionary wage increase in terms of prospects (forecasting was 
then regarded with more of the skepticism it still deserves); 
and by including an appendix that dwelt on weaknesses of 
productivity statistics and that offered two private-sector
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measures not quite in accord with each other. Later, 
however, in 1962, a numerical beacon was established—a 
light that failed. Now, as we contemplate a more formal 
guideline program, the sentence of 1958 still has something 
to say to all who care about flexible administration:
So crude are existing quantitative tools compared 
to the ones required that clamor for more detailed 
and more complete basic statistics would surely 
seem as appropriate as the babel of diagnosis and 
prescription heard throughout the land. 13
13. See Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement, p. 38.

1968
The Kerner Commission Report 
and Economic Policy
Parti
Implications of the Kerner Commission Report 
for Economic Policy
This statement, organized around three heads, considers 
some of the remarks, findings, and recommendations of the 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (the Kerner Report) in the light of the Joint 
Economic Committee's letter of invitation. The points of 
departure for my first two sections are the two sentences in 
the Report that refer most explicitly to the Employment Act 
of 1946; these sentences were cited, though not quoted 
literally, in the Committee's letter. Following the Commit 
tee's lead in one other respect, I have used the commercial 
edition of the Report, energetic promotion of which seems to 
have relegated the handsomer but tardier official version to 
obscurity.
At the outset, I should admit to a certain vacillation be 
tween two views of the future in the preparation of this state-
Prepared statement accompanying oral testimony of June 4, 1968, before the Joint 
Economic Committee.
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ment. The first view, which it is natural to assume and 
prefer, is that the established order will prove adequate to 
the stern challenges impending at home and in the interna 
tional arena. Domestically, according to this view, the task, 
say, of greatly improving the economic and social status of 
racial minorities will be resolved more or less satisfactorily, 
in good enough time. The stresses will be accommodated 
with flexibility and resilience, and the needed adjustments 
made without essential impairment of the viability of the 
Republic. On the contrary, the foundation of popular sup 
port would even be strengthened. This is the vision that 
animates the Kerner Report: "to make good the promises of 
American democracy to all citizens—urban and rural, white 
and black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every 
minority group" (page 2).
A grim alternative possibility is an extensive breakdown of 
the sense of community—which would, among other things, 
prevent balanced pursuit of national objectives at home and 
abroad. Symptoms pointing to breakdown include not only 
the flight to suburbs and racial disorders but also outbreaks 
on the campuses, public-service strikes, and occasional 
violence in labor-management disputes. If the use of "focus 
ed rage" becomes a pervasive practice, the functionality of 
the nation-state and the national economy would be hobbled 
drastically. Even if not pervasive but systematic, the practice 
could introduce significant duress and distortion into the 
legislative process, the administration of laws, and the 
allocation of federal funds.
Meaning and Future of the Employment Act
The Commission's first reference to the Employment Act 
represents the usual sort of simplistic paraphrase, rather 
than a faithful or studied interpretation, of the 109 words 1
1. I have counted "self-employment" as one word.
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constituting the single sentence of Section 2, the Declaration 
of Policy. The Commission states:
In the Employment Act of 1946, the United States 
set a national goal of a useful job at a reasonable 
wage for all those who wish to work. 2
The Declaration, however, actually says much more than 
this, and also much less. If it did not, it could not have gain 
ed impressive bipartisan support in 1946, and it might not 
since have proved so flexible for accommodating greatly dif 
ferent theories and styles of implementation:
The tortured negotiated sentence of Section 2 cautiously 
circumscribes both the nature and extent of the federal com 
mitment. It does not even mention "full employment," but 
refers to "maximum employment." It does not obligate the 
federal government to offer, provide, or guarantee jobs. It 
says nothing at all about "a reasonable wage," contrary to 
the Commission's assertion. It does not presume to speak for 
"the United States" or "to set a national goal" for jobs 
without regard to the prerogatives and duties of the private 
sector and of the other layers of government. It does not 
consider employment as an isolated economic category, and 
it acknowledges the coexistence of other federal duties. It 
declares, in short, this "continuing policy and 
responsibility": With proper attention to other prescribed 
federal functions and to customary private and nonfederal 
governmental roles, the federal government is committed 
(1) to contribute to "conditions under which there will be af 
forded useful employment opportunities, including self- 
employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work" 
and (2) "to promote maximum employment, production, 
and purchasing power."
2. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1968), p. 414.
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A return, from time to time, to the language maze of Sec 
tion 2 would supply a wholesome reminder that the Act 
serves better as a potential master framework for coor 
dinating public and private economic policy than as an ab 
solute, unequivocal federal pledge to maximize employment. 
Despite differences in circumstances and emphasis, the 
various Councils of Economic Advisers have sought, or have 
been forced to discover, more or less balanced blends of 
economic objectives. Indeed, a Council has to assume, or is 
soon obliged to acknowledge, the curvature of the economic 
space in which we live. Exclusive or zealous concentration on 
maximum employment, for example, would soon lead to 
troublesome readings in some other economic dimensions, 
such as prices and the international balance of payments. 
Pursuit instead of, say, a good record for price stability 
might too soon entail an intolerably high unemployment 
rate.
A cursory review of the Economic Reports of the various 
presidents makes it clear that the legislative charter has, in 
deed, been broadly construed. In his valedictory Report, 
President Truman listed three purposes of the Employment 
Act, the first of which was to provide a framework for public 
and private collaboration toward common economic ends. 
The other two were also more general than employment 
maximization—"to prevent depressions" and to signify a 
national resolve to maintain "a full and growing 
economy." 3
The Reports of the Eisenhower years that followed 
reflected a keen and persistent concern for the stabilization 
of prices and international payments. In the valedictory 
Eisenhower Report, as in the penultimate one, it was even 
proposed that the Employment Act be amended "to make
3. Economic Report of the President, January 1953, pp. 8-11.
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reasonable price stability an explicit goal of national 
economic policy." 4
The Kennedy-Johnson era has seen a daring test of the 
range of plausible combinations of readings on the primary 
economic gauges. The systemic tools of fiscal and monetary 
policy have been used very actively for the encouragement of 
growth as the universal solvent of unemployment and other 
ills. (Growth also brings new problems, of course; and its 
failure to cure the stubborn residual ailments that it more 
fully exposes may complicate these ailments by depressing 
the patient—and his friends and relatives. I return to this 
matter in the next section.) Specific "structural" remedies 
were also applied to unemployment; and, by exhortation of 
labor and management to live according to the productivity 
principle, an attempt was made to extend the base of policy 
maneuver provided by the production-cost stability inherited 
from the late Eisenhower years. (The introduction in 1963 of 
an annual Manpower Report of the President, compatible 
with the Economic Report, illustrates the interest in com 
plementary and coordinated structural attacks on 
joblessness.) Activism and the expanding impact of Vietnam 
hostilities have finally produced impressive distortions in 
commodity and money prices and international payments; 
and the 1968 Report, not so cocky as its predecessors, starkly 
repeats the lesson of inevitable interdependence of the major 
economic variables.
If a broad construction of the Act remains generally ac 
ceptable in the coming years, what next evolutionary steps
4. Ibid., January 1961, p. 67. Unofficial evidence of the uneasiness felt with regard to the 
balance of payments in the late Eisenhower years is provided by the following exhibit, a 
classical haiku shared at the time with my colleagues on the staff of the Council of 
Economic Advisers:
While I sing and splash
In my scented bubble-bath,
Who tugs the golden plug?
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seem natural? The antecedent clause echoes my earlier com 
ment on the threats of parochialization and fragmentation of 
our society, or worse; but it also anticipates that coordinated 
national economic policy will remain pursuable. Given such 
a resolution of the strains already evident, we may project a 
more determined transition from a "mixed" economy 
toward a "monitored'* one, in which "responsible" 
behavior will be increasingly demanded of individuals and 
groups wielding strategic economic power. One avenue of 
development is the reinstitution of guidelines—but 
guidelines that take account of productivity prospects in 
stead of past trends.
A second direction of plausible evolution is the social con 
straint of private power to set wages and set prices. Syndical 
arrangements of the federal government with management 
and labor organizations offer one such approach; these ar 
rangements could be rationalized on the ground that active 
governmental policy in behalf of growth and sustained de 
mand diminishes the risk element in economic outlook and 
accordingly warrants diminution of speculative wage and 
price increases. Perhaps, something like "wage-deferment 
bonds," which I have proposed elsewhere, will one day find 
favor; the idea would be to protect workers who accept wage 
increases within guideline limits against the ravages of infla 
tion attributable to less "responsible" decisionmakers, in 
cluding government.
A third indicated direction is the harmonization of the 
older Federal Reserve Act with the newer Employment Act. 
A common interface for policy becomes evident when the 
guideline criterion is restated in terms of aggregate output 
and payrolls (or total incomes). That is, the supply of money 
and credit should bear some reasonable relationship to the 
volume of output, which in turn provides a governor for 
noninflationary total wage (or income) payments.
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That pressures for emergency resolution of stubborn 
residual problems of unemployment will intensify is in 
dicated not only by violent actions and by the general tenor 
of the Kerner Report but also by the findings of two other 
advisory bodies cited therein. These bodies, engaging in 
casual pontification, first misstate the import of the Employ 
ment Act and then propose concentration on the provision 
of jobs for particular segments of the population. It is 
desirable, however, to continue construction of the Act as a 
broad-spectrum charter for the balanced pursuit of 
economic policy, with a heavy accent on employment. The 
Act should not be used as a mandate for crash programs 
relating to jobs. The primary task of resolving, say, hard 
core unemployment in urban centers should be left to new 
special-purpose laws and to the more determined administra 
tion of existing special-purpose laws. Successful implementa 
tion of the Employment Act can, of course, provide a 
favorable setting for such governmental endeavors.
The summary volume issued in February 1966 by the Na 
tional Commission on Technology, Automation, and 
Economic Progress illustrates the danger of casual pontifica 
tion, especially when good channels of public communica 
tion are available. In advocating federal sponsorship of 
"public-service employment," a proposal echoed by the 
Kerner Commission, the Technology Commission asserted 
that "we take seriously the commitment of the Employment 
Act of 1946 to provide * useful employment opportunities for 
all those able, willing, and seeking to work.' " Words such 
as "provide" and "promises" certainly go far beyond the 
description of the federal job role written into the Act; and 
the term "recommitting" is gratuitous or disingenuous. 5
5. Technology and the American Economy, Vol. I, February 1966, pp. 35, 37. The quota 
tion from the Act on page 35 incorrectly includes the word "all"; the one on page 37 incor 
rectly includes the words "all of."
In addition to the notion of "recommitment," we find frequent reference in both 
popular and technical literature to the "Full Employment Act of 1946"—a misnomer. Both
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The second body cited by, and obviously having some in 
fluence on, the Kerner Report is the President's National 
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty. Findings issued in 
September 1967 recommend "that the Federal Government 
take more vigorous action to reach the goals of the Employ 
ment Act of 1946." This recommendation, strangely, is 
followed by a rare verbatim reproduction of the Declaration 
of Policy, which the Rural Poverty Commission "endorses" 
without any printed evidence of an actual reading. After 
stating that the "goals" of the Act "have not yet been reach 
ed" (inasmuch as "millions of Americans are unemployed or 
underemployed," even in the absence of recession), the 
Rural Poverty Commission makes this remarkable proposal:
The Federal Government, in cooperation with the 
States, should initiate comprehensive social plan 
ning, setting forth concrete goals to be attained by 
specified target dates.
Indeed,
It should be definite public policy to reduce the na 
tional unemployment rate from its current level 
near 4 percent to the lowest possible fractional rate 
of unemployment, as rapidly as feasible.
Brave and sage exhortation is then given to show the atten 
dant difficulties of such a program. Without directly criticiz 
ing the Council of Economic Advisers, this prestigious body 
comprised essentially of noneconomists advises that 
"monetary and fiscal policies must be used in a timely man 
ner," that "recession must be avoided," that "excessive in 
flation should also be avoided," and that "a more equitable 
and humane economic policy must be achieved." 6
of these common errors are repeated in a recent "Call to Americans of Goodwill" that 
demands of the Congress, among other things, "immediate creation of at least one million 
socially useful career jobs in public service" (New York Times, June 3, 1968).
6. On this paragraph, see The People Left Behind, A Report by the President's National 
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty (Washington: September 1967), pp. 18-19.
[On] Kerner Report (1968:2) 113
In concluding this section, I cite another seemingly 
authoritative statement that tends to encourage 
misunderstanding of the Act, to support its conversion from 
a comprehensive framework for economic policy into a mere 
basis for extreme unemployment proposals. At a meeting in 
December 1967, the Executive Director of the Rural Poverty 
Commission said:
The Commission calls upon the Federal Govern 
ment to fulfill literally the language of the Employ 
ment Act of 1946. Specifically, the Commission 
recommends that the U.S. Government stand ready 
to provide jobs at the national minimum wage to 
every unemployed person willing and able to 
work. 7
Contrary to the implication of the first quoted sentence, a 
"literal" implementation of the Declaration of Policy would 
necessarily be balanced and hedged, rather than simplistic 
and misleadingly "straightforward." Furthermore, the 
recommendation contained in the second quoted sentence is 
offered as though it logically follows from a supposedly cor 
rect reinterpretation of the Declaration. Even in the Rural 
Poverty Commission's report, however, this recommenda 
tion (on "guaranteed employment") is separate from the 
recommendation concerning "vigorous" enforcement of the 
Employment Act, mentioned in our preceding paragraph. 8
Has the Employment Act Failed?
The second sentence in the Kerner Report that refers to the 
Employment Act also deserves comment. Coupling the Act
7. National Growth and Its Distribution, Report of a Symposium on "Communities of 
Tomorrow," December 11-12, 1967, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington: April 
1968), p. 45.
8. See the third recommendation of the Commission on Rural Poverty in People Left 
Behind, p. 19.
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with federal measures explicitly referring to manpower im 
provement, the sentence renders an unduly pessimistic ver 
dict:
Despite these [federal] efforts [at manpower 
development and training], and despite sustained 
general economic prosperity and growing skill 
demands of automated industry, the goal of full 
employment has become increasingly hard to at 
tain. 9
This evaluation is not warranted by facts presented in the 
Kerner Report and by other available statistics. Actually, 
substantial advances in employment levels and substantial 
reductions in unemployment rates have been recorded in re 
cent years in spite of the large numbers of new labor force 
entrants, the sizable rural Negro inmigration into the cities, 
extensive industrial relocation and merger, and changes in 
productivity, technology, and tastes. Nonwhites, further 
more, have shared in the improvement although their 
economic situation is still generally desperate.
The statistics cited by the Commission after the sentence 
quoted above refer to current status, rather than to time 
trends. They show national unemployment at about 2 
million (the correct figure is somewhat larger), underemploy 
ment at about 10 million, hard-core unemployment in the 
central cities at 500,000, and unemployment rates among 
younger slum residents at several times the national percen 
tage for the entire labor force.
These and other status figures cited elsewhere in the 
Kerner Report cannot prove that "the goal of full employ 
ment" imputed to the Act "has become increasingly hard to 
attain." However "maximum" or "full" employment is 
defined, the implicit unemployment target must remain well
9. Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 414.
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above zero percent—as high, perhaps, as 3 percent, repre 
senting about 2.35 million of the persons in the current 
civilian labor force. The persistence of such numbers seems 
almost inevitable for an economic order like ours. Much of 
this unemployment is transitional and may not require heroic 
or new remedial measures. Public policy, on the other hand, 
does not dismiss a "small" residual unemployment percen 
tage as inconsequential. It has also recognized increasingly 
that the concentration of unemployment according to race, 
sex, age, or location merits attention even if the group af 
fected is not sizable.
Figures that do show economic improvement over time for 
nonwhites are scattered throughout the Kerner Report. On 
page 253, for example, it is observed that "unemployment 
rates among Negroes have declined from a postwar high of 
12.6 percent in 1958 to 8.2 percent in 1967." In the same 
place, an important status figure is mentioned: "Among 
married Negro men, the unemployment rate for 1967 is 3.2 
percent." (If these were stabler times, one might op 
timistically observe that this was the rate for all married 
males in the labor force in 1963, and that the rate for the lat 
ter has since fallen to about 1.6 percent.) On page 282, it is 
noted that "the proportion of nonwhites employed in white- 
collar, technical, and professional jobs has risen from 10.2 
percent in 1950 to 20.8 percent in 1966, and the proportion 
attending college has risen an equal amount." In the same 
place, mention is made of the growth of a Negro middle 
class—but only as an additional irritant, alas, to the increas 
ingly alienated Negro have-nots.
What about the future? Only two pages before the 
sentence about the Employment Act, the Kerner Report 
sounds almost reassuring that we are on the right track with 
respect to corrective measures (page 412):
Much has been accomplished in recent years to 
formulate new directions for national policy and
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new channels for national emergency. Resources 
devoted to social programs have been greatly in 
creased in many areas. Hence, few of our program 
suggestions are entirely novel. In some form, many 
are already in effect.
All this serves to underscore our basic conclu 
sion: the need is not so much for the government to 
design new programs as it is for the nation to 
generate new will.
The "new will" would presumably manifest itself in the 
voting of larger federal funds (for which Vietnam re 
quirements now compete), in improved coordination of pro 
grams (within and between governmental layers) for more ef 
ficient service, and in increasing involvement of business 
firms and foundations in urban revitalization (the establish 
ment of the Urban Coalition and the National Alliance of 
Businessmen is acknowledged on page 418).
Statistics and program information not included in the 
Kerner Report also gainsay the verdict rendered in the sec 
ond quoted sentence on the Employment Act. A Census 
tabulation, for example, shows a reduction in the absolute 
number of nonwhites below the poverty line between 1959 
and 1966 as well as a decline in the corresponding percent 
age—from 54.6 to 41.4. On the whole, however, whites have 
fared much better than nonwhites; their percentage below 
the poverty line was 18.0 for 1959 and 11.8 for 1966. (Never 
theless, absolute figures for 1966 show that penury remains a 
widespread blight; 20.1 million whites and 9.6 million non- 
whites were still below the poverty line.) 10
10. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Income in 1966 of Families and Persons in the United 
States," Current Population Report, P-60, No. 53, December 28, 1967, Table H.
A newer Current Population Report, "The Extent of Poverty in the United States: 1959 
to 1968," P-60, No. 54, May 31, 1968, presents the same figures, as well as other pertinent 
information.
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The latest Manpower Report of the President should also 
be mentioned. It, too, offers statistical evidence of advance 
by nonwhites in various aspects of employment and 
unemployment—as well as evidence, of course, of egregious 
failures (e.g., to reduce teenage unemployment) and of per 
sisting and pervasive economic afflictions. The document is 
of interest here, however, for two additional reasons.
One reason is that both the President's prefatory Man 
power Message to the Congress (January 23, 1968) and the 
Secretary of Labor's introduction point to the long term 
gains made during the regime of the Employment Act. Over 
the years, the focus of attention has shifted from the gross 
national problems of moderating recession and of sustaining 
and increasing total employment toward regional problems 
of economic improvement and now toward problems con 
fronting specific categories of individuals. The "remaining 
targets" that command federal attention, the Secretary 
notes, include the hard-core unemployed, the seasonally 
unemployed, youths between school and work, inactive 
older workers, racial minorities, and the jobless handicap 
ped.
The second reason that the Manpower Report is of interest 
here is its description of federal programs directed at these 
"remaining targets" and presumably responsive to the 
Kerner Report. For example, it discusses JOBS (Job Oppor 
tunities in the Business Sector), a government-industry 
"partnership" for training and hiring the hard-core 
unemployed. It also discusses the National Alliance of 
Businessmen (but I do not see the acronym, NAB!). It 
describes CEP (Concentrated Employment Program) and 
CAMPS (Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System), 
which potentially meet the need mentioned in the Kerner 
Report for interagency and intergovernmental coordination 
of manpower and related services (including manpower ser 
vices provided under the emerging Model Cities Program).
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The Secretary of Labor confidently reports that "we now 
have the knowledge," acquired through experience under 
various programs, to help the hard-core unemployed. ! '
The President and the Secretary of Labor should not be 
expected to proclaim costs and setbacks as loudly as they 
proclaim successes, but it is fair to observe that the progress 
made during the era of the Employment Act has itself helped 
to exacerbate the disappointments widely felt over persisting 
minority misery. Though hampered by expansion of Viet 
nam hostilities, by inflation, and by the gold drain, active 
fiscal and monetary policy has contributed very substantially 
to the reduction of national unemployment drag. But there 
are feedbacks: Active fiscal policy has itself contributed to 
our inflationary and balance-of-payments difficulties—and 
to monetary and other distortions that have not yet 
registered their full social costs. It is true, besides, that the 
start and stall of a well-advertised "war on poverty" in a 
"great society" have helped to generate and also to frustrate 
a "revolution of rising expectations." What I want to point 
up here, however, is that a clearer revelation of disparity of 
status adds fuel to such a revolution—as the Kerner Report 
noted. The stubborn remaining problems of joblessness and 
low-grade employment in our society have been exposed to 
easier view against a background of increasing general af 
fluence. The evils existed before, and solid historical im 
provement has also been achieved; but they now stand more 
fully revealed and are amplified, repeated, and dramatized in 
our entertainment and news media. The obvious ubiquitous 
signs of unequal economic and social status have a 
psychological effect which apparently cannot be matched by 
the citation of any record of historical improvement.
The noncorrespondence between evidence of historic gain 
and the fact of current despair is poignantly reflected in
11. On this paragraph and the two preceding ones, see Manpower Report of the President, 
April 1968, passim.
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some recent remarks by the President. In a speech in Chicago 
on April 24, he rightly observed:
Our society still bears burdens and scars from 
times before we were born. But we have acted to 
relieve those burdens and to heal those wounds. 
Nowhere else—in no other society on this earth, are 
so many so devoted to leaving this earth better than 
they found it. It is this purpose that is throbbing 
through this Republic now.
On May 20, he said the following in a speech in New York:
To me, the fact that we recognize a gap between 
achievements and expectations represents a symp 
tom of health, a sign of self-renewal, a sign that our 
prosperous nation has not succumbed to com 
placency and self-indulgency.
The temper of these comments accords with the outlook of 
the Kerner Report, even though the Report's treatment of 
the past and present may well discourage the average white 
reader—and the nonwhite reader, too.
The difference between history and status, between objec 
tive and psychological fact, should still matter to any social 
"scientist" even if he is committed to activism. It is not 
necessary to accept the verdict that the Employment Act has 
more or less reached its limits, that the economic and social 
gap between whites and nonwhites can no longer be narrow 
ed significantly through the job route. Despite propaganda 
against which no profession is proof, work is likely to remain 
a vital category of human activity in the future, either in our 
own society or in any stable successor. Work has not been 
rendered vestigial or ceremonial by automation, cyberna 
tion, or any other barbarism of the new lexicon; it remains 
important for personal dignity and political cohesion as well 
as for economic production. An outmoded materialistic con-
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cept that does not die identifies production with manufactur 
ing and similar processes only; but service production has for 
many decades been definitionally and otherwise respectable, 
and it is destined to continue its impressive expansion as an 
employer. The link, in short, between work and income does 
not need to be severed; and a social scientist can still look 
forward to as long and honorable a career in studying 
employment as in sponsoring guaranteed incomes.
Kerner Commission 
Employment Recommendations
Work, especially in a nonmenial job with a future, is 
deemed vital by the Kerner Commission for counteracting 
poverty and unrest in the ghetto. In the chapter on recom 
mendations, the Report says (page 413):
Unemployment and underemployment are among 
the persistent and serious grievances of disadvan- 
taged minorities. The pervasive effect of these con 
ditions on the racial ghetto is inextricably linked to 
the problem of civil disorder.
Furthermore, in supporting a national program of income 
supplements for the needy, the Commission remains mindful 
of the value of work. The aim should be "to provide for 
those who can work or who do work, any necessary sup 
plements in such a way as to develop incentives for fuller 
employment" (page 466).
After describing desirable employment goals and 
strategies, the Kerner Report proposes programs in six areas: 
(1) consolidation and concentration of efforts to recruit and 
place workers; (2) removal of barriers to employment and 
promotion; (3) creation of a million new jobs in the public 
sector in three years; (4) creation of a million new private 
jobs in three to five years; (5) economic development of
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areas of urban and rural poverty; and (6) encouragement of 
Negro ownership of businesses in the ghetto. Some of the 
facets of these programs will be mentioned in the course of 
the discussion that follows.
Although public and private action along the recommend 
ed lines is already underway, it may not at all proceed on the 
scale and at the speed recommended by the Commission. 
Three reasons suggest themselves: (1) technical difficulties, 
especially in the accomplishment of an extensive organiza 
tion or reorganization of manpower services while a vast 
throughput is also sought; (2) competition of proposed pro 
grams with other public and private commitments and objec 
tives; and (3) the slow generation, at best, of a "new will" to 
resolve decisively the basic problems related to civil disorder. 
I discuss these points in turn.
The Commission's statement of required "basic 
strategies" gives some idea of the magnitude of the tasks en 
tailed (page 415):
Existing programs aimed at recruiting, training and 
job development should be consolidated according 
to the function they serve at the local, state, and 
Federal levels, to avoid fragmentation and duplica 
tion.
The Kerner Report recalls the difficulty experienced in 
reorienting the Employment Service. It proposes the creation 
of a federally chartered corporation to coordinate the job 
programs for the private sector—"a single cooperative na 
tional effort . . .with the assistance of business, labor and 
industrial leaders at national, regional and local levels" 
(page 418). This corporation would operate "through 
regional and local subsidiaries" (page 422). Arrangements 
would also have to be made "for the flow of trainees from 
public-sector jobs to on-the-job training in private com 
panies" (page 416). Specially trained supervisors are re-
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quired for helping the hard-core unemployed through the in 
itial job experience (page 417). While these administrative 
and logistical tools are themselves being forged, it is propos 
ed that, in the first year, 250,000 of the million public-service 
jobs be created and 150,000 of the million new private 
jobs—or 300,000 private jobs if a timely tax credit is 
enacted. These goals are much more ambitious than those 
proposed in present government plans.
Additional technical obstacles impede attainment of the 
Kerner Report's objectives with respect to scale and speed. 
An employing agency or firm has to define or restructure 
jobs for the hard-core unemployed and other persons of 
limited skill, to design career ladders, and smoothly to ac 
commodate these into established work systems. To set up 
even dead-end jobs and integrate them into established 
public and private organizations would still require time, 
skill, and tact. The Report notes, furthermore, that "a sure 
method for motivating the hard-core unemployed has not yet 
been devised" (page 416). If trainees in new public-service 
jobs, moreover, are paid "not less than the minimum wage 
or prevailing wage in the area for similar work, whichever is 
higher" (page 421), objections could well be raised by unions 
representing experienced workers; or an impetus would be 
given to demands by such workers for wage increases to 
preserve differentials.
What I have just said could serve as the first of my obser 
vations on the competition of new employment proposals for 
the disadvantaged with other private and public com 
mitments and objectives. Private employers, of course, wish 
and need to make profits, and stockholders expect 
dividends. More affluent companies can, of course, afford 
better than the others to pursue social purposes, and they 
may not need much persuasion to recognize the probable at 
tendant benefits to their public image. Below the federal 
level, governmental jurisdictions are notorious for reluc-
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tance to levy new taxes and to raise debt limits; and many 
plagued urban areas already have woefully inadequate 
revenue bases. As for the federal government, new undertak 
ings are discouraged by demands for Vietnam (and other 
purposes) in a period in which the protection of the value of 
money and the maintenance of competitiveness in foreign 
markets are also deemed to be important restraining objec 
tives. Tax credits, recommended by the Kerner Commission 
for rural development as well as for private job creation, are 
rarely enacted with enthusiasm; and they will not now be em 
braced eagerly.
At the beginning of its chapter on recommendations 
(which cover education, welfare, and housing in addition to 
employment), the Kerner Commission addresses itself to the 
nation's fiscal condition and capacity (pages 410-11). It cites 
two facts as fundamental—the vast productivity of the na 
tional economy and the responsiveness of the federal revenue 
system to economic growth. While acknowledging that the 
national cornucopia is not inexhaustible and that the alloca 
tion of funds among alternative objectives may require hard 
choices, it does not see an insuperable problem. Despite Viet 
nam and other demands, we have "enough to make an im 
portant start on reducing our critical 'social deficit.' " In 
deed, figures cited by the Commission do "demonstrate the 
dimension of resources—apart from changes in tax 
rates—which this country can generate." Unfortunately, 
however, the Commission makes no reference to constrain 
ing factors, such as inflationary pressures and the nagging 
balance-of-payments deficit. Furthermore, the Commission 
fails to estimate the annual cost of its proposals and to pre 
sent alternative budgets that also accommodate other major 
national purposes (including, say, price restraint). If such 
steps had been taken, the meaning of the Report would have 
been rendered more concrete, and compromise and construc 
tive adjustments would be easier.
124 [On] Kerner Report (1968:2)
A comment is required on public-service jobs. It is a 
mistake to think only of new low-skill and low-training 
employment opportunities when we consider the induction 
of the hard-core unemployed into the world of work. Actual 
ly, significant jobs could be provided for a very wide assort 
ment of occupations and at all levels of skill if the various 
layers of government saw themselves as the logical employers 
of first resort, 12 not last resort, for certain services that the 
private sector cannot or would not normally supply. These 
new or expanded services pertain to health, education, an- 
tipollution, recreation, police and fire protection, mail 
delivery, urban development and reconditioning, and many 
other categories of public interest. Although governments 
alone are the potential entrepreneurs, they could enlist exten 
sive private participation on a contract basis. These 
government-operated or government-sponsored undertak 
ings could provide on-the-job training opportunities and 
career ladders for new workers as well as jobs for better 
qualified manual, service, office, technical, professional, 
and managerial employees. But, of course, time would still 
be required—and a "new will," too—to meet these long- 
neglected public needs. Thus, "new will" is demonstrably 
absent to meet perennial, accumulating, public-service re 
quirements in general. The "white society," in short, 
neglects itself too; it does not tend to neglect the area of the 
Kerner Commission's primary concern on racist grounds 
merely.
These references to a "new will" bring me to my third, 
and final, point. A widespread reading of the Report is not 
likely to generate the public zeal that would assure attain-
12. See essay no. 8 in this volume.
Since governmental action as employer of first resort is the key to an important remain 
ing economic frontier, and since the sense of community might be seriously impaired by the 
adoption and extension of income guarantees that are divorced from work, I see increasing 
merit in the verbalization of the Beveridgean concept of full employment (i.e., more jobs 
than seekers) as a social ideal, as an eventual goal, for the United States.
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ment of the Commission's goals of scale and speed. First, 
there really is no monolithic, superorganic "white society" 
that hears, and then decides to honor or to ignore, the Com 
mission's recommendations. The polarization of popular 
"white" sentiment on what to do, how much, and when is 
rendered unlikely, furthermore, by the failure of the Com 
mission to draw up a budget accommodating the Report's 
employment and other objectives with remaining national 
purposes. (The Secretary of Labor, incidentally, has taken 
the position—both in the latest Manpower Report and in 
testimony on legislation proposing more ambitious job- 
creation programs than the Administration favors—that it is 
up to the people to make known their appraisal of the Com 
mission's recommendations.) 13 Still worse, the Report seems 
to have neglected the opportunity that it had to tap the reser 
voir of good will already existing in the white majority. This 
leaves us with an open question: Will activism by racial 
minorities, will marches and camp-ins, will new disorders 
supply the moral equivalent of "new will"? This question is 
seasonal and seasonable.
The experience of reading the Report (a nonfiction 
equivalent of Moby Dick) gives me the hindsight to have of 
fered the following advice to the Commission if I had been 
asked in advance about the generation of a "new will" and 
the movement toward "a true union."
First, the findings ought to have taken explicit account of 
a need for balanced pursuit of national objectives. Such a 
pursuit is implicit in the Employment Act; and all other 
federal legislation concerning manpower, as well as other 
needs, has to fit into some kind of a plausible whole. The 
larger-systems approach and cost-effectiveness analysis, of 
which so much is heard, ought to be applied, even crudely
13. Washington Post, May 10, 1968; and Manpower Report of the President, April 1968, 
p. 10.
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and experimentally, across governmental programs and 
across periods of time. Alternative trial balances should ac 
cordingly have been prepared or commissioned. The prob 
lem might have been commended to the Council of 
Economic Advisers, to such nongovernmental bodies as the 
National Planning Association (which has a Center for 
Priority Analysis), and to organizations maintaining 
econometric models. We should, for example, be able to 
consider how much inflation would be generated or how 
much might be tolerated to accommodate the Kerner Com 
mission's recommendations regarding employment, educa 
tion, welfare, and housing. What are the implications of the 
recommendations for the end-game in Vietnam? How much 
constraint on new expenditures for urgent domestic pro 
grams is really implicit in our inflationary and balance-of- 
payments difficulties? Should the tax burden be increased 
beyond the Presidential request? These are not easy ques 
tions; but we do need to progress toward a calculus, however 
rough, to facilitate national intergroup bargaining on vital 
issues that could also be settled far less peaceably. We need a 
calculus of consensus for the engineering of consensus. 14
Second, as a positive incentive to white men of good will, a 
timetable should have been established that sets significant 
yet clearly achievable employment goals for the first year. 
Correlatively, the Report could have encouraged a general 
understanding that, even with earnest dedication in the white 
community, the full recommendations respecting employ 
ment and other categories are not easy to meet. An 
auspicious beginning might thus have been assured; a possi 
ble contribution to the cycle of overexpectation and over- 
reaction among whites and blacks would also have been
14. It may soon become technically feasible and publicly useful to interpret Sections 3(a), 
4(c), and 5(b) of the Employment Act to require routine annual estimation and revelation 
of the monetary and manpower implications of alternative (desired or plausible) com 
prehensive mixes of public and private programs and actions.
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avoided. In this connection, the Report could have made 
more of a statement on the "difficulty of really improving 
the economic status of the Negro man" (pages 255-56):
It is far easier to create new jobs than either to 
create new jobs with relatively high status and earn 
ing power, or to upgrade existing employed or 
partly-employed workers into such better-quality 
employment. Yet only such upgrading will 
eliminate the fundamental basis of poverty and 
deprivation among Negro families.
Finally, if an even conciliatory spirit could not have been 
maintained in the preparation of the Report, more en 
couragement should still have been offered to the white ma 
jority, on which implementation so largely depends. For a 
journalist writing the introduction to the commercial edi 
tion, it may seem a sufficient coup for the Commission to 
have stated the name of the shame as "white racism." But 
implementation—that is the thing. The "we" of the Report 
are mostly white; the tainted "white society" and "white in 
stitutions" are essentially "the nation" that is being asked 
"to generate new will" and to move toward "a true union." 
Would it not, therefore, have been better "strategy" (to use 
a word appearing so often in the Report) to encourage the 
white majority to don the armor of crusading concern than 
to accept the poisoned shirt of corroding guilt? After all, 
even the establishment of the Commission and the publica 
tion of its Report must be attributed at least as much to white 
hope as to black despair.
Part II
Answers to Supplementary Written Questions 
of Joint Economic Committee
Question No. 1: On page 23 of your statement, you write 
that "the Commission fails to estimate the annual cost of its
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proposals and to present alternative budgets that also accom 
modate other major national purposes (including, say, price 
restraint)." Don't you think that those are tasks for such 
organizations as the Upjohn Institute, NPA, and the Joint 
Economic Committee, rather than the Commission in its 
report completed under pressing constraints?
Answer to Question No. 1: Part III of the Kerner Report 
has the title "What Can Be Done?" and Chapter 17, con 
tained therein, presents "Recommendations for National 
Action." The quoted sentence and the succeeding one in my 
statement refer to an opportunity that was missed (a) to 
render "more concrete" the proposals made by the Commis 
sion in Chapter 17 and (b) to facilitate "compromise and 
constructive adjustments." The Commission, indeed, ac 
complished a remarkable amount of work between the end 
of July 1967, when it was established, and March 1968, when 
the commercial version of its Report appeared; and, in this 
brief period, the Commission necessarily had to rely heavily 
on completed and ongoing economic research. As I point out 
later in my statement, the problem of designing "alternative 
trial balances" could, nevertheless, "have been commended 
to the Council of Economic Advisers, to such nongovern 
mental bodies as the National Planning Association (which 
has a Center for Priority Analysis), and to organizations 
maintaining econometric models." From Dr. Colm's 
testimony, I was pleased to learn that the National Planning 
Association has already been addressing itself to appraisal, 
in monetary and manpower terms, of the Commission's 
recommendations. NPA's existing capability to do so surely 
owes something to contract support provided by the U.S. 
Department of Labor under authority of the Manpower 
Development and Training Act.
Perhaps, as the state of estimating arts improves (or as in 
hibitions to make projections continue to dissolve), more 
research groups will engage not only in the construction of
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alternative trial balances that are useful for compatible and 
comprehensive policy design but also in the quantification of 
the manpower implications of different policy mixes. The ex 
tensibility of this idea to the implementation of the Employ 
ment Act is obvious. The time may soon be right, in other 
words, to interpret Sections 3(a), 4(c), and 5(b) of the Act as 
requiring the translation of anticipated or desired total 
public and private economic performance (including the Ad 
ministration's legislative program) into coherent sets of 
financial and manpower accounts.
Question No. 2: I think all of you see a need for extensive 
public employment to take up the manpower slack. This 
poses another basic problem. What do we really mean by 
"job creation"? On the one hand, we know that there are 
substantial numbers of vacancies. Why can't these be filled 
from the ranks of the unemployed, in your opinion? Now, 
on the other hand, it appears to me that many of the jobs 
that are going begging are very low-paying, low-prestige jobs 
which the unemployed do not want. How do we resolve this 
question?
Answer to Question No. 2: Concerning what "we really 
mean by 'job creation,' " three things should be said:
1. "Job creation" is definable in many ways, but the con 
cept is functionally most significant when it allows for a 
process of mutual adaptation between (a) the available 
individuals and (b) the work that potential employers 
(private and public) want done. With regard to available 
individuals, the adaptation process may entail en- 
culturation, motivation, basic education, job training, 
and adequate supervision. With respect to the work to 
be done, the process may entail the design of jobs hav 
ing appropriate content or the provision of graded, ar 
ticulated, job sequences to form career ladders. The 
adaptation process obviously involves costs, in money
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and time; appropriate arrangements for sharing the cost 
burden, however, often do not exist, and the required 
time cannot always be spared by needy individuals or by 
would-be employers.
2. Although our society is regarded as work-oriented, it 
never has devoted itself as zealously as it should to the 
creation of jobs for those who want them or ought to 
have them. Work is important not only for economic 
purposes but also for political and social cohesion; ac 
cordingly, even if work generally becomes less onerous, 
it remains necessary as a form of "social dues." Since 
the disjunction of income and work is now being press 
ed, it becomes increasingly desirable for our society to 
consider establishing conditions for Beveridgean "full 
employment" as a more wholesome alternative. Ac 
cording to Beveridge, the full-employment standard re 
quires that there be "always more vacant jobs than 
unemployed men, not slightly fewer jobs." These jobs 
should be "at fair wages, of such a kind, and so located 
that the unemployed men can reasonably be expected to 
take them."*
3. As we continue to create jobs in the private sector, we 
also need, in line with the preceding paragraph, a more 
decisive assumption by government (at all jurisdictional 
levels) of its rightful role as employer of first resort. 
Enough work, already well described, remains to be 
done in the public sector to supply amenities for a grow 
ing population and to enhance the quality of living. It is 
not sufficient, however, to talk of the work to be done; 
this notion of unmet needs has to be transformed into 
"job creation," into active demand for workers. That
•If Lord Beveridge were writing Full Employment in a Free Society in 1980 instead of 1944, 
he would not have confined attention to "men." Similarly, if the Kerner Report and my 
testimony were prepared in 1980, neither would have referred to "Negroes" rather than 
"blacks."
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is, jobs have to be defined, titled, and translated into 
slots actually to be filled. Funds have to be pro 
vided—by additional taxation and, perhaps, by a shar 
ing of federal tax revenues with state and local jurisdic 
tions. If government acts as employer of first resort to 
satisfy unmet public needs, the created jobs are likely to 
pay well enough, to carry prestige, to represent a full 
assortment of skill requirements, to provide career lad 
ders, and to include opportunities for meaningful on- 
the-job training of the hard-core unemployed, of per 
sons of varying degrees of skill and education, and of 
teenagers.
Concerning the coexistence of job vacancies and 
joblessness (or only tenuous and circumscribed attachment 
to the labor force), two observations are offered:
1.The number of vacant jobs usually reported for a 
geographic area is smaller than the number of 
unemployed persons—or of persons who should have 
jobs, whether or not they actually are in the labor force. 
(See, for example, New York Times, May 6, 1968.) The 
problem is not simply one of qualitative mismatch.
2. Anomalies may be due not only to racial discrimination 
but also to numerous other factors—e.g., age or sex 
discrimination, union barriers, inadequacies of skill and 
education (or even overeducation), self-image in light of 
past work history, satisfaction with welfare or 
unemployment benefits, availability of superior training 
options, draft status, language difficulty, unsure 
literacy, health defects, motivation lack, exaggerated 
expectations, inconvenient job location, transportation 
cost (money and time), and unattractiveness of pay or 
working conditions.
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To reduce the gap between vacancies and joblessness, we 
should, as a nation:
1. Move toward the Beveridge concept of full employment 
as a sounder social alternative to a general attenuation 
of the link between work and income.
2. Maintain employment incentives (as the Kerner Report 
proposes) in the design of any income-supplementation 
schemes.
3. Seek determined action by government (at all levels) as 
employer of first resort.
4. Support existing government programs (JOBS, CEP, 
CAMPS, Model Cities, Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
Operation Mainstream, New Careers, MDTA training, 
etc.) and private endeavors (e.g., those of the Urban 
Coalition and the National Alliance of Businessmen) 
that seek to improve the employability and employment 
of racial minorities and that indoctrinate younger slum 
dwellers in the values of work; and expand or develop 
such manpower programs in directions indicated in the 
Kerner Report.
5. Improve work prospects of teenagers through better 
counseling and guidance services in the schools and 
also, perhaps, through establishment of a "youth 
wage" below the statutory minimum.
6. Emphasize the cultural adaptation and greater func 
tional literacy of disadvantaged children, as well as the 
general elevation of their educational attainment.
Question No. 3: What, in your opinion, is the practical 
minimum unemployment figure that we can use as a target 
under the Employment Act?
Answer to Question No. 3: In my statement, I referred to 3 
percent of the civilian labor force (about 2.3 million persons)
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as the implicit unemployment target for a society such as 
ours. This figure may be impracticably low in view of (a) the 
experienced difficulty of maintaining reasonable price 
stability as active fiscal and monetary policy pushed 
unemployment down toward 4 percent in recent years; and 
(b) structural changes related to the increase in the number 
of young persons, the greater participation of women in the 
labor force, and rural-urban migration. On the other hand, 
improvements in the labor-market performance of racial 
minorities and teenagers as the result of specific manpower 
policies would help us to move toward 3 percent. The 
unemployment rate for married men, largely comprising ex 
perienced workers, has fallen to about 1.6 percent; and this 
low figure offers hope. Finally, we may be able to improve 
the Phillips curve by two devices I mentioned in my state 
ment: (a) the introduction of wage-deferment bonds and 
(b) syndical arrangements with labor and management to 
limit wage and price increases in consideration of the greater 
stability of employment and income attainable through 
balanced government policy. (I have to add that, whatever 
the national unemployment rate, we cannot afford to be 
complacent if the incidence is high for any fraction of the 
labor force identifiable by race, sex, age, or location.)
It may be useful to look at the unemployment rate of 3 
percent and its absolute equivalent in another way. The 
number of persons currently reported as unemployed 
(seasonally unadjusted) is actually not much above my figure 
of 2.3 million. The challenge may accordingly be restated as 
one of maintaining something like our lately realized low na 
tional unemployment level while regaining price stability. 






The 1968 Economic Report
Some Costs of Effectiveness
The latest Economic Report of the President continues to 
exude a proper pride in the feats of "active discretionary 
policy," but it also reflects the discomfiture occasioned by 
some of the attendant costs. Among these costs are the 
"wage-price spiral" in which the nation is said already to be 
gripped and a persistent related condition of "inflationary 
bias." Like the very high cost of money, the threatening gold 
drain, the nation's weakening competitive position in the 
world's markets, and the intensifying strains of urban life, 
these objectionable symptoms cannot be dissociated from 
the achievements of seven years of sustained economic ex 
pansion.
Even before the packaging and promotion of a "new 
economics," it was widely appreciated that fiscal and 
monetary policies which were intended to spur growth could 
foster an updrift of prices as well as gains in employment. 
This lesson has been taught with varying degrees of
Reprinted, with permission, from Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. II, No. 1, March 1968.
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definiteness and thoroughness by the world's experience with 
central banking and with expansible paper currencies, by 
federal efforts before 1961 to assure the supply of both guns 
and butter, to encourage "reflation," or to stretch out 
booms, by communist planning, by forced-draft production 
in fascist or other totalitarian regimes, and by socialistic 
welfarism supported by "incomes policies." The 
employment-price connection has also troubled economic 
thinkers; Keynes 1 visualized it early, and so did many of his 
British colleagues. In recent years, the relation between the 
unemployment rate and price advance has become a lively 
topic for investigation and discussion (especially in terms of 
"Phillips curves") on both sides of the Atlantic. 2
The benefits in employment and production claimed for 
the new activism have helped to conceal, or to divert atten 
tion from, its seamy side. The greatest success came with the 
demonstration, under Democratic auspices, of the magical 
consequences of implementing a Republican cliche: of "let 
ting the people spend more of their own money." In the first 
flush of euphoria following the 1964 income-tax reduction, 
an endless vista of additional tax cuts was projected; the na 
tional economy had become a widow's cruse of fiscal 
dividends. But a still newer, or much older, economics soon 
began to assert its own truths as "exogenous" forces con 
tinued to penetrate the boundaries of the imagined "isolated 
state." The Eisenhower legacy of slack, which apparently 
contributed a firm base of unit labor cost for the activism of 
the two subsequent administrations, was eventually used up. 
The Vietnam cloud has grown much bigger than any man's 
hand, although the 1968 Economic Report gives little notice
1. A cogent reminder that Keynes's General Theory proposes a guidelines policy is provid 
ed by J.H. Hotson, "Neo-Orthodox Keynesianism and the 45 ° Heresy," Nebraska Journal 
of Economics and Business, Autumn 1967, pp. 34-49.
2. A good survey is provided by M.E. Levy, "Full Employment and Inflation: A 'Trade- 
Off Analysis," Conference Board Record, December 1966, pp. 17-27.
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to the dark shadows now cast everywhere. Nevertheless, the 
Report does acknowledge, and it even insists, that military 
spending after mid-1965 has added sufficient inflationary 
pressure to warrant an income-tax rise. Costs and prices have 
been moving upward, and it is risky to apply effective 
brakes. The foolish fetishism for gold that was attributed at 
first to French peasants and to Swiss gnomes has become 
recognized as a far more pervasive expression of doubt about 
the soundness of the dollar; and even contemptuous 
Americans eagerly eye the prices of palladium and platinum 
futures. The adverse balance of payments has become an 
unambiguous contraint. Worst of all, although Social 
Security taxes can still be increased, an income-tax surcharge 
sought for deliberate dampening of demand has been long 
delayed by a skeptical Congress. Heraclitus was wrong in 
believing that the way up and the way down are the same; in 
Washington, at least, they are not.
"New standards of economic performance" have emerg 
ed, according to the 1968 Report, with the demonstration of 
the power of discretionary policies during the past seven 
years; but the public may already have gone beyond what the 
Council has in mind. Consistently high employment has 
become quickly incorporated into the pattern of expecta 
tions; and the attention of people at all income levels focuses 
on remaining concerns, including the price uptrend, the ac 
companying hardships and nuisances, the impending 
dangers. Popular "systems evaluation" easily comprehends 
both the benefits that appear early and the lagging associated 
costs, and it may even give undue weight to the latter. Thus, 
a remark made in the spring of 1967 by a renowned academic 
economist is more likely to satisfy professional colleagues 
than to meet the "new standards of economic performance" 
gaining general support:
I want to try activism until it is demonstrated that 
activism is wrong, but I hope the statute of limita-
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tions will keep us from discussing the balance-of- 
payments aspect of that. 3
For the economist engage, such a view would nowadays seem 
irresponsible.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a brief examina 
tion of wage-price issues and policies as presented in the 1968 
Economic Report and to a restatement of guideline needs for 
the monitored economy toward which we apparently are 
heading. For the purpose of this paper, the Report includes 
both of the contributions bound in one volume: the Presi 
dent's message to the Congress, which, strictly, is the 
Economic Report of the President, and the longer, technical 
supporting document constituting the Annual Report of the 
Council of Economic Advisers. Separation of the reports, 
reintroduced in the Kennedy Administration, does not 
always work to the advantage of the economist qua profes 
sional (or even qua politician), especially when cir 
cumstances no longer permit him to look like a demiurge. As 
our comments indicate, the separation also risks creating on 
occasion, as in 1968, an awkward impression of unequal 
determination on the part of the President and his advisers.
A Soft Crusade
Though we are caught by the spiraling tail of an infla 
tionary dragon, the 1968 Economic Report does not propose 
heroic counteraction. Executive strategy is directed primarily 
toward starving the beast, provided that the Congess ap 
proves; it relies heavily on fiscal measures, especially an 
income-tax surcharge that has long been delayed (the new 
escalation of the Social Security tax, strangely, goes unmen- 
tioned). The President will also continue to exhort labor and
3. P.A. Samuelson, inA.F. Burns and P.A. Samuelson, Full Employment, Guideposts and 
Economic Stability, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1967, p. 164.
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business not to feed the monster as they have done before 
and as the Council too readily expects them to keep doing. 
Furthermore, a new Cabinet Committee on Price Stability is 
being established to make studies and recommendations, to 
hold conferences and, generally, to encourage more 
"responsible" private (and public) decisionmaking.
The two explicit wage-price ingredients of Executive 
strategy, which are of special interest for this paper, do not 
promise decisive results. Desirable though it is in a free soci 
ety to give most authoritative voice to macroeconomic 
truisms and to urge labor and business to act with restraint, 
the actual anti-inflationary contribution of exhortation is 
bound to be minor in a situation like the present one. Unfor 
tunately, the Council of Economic Advisers, which is also 
prestigious, diminishes the force of the President's statement 
of resolve by discounting in advance, in its own contribution 
to the 1968 Report, the outcome of appeals for "sacrifice." 
The same political discretion that must have guided, say, the 
Council's remarkably limited notice of the deep economic 
and social implications of Vietnam hostilities could just as 
well have persuaded the Council toward a more tactful treat 
ment of the probable response of unions to rising living costs 
and to the rising minimum wage.
As for the second ingredient of explicit wage-price policy, 
we should not expect too much from a Cabinet Committee 
on Price Stability in a free economy that is already "over- 
committeed" and in which the outstanding structural 
sources of inflationary bias (even governmental ones) are 
already well known. The new Committee recalls predecessors 
of the Eisenhower era; the world then little noted, nor has it 
long since remembered, what those committees did or even 
said, and press accounts lauding the establishment of the 
new Committee have uniformly neglected these precedents 
(or models?). Of course, since the federal style is now much
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more activist, it is natural to view even the establishment of a 
committee as a dynamic step.
The moderateness of the action proposed in the 1968 
Report, despite the urgency of tone of the many descriptions 
of the wage-price challenge, reflects an important difference 
between the newer and older interpretations of the Employ 
ment Act. The difficult-to-parse policy declaration that con 
stitutes Section 2 of the Act ends with the words "to promote 
maximum employment, production, and purchasing 
power.'* These are the words to which the new activism 
largely confines attention, and the goal of "maximum 
employment" is ranked above the rest. Furthermore, in the 
pursuit of this goal, the conditioning phrases in the rest of 
the labored sentence do not seem to be taken as inhibiting. In 
the 1968 Report, the Council states that "high employment 
of resources—especially manpower—is obviously a top 
priority," so we have to learn to master, somehow, the ac 
companying inflationary bias. True, sufficiently restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies could halt the advance of wages 
and prices, but the probable cost in joblessness would be 
"unacceptably high." The President voices the same thought 
in the 1968 Report: such restrictive policies "would serve the 
objective of price stability only by sacrificing most of our 
other key economic objectives."
In contrast, the Eisenhower Reports, as may be seen in 
those for 1960 and 1961, more literally confronted the am 
biguities, checks, and balances written into Section 2. They 
reflected a deep concern for correct partitioning of the 
"shared responsibility" for economic performance among 
the various levels of government and between the public and 
private sectors. Those Reports stressed the coordinate im 
portance and the coordinate pursuit of the multiple objec 
tives of the Act; and they even recommended that the Act be 
amended "to make reasonable price stability an explicit goal
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of economic policy," although the advertised inflationary 
hazards of the 1950s had apparently come under control.
Does the moderateness of the wage-price stance of the 
1968 Report signal a respite in the evolution toward a 
monitored economy? Not really. The remedies that are 
prescribed hardly match the seriousness of the diagnosis, but 
activism may simply have no better medicine to offer for the 
moment, given the values held by the doctors—and, 
presumably, the public too. Furthermore, since the Report is 
a politically affected statement that keeps many considera 
tions in view, it surely takes note that 1968 is a year of 
Presidential election. In the preparation of the 1968 Report, 
account must, therefore, have been taken of the bitterness 
expressed in the business community on the few earlier occa 
sions of vigorous enforcement of price guidelines. Account 
must also have been taken of the general abhorrence of 
"peacetime" wage and price controls, which Congressional 
catechisms recurrently oblige governmental officials to ex 
press. Finally, the future is fraught with grave uncertainties 
at home and abroad, and exogenous factors may well deter 
mine the critical governmental wage-price actions of 1968. 
Among these factors are the course and the spillovers of the 
Vietnam conflict and the changing foreign assessments of the 
strength of the dollar. Activism, it would seem, has come to 
a standstill—waiting, perhaps, for events to give us a new 
push, even into the forbidden city of controls.
Darkened Counsel
The President and the Council agree on the importance of 
restraining wage-price increases in 1968, and they agree that 
exhortation has a place; but the Council volunteers a 
pessimistic appraisal of the prospects, thus blunting the im 
pact of the President's own firmness. In the paragraphs that 
follow, the two positions are outlined.
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The Presidential message speaks gravely of this "time for 
decisions" and of the dangers of temporizing. "In the com 
ing weeks and months," business and labor will have to 
"behave prudently in setting prices and wages" or "risk an 
intensified wage-price spiral." Stability, however, cannot be 
achieved "all at once." The goal is actually longer-range: 
"reasonable price stability in a steadily growing, high- 
employment economy." This observation foreshadows the 
announcement concerning the Cabinet Committee, but the 
President also has in mind the need for quick tax action "to 
expand Federal revenues" in the current inflationary con 
text.
In a section of his message on "the return to price stabili 
ty," the President more explicitly describes stabilization as a 
"persistent, long-term problem" but repeats that "we must 
do what we can to minimize price increases in 1968." He 
describes what constitutes "responsible wage and price 
behavior" and sketches the mission of the new Cabinet 
Committee. "I must again," the President declares, 
"urge—in the strongest terms I know—that unions and 
business firms exercise the most rigorous restraint in their 
wage and price determinations in 1968." Indeed, "we must 
make a decisive turn back toward price stability this year"; 
and, in this connection, he commends adherence to the 
guideline criteria.
The Council's contribution to the 1968 Economic Report 
contains a whole chapter on "the problem of rising prices." 
It rejects the "temptation" to dismiss as a "minor inconve 
nience" the inflationary bias entrained by "minimum 
unemployment and high utilization of our productive 
resources." The Council acknowledges that inflation can do 
"serious and pervasive harm"—that it "impairs economic 
efficiency, redistributes income capriciously, and weakens 
the Nation's competiveness in world markets." The Council 
asserts "the pressing need to re-establish and to maintain
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price stability," a need to slow the uptrend this year. Indeed, 
" every effort must be made to slow the rate of price increase 
in 1968," and wage settlements "appreciably lower" than 
those of 1967 would be helpful. The Council^ like the Presi 
dent, says that government will continue to urge wage-price 
restraint in 1968; and it recognizes that such restraint will de 
mand "some immediate sacrifices."
So far, so good; but "sacrifices" by whom? Resolution 
quickly pales. In the very next paragraph, the Council 
retracts; and, in an obiter dictum, it even tends to undercut 
the President's position. The Council abandons not only the 
posture just taken but also the posture of 1967, when it 
refused to sanction supra-productivity wage increases despite 
the pressure of rising living costs. The Council unneutrally 
and gratuitously asserts that, in 1968, "it would be patently 
unrealistic to expect labor to accept increases in money 
wages which would represent essentially no improvement in 
real hourly income." After this bit of eclectic realism, the 
Council reaffirms the productivity principle for noninfla- 
tionary wage settlements as stated in 1967!
The next remarks of the Council seem reconciled to a long 
journey back toward price stability. Some day, stability will 
somehow be reached again, but "only when wage set 
tlements once more conform to the productivity standard, 
and only when business engages in responsible 
price-making." This conclusion may be intended as an in 
troduction to the discussion that follows on the Cabinet 
Committee on Price Stability, but it does not allay the 
uneasiness already engendered.
The treatment by the Council of the new 14 percent rise in 
the minimum wage also works against the President's posi 
tion. This rise, the Council asserts, "will have an even 
greater impact than did the 1967 increases, which mainly 
restored the minimum wage to a more typical relationship
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with the average wage level in the economy." Earlier in the 
1968 Report, the Council says that the 12 percent advance of 
1967 and the extension of coverage exerted "an important 
influence on both union and nonunion wage increases." In 
the 1967 Report, on the other hand, the Council argued that 
the rising minimum provided no warrant for a general wage 
adjustment: that workers in high-wage industries, having 
already experienced gains, should be content with less-than- 
average money increases so that low-wage workers might en 
joy a rise in real wages. Could not the tenor of this 1967 
obiter dictum have been adopted in 1968 to support the 
President's stand?
The Council's 1968 assessment of the minimum wage sug 
gests that consideration ought to have been given to the ques 
tion of repeal or revision, to counter the unintended infla 
tionary impact. A revision is also suggested by other ap 
parent dysfunctionalities of the rising statutory minimum, 
such as interference with the goal of higher employment of 
urban persons with low education and little skill. In this con 
nection, it should be noted that the Council's 1968 chapter 
on improving the status of the poor claims neither a past nor 
a prospective beneficial contribution from the rise in 
minimum wage.
Another embarrassment to the case for early return 
toward price stability is offered in an inadvertence regarding 
the expectation of a "moderate" upward drift even in times 
of slack! For 1961-1965, a period of slack, the Council's con 
tribution to the 1968 Report asserts that a rise of 1 to 1.5 per 
cent per year in consumer prices is "not significant," 
especially "because improvements in quality and the in 
troduction of new goods add to consumption opportunities 
even when they are not fully reflected in price indexes as 
reductions in prices." This observation has intriguing and 
unexplored implications for guideline monitoring, but it is 
only half an observation. Should we not, in price indexes,
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also take account of quality declines, of forced uptrading 
through the disappearance of cheaper (though satisfactory) 
lines of merchandise, of time losses in shopping (due, say, to 
crowding or to service deterioration), and of purchases re 
quired merely to compensate for degradations of physical 
and man-made environment?
Obviously, the Council can choose between comment and 
silence without compromising its professional integrity; and 
its failure to reinforce more consistently the President's 
austere position on wage-price stability is highlighted by its 
discreet forbearance on other matters. Reference has already 
been made, for example, to the guarded acknowledgment of 
the Vietnam hostilities in the 1968 Report. A less touchy, but 
very relevant, subject that is neglected altogether in the 1968 
Report is the retroactive federal pay adjustment enacted in 
December 1967. 4 This three-step ,pay adjustment con 
spicuously violated the guideline principle in 1967 and will 
do so again in 1968 and in 1969. The first stage provided a 6 
percent rise for postal workers and an average rise of 4.5 per 
cent for other civilian personnel. The July 1968 adjustment 
will amount to 5 percent for postal employees. Since the 1968 
and 1969 revisions for other civilian employees will reflect 
rising scales in private industry, supra-productivity gains 
should be expected in both instances. It is instructive to con 
trast the silence of the 1968 Report on this major pay adjust 
ment with the fanfare accompanying the revision of federal 
pay schedules in 1966. To reinforce the guideline principle at 
that time, the Administration insisted on, and persevered in, 
limiting the average rise to 2.9 percent for salaries and to 3.2 
percent for salaries plus fringe benefits. 5 The monitor clearly 
needs monitoring for the "responsibility" of his own wage
4. Special Analyses: Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1969, p. 74.
5. John Sheahan, The Wage-Price Guideposts, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1967, 
pp. 54-55.
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practices in an inflationary period and in the absence of 
general controls.
A New Cabinet Curio
To the Troika and the Quadriad is now added what might 
be called a Quinquevirate—or, since harmony is to be ex 
pected, simply a Quintet. The 1968 Report tells of the forma 
tion of a Cabinet Committee on Price Stability consisting of 
the Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, the 
Budget Director, and the Council Chairman. "As required," 
other agency heads will participate in the Committee's work, 
which will be "coordinated" by the Council Chairman and 
performed with the aid of "a small professional staff."
The mission of the Committee is to help reconcile sustain 
ed high employment with reasonable price stability, par 
ticularly by focusing governmental efforts on the resolution 
of "structural problems that impede economic efficiency 
and contribute to inflation." Five activities are described; 
they include the making of industry studies, examination of 
the government's own incongruent policies, enlistment of 
business-labor-public cooperation, the conduct of con 
ferences, and design of remedial legislation. Regular 
meetings will be held, and special ones too for urgent pro 
blems; but the Committee "will not become involved in 
specific current wage and price matters."
Although the designation of a group of high-level officials 
to show a continuing concern for price stability should be 
welcomed, the ultimate accomplishment of such a group will 
probably prove disappointing. For one thing, these officials 
are already fully engaged. For another, the challenge ad 
dressed to them is impossibly huge and cannot be met by a 
small staff within any realistic time frame. Only a piecemeal 
approach is feasible, rather than a grand redesign. Finally, as 
we concentrate on the long-run, structural, inflationary bias,
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we are not certain to be providing the defenses needed 
against exogenous threats in the current wage-price predica 
ment.
The Cabinet Committee is new, but in a sense it is deja vu. 
The work cut out for it has been attempted before in 
peacetime, although on a modest scale. The 1967 Report 
cites heroic efforts by the Council to promote guideline 
adherence, and these efforts give some idea of the magnitude 
and complexity of the Committee's task. It is also striking 
that, during the late Eisenhower years, a high-level instru 
ment of similar name existed: the Cabinet Committee on 
Price Stability for Economic Growth. The Vice President 
headed this Committee, and the Council Chairman served as 
a member. Furthermore, the Council Chairman at that time 
also participated, along with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Federal Reserve Chairman, and a special Presidential 
assistant, in "an informal group which discussed problems 
of financial policy with the President." Archival evidence, if 
no other, further shows that a Committee on Government 
Activities Affecting Prices and Costs functioned during the 
Eisenhower period; and the Council Chairman was again a 
member. The most important of the Eisenhower policy in 
struments for the area of interest to us was the Advisory 
Board on Economic Growth and Stability, established under 
Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953. Headed by the Council 
Chairman, it had high interagency representation and met 
regularly (even weekly). 6
Although these Eisenhower forerunners had very small 
special staffs, if any, and they flourished, or languished, 
when Federalism had a lower metabolic rate, they should not 
be dismissed as irrelevant snow-jobs of yesteryear. They did, 
like the new Cabinet Committee, have access to a vast and
6. See for example, Economic Report of the President, January 1960, pp. 77-78, and 
January 1961, pp. 73-76.
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diversified federal apparatus already in being. Their failure 
to leave teeth marks on our time reflects not only a dif 
ference in temperament but also the pluralism of our society, 
the multiplicity of competing detailed objectives within the 
federal government itself as well as in the private sector, and 
the inherent difficulty of engineering deliberate and sizable 
structural change. An activist disposition is not necessarily 
decisive, for activism is still the spearhead of one interest and 
the threat to another. Besides, when many agents of change 
work on many problems at one time, they soon run into each 
other; and, as Archimedes made clear, it is necessary to have 
a place to stand in order to move the world.
In any brief list of topics which merit the Committee's at 
tention and are commensurate with its probable resources, 
the rehabilitation of wage-price guidelines would have to 
rank high. From the 1968 Report, it is clear that a free soci 
ety has a very limited range of techniques for complementing 
or replacing systemic ministrations of monetary and fiscal 
policy in the quest for maximum employment with 
reasonable price stability. Among these techniques is the 
monitoring of national wage-price criteria. The rest of this 
paper concerns the revision of guidelines for containment of 
the inflationary bias discussed in the 1968 Report. Stress is 
placed on the maintenance of an economic and social milieu 
that is basically recognizable.
Toward New Guidelines
Another essay in this volume, "Guidelines for the Perplex 
ed," notes the "trend toward permanent Federal wage-price 
monitoring" and states two needs—to slow this evolution 
and to channel it, "in any case, in benign directions." These 
two challenges are related; for, in slowing the change, we 
should be exercising, preserving, strengthening, and renew 
ing virtues of our political order.
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Education (including "exhortation") and emergent ex 
perience, rather than force, would have to be assigned domi 
nant roles in the administration of any effective new 
guidelines program. This is true for any society, but it is 
especially true for a democratic one that is vigilant to retain 
its essential character. A new guidelines system is bound to 
include features antagonistic to the customary freedoms en 
joyed by various individuals and groups. The freedoms that 
are prized at any time can, of course, be changed, replaced, 
and supplemented; they do not have to be denied, and fun 
damental freedoms should not be casually or irreversibly 
degraded. The challenge to education under our democratic 
aegis is to internalize new social values, to encourage unac 
customed voluntary economic action and restraint in the 
general interest. Assurance that the government itself is 
"responsible," that it remains significantly responsive to the 
public will, would facilitate the task of education. With 
respect to emergent experience, we should recognize that a 
heightened fear of formal controls, or another interlude of 
such controls, might itself contribute to the modification of 
attitudes, practices, and patterns that now inhibit the effec 
tive operation of guidelines.
The 1968 Report mentions various advances and needs in 
the realms of statistics and forecasting, but the requirements 
of a workable guidelines program for our type of political 
order remain far from satisfied. Progress is desirable in these 
realms at the national, industry, and company levels to 
enhance the vigor of a society committed to the widest prac 
ticable diffusion of opportunities for economic decisionmak- 
ing. Statistical information and technical knowledge can 
support not only the more harmonious pursuit of national 
objectives but also the constructive exploration of diversity 
at various subordinate levels.
Although voluminous statistics are already available on 
wages, prices, and productivity, there are still many con-
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spicuous gaps; but, instead of repeating the familiar lacunae, 
we wish to highlight here the nonexistence of index numbers 
that are especially appropriate to guidelines administration. 
The required measures of wages, prices, and productivity 
would ideally refer to the same scope and be conceptually 
consistent and algebraically symmetrical. Such compatible 
measures should be approximated on a product basis for 
particular companies, industries, economic sectors, and the 
total economy. The measures might be of the aggregative 
variety and patterned, say, in accordance with this identity:
Hourly earnings=Prices X Output per man-hour 
X (Payrolls H-Product value).
To assure algebraic symmetry (so that all the economic 
variables are treated with equal respect), we might then make 
adjustments that yield generalized Fisher or Stuvel index 
numbers or some other unbiased variety. Furthermore, 
"output" should be measured net, and "product value" 
should refer to value added; and prices should be consistent 
ly defined. If such a set of indexes were approximated for the 
whole economy, the product value would correspond to na 
tional income; and the ratio shown in the identity would 
represent the share of wages in the total income. 7
Under the best of circumstances, such coordinate indexes 
could not be computed exactly (for example, because of the 
obscurity of the "product" of various economic activities, 
including much of government); but what is striking is the in 
adequacy of the vast national data base for the derivation of 
reasonable approximations to the ideal measures. For a
7. Among the writings of I.H. Siegel on the topic of this paragraph are: "On the Design of- 
Consistent Output and Input Indexes for Productivity Measurement," in Output, Input, 
and Productivity Measurement, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 25, Princeton, 1961, 
pp. 23-41; "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and Stabilization 
Policy," included in this volume, and "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index 
Numbers," 1965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the 
American Statistical Association, pp. 369-372.
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serious guidelines effort, consideration should be given to 
the development of such special-purpose approximations. 
The data, incidentally, would be applicable to many other 
uses for which economic information is now compiled. 
Thus, they would serve such different needs as marketing, 
input-output analysis, and the construction of superior im 
plicit price deflators for components of the gross national 
product. If the European interest in value-added taxes 
spreads to the United States, we may expect an impetus to be 
given to the compilation of the required data on the com 
pany level.
Projections of the real national product have an important 
place in active discretionary policy, and they also fit logically 
into a guidelines program. The productivity that is relevant 
to the setting of annual wage targets is not an average for 
some past period but a rate for the future. The proper rate 
may be a trend projection or a nearer-term (say, annual) 
prospect, and a case could be made for preferring the more 
conservative figure in such a pair of outlook estimates (if 
both are positive). 8
The Reports for the years 1962-1968 suggest a single wage- 
percentage standard corresponding to the national produc 
tivity performance; however, variation according to com 
pany and industry performance is at least as reasonable and 
should not be discouraged. Indeed, variation has a sound 
basis in marginal productivity differences, even for the 
"same" kinds of workers in different settings and equipped 
with different amounts of capital. Wage conformity through 
imitation and through efforts to maintain supposedly 
customary differentials is not a superior principle which the 
Cabinet Committee on Price Stability should take for 
granted or which should escape reconsideration in any new
8. Projected, rather than historical, productivity change is emphasized in "Guidelines for 
the Perplexed," included in this volume, and also in the last Eisenhower Reports (for exam 
ple, the one for 1958).
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guidelines design. This view is in opposition to the apparent 
acceptance in the 1968 Report of even a minimum-wage rise 
as a sufficient reason for a general upward movement 
without regard to productivity.
The wage-price-productivity connection may be restated in 
a simple equivalent form, and this alternative discloses im 
portant opportunities for public and private policy. The 
identity shown earlier may be rewritten:
Payrolls =Unit labor cost X Output.
Thus, instead of dealing with hourly earnings and produc 
tivity, we consider here the totals from which they are deriv 
ed: payrolls and output. Unit labor cost replaces two other 
terms in the original identity: price multiplied by the ratio of 
payrolls to product value. The new version of the identity in 
dicates at once that unit labor cost remains unaltered when 
payrolls rise at the same rate as output.
Three implications of the restatement should be noted. 
First, a common handle of macro-policy is provided for the 
Council and the Federal Reserve. The Council is concerned 
with the relation of payrolls to output; the Federal Reserve, 
with the relation of output to the supply of money and 
credit. A rough master criterion for equilibrating the whole 
economic system with a view to price stability is thus in 
dicated for the two agencies: Aggregate payrolls, output, 
and money and credit should advance at reasonably com 
parable rates. The projected increase in national output is 
the key figure; the other two figures should be adjusted ac 
cordingly.
The second implication is that firms, industries and sectors 
may easily explore opportunities for variation in micro- 
policy without jeopardizing the national performance. It is 
sufficient for each component of the economic system to 
keep the rise in payrolls within the range of the correspond-
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ing projected output. Such behavior would still be compati 
ble with aggregate control of inflationary bias. Furthermore, 
companies obviously have considerable latitude, at least in 
principle, to pursue flexible wage administration. The im 
portant thing is to have adequate statistical tools.
The third implication relates to these tools. National 
stabilization with wide micro-variation is achievable even in 
the absence of the vast supply of statistics required for a 
more literal monitoring of the wage-price-productivity con 
nection. Leaving price and productivity statistics in their 
present condition, we could concentrate on the development 
of output indexes that have unit labor costs as weights. For 
example, these measures might be aggregative in form; and, 
for the sake of algebraic neutrality, both the Paasche and 
Laspeyres variants might be approximated and then combin 
ed in a geometric mean according to Fisher's "ideal" for 
mula. This composite measure would also permit the easy 
derivation, from payrolls, of the Fisher index of unit labor 
cost. Indeed, we could just as well have stated the minimum 
new statistical need for a guidelines program in terms of 
Paasche and Laspeyes indexes of unit labor cost incor 
porating output weights. Here, as in the earlier treatment of 
coordinate wage, price, and productivity measurement, we 
skip discussion of the stubborn technical problems that 
abound. 9
To encourage general adherence to the national wage stan 
dard, to discourage excessive intercompany variation, and to 
bolster its own practice and reputation of "responsibility," 
the government might consider issuance of "wage-deferment 
bonds." 10 Such federal bonds, non-negotiable and bearing a
9. On technical matters, see I.H. Siegel, Concepts and Measurement of Production and 
Productivity, Washington, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952.
10. These bonds were proposed in "Guidelines for the Perplexed." They take proper ac 
count of cost-of-living changes, whereas proposals to super-add a price adjustment to the 
productivity factor simply assure the intensification of inflationary pressures.
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low rate of interest, would be protected in purchasing power 
until redemption. If the projected national gain in real out 
put or in productivity is y percent, a worker who is scheduled 
for a pay rise of y percent or less should be able to elect pay 
ment of all or part of his increase in inflation-proof bonds. A 
worker scheduled for a rise of more than >> percent would not 
be eligible for any such protection. Deferral of redemption 
might be administered for national convenience; thus, heavy 
cashing might be delayed to times of flagging aggregate de 
mand. In short, an economic incentive is devisable for the 
reinforcement of exhortation and other kinds of education. 
If the incentive also proves socially effective, this experience 
should contribute to subsequent voluntary individual con 
straint.
In difficult shortage areas such as medical and hospital 
care, the government could improve the poor price record by 
determined exercise of its monopsony power. It is a large 
purchaser, and it is a still larger underwriter of public 
demands for health goods and services.
Total federal behavior in health, education, and some 
other fields could be made more "responsible" by the 
establishment of this good rule: Any government program 
that places heavy demand on skills in short supply should be 
complemented by a program designed to assure early 
availability of the needed personnel. This rule would reduce 
the unfavorable price impacts of popular demand-generating 
legislation—or change the timing and scope of such legisla 
tion. A supply-inducing program should, of course, take ac 
count of probable market responses in the absence of federal 
initiative, the training capabilities of nonfederal sources, and 
so forth.
We conclude this paper with an acknowledgment that 
many difficult problems have not been touched and with two 
additional comments. Attention has not been given, for ex-
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ample, to the thorny issues of wage moderation in the public 
service industries, including those operated by states and 
localities. The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability will 
surely have occasion to ponder the feasibility of, say, 
measures to reduce crisis bargaining and procedures for 
obligatory arbitration.
One of the remaining two observations concerns the en 
couragement of unions and business management to col 
laborate with active discretionary policy. The pursuit of 
fuller employment without damaging inflationary accom 
paniments requires acceptance of this idea by private deci- 
sionmakers: The assurance of a climate favorable to con 
tinuous high-volume production and near-maximum 
employment warrants a longer-run outlook in private plan 
ning and strategy, and this changed outlook should include 
reduction of the speculative component of target prices and 
target wages. The scaling down of such private goals should 
actually contribute to their more ample fulfillment. This 
observation is made as a suggestion, rather than as an en 
dorsement of the activist federal policy that has been pur 
sued.
The final observation concerns, the danger that various 
federal decisions may inadvertently increase the persisting 
problems of structural unemployment against which active 
discretionary policy constantly butts. Thus, for the 1968 
Report, the federal decision to reduce the use of railroads for 
mail transportation is not a matter of importance; for a later 
Report, however, it may well be, as passenger trains are 
discontinued in increasing number and as certain com 
munities become stranded. We should recall the federal con 
tribution to the distress of Appalachia made by earlier deci 
sions to encourage petroleum production. In this era of 
sophisticated budgetry, computer-assisted cost-effectiveness 
evaluation, and active federal policy, an increasing range of 
speculative inputs should be taken into account by the in 




On Manpower, Forecasting, and
Public-Private Roles:
Three Evolving Concepts
Nature of Chapter and Book*
This chapter is intended as a setting for the rest of the 
volume rather than as a systematic summary or synopsis. 
Having been written last, however, it could, and does, take 
some account of the papers, discussion, and statements mak 
ing up the remainder of the book.
Three topics were selected for treatment here, as the 
chapter title indicates. They are comprehensive enough to 
subsume much of the content of the book—if the object were 
indeed to provide a brief survey of the whole. Two of the 
terms, "manpower" and "forecasting," relate to the central 
concern of the volume. For this reason and also because their 
signification and scope are neither standardized nor static, 
these two terms merit early scrutiny. The third term in the ti 
tle, "public-private roles," refers to a major environmental 
factor—to the political and economic institutions, policies,
Reprinted from I.H. Siegel, ed., Manpower Tomorrow: Prospects and Priorities, Augustus 
M. Kelley, New York, 1967.
*The references here and below to "chapter," "book," and "volume" are; of course, to 
the work from which the present essay is reprinted.
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and actions that largely shape the manpower outlook. The 
shift toward public, especially federal, initiative has already 
registered a substantial impact on the employment and the 
qualifications of manpower, and it is bound to have even 
more decisive influence in the future.
The rest of the book is comprised essentially of responses 
given by different experts to the two questions defining the 
theme of the Upjohn Institute Conference of October 1966. 
These questions rather literally provided the focus for the ef 
forts of all the Conference participants—the 6 principal 
speakers (see Part I), the discussants (Part II), and the more 
than 40 invitees who complied with a request for advance 
submission of independent replies (Part III). The wording of 
the questions was as follows:
1. In the next two decades or so (a span equal to the 
present lifetime of the Institute), what manpower 
developments, issues, and problems do you expect 
to emerge or dominate?
2. Given these prospects, what directions should be 
taken by the research program of an organization 
concerned with manpower policy (such as the Up 
john Institute)?
As the remainder of this volume attests, two seemingly 
simple questions have called for an impressive variety of 
responses. On first perusal, it is the diversity of the replies 
that is striking. Manpower forecasts obviously vary, as other 
forecasts do, in boldness, emphasis, and level of detail. Ex 
perts differ in the prospects they delineate, the priorities they 
propose, and the policies and programs they recommend. 
Points of similarity and degrees of concurrence among the 
contributors become apparent, however, on closer study, 
after the various manners of speaking have been penetrated 
and after consideration has been given to the omissions as 
well as to the replies proper.
Manpower, Forecasting & Government (1967:1) 159
For several reasons, no attempt at a synthesis of the 
various contributions is made here. Many of the persons in 
vited to the Conference, after all, are recognized authorities. 
Besides, a composite or eclectic picture would represent only 
another, and a competing, view. Furthermore, since a con 
tribution that is slighted or overlooked in what purports to 
be a synthesis tends thereby to be devalued, it may also be 
given insufficient attention by the reader. There is a risk in 
such neglect, for the true anticipatory significance of an ex 
pert's opinion does not, of course, depend on the current 
popularity or degree of acceptance.
Accordingly, not only the Upjohn Institute but also the 
other organizations and the individuals seeking guidance in 
research, policy formulation, program design, or ad 
ministration ought leisurely to make their own 
discriminating reviews of the total Conference output. They 
should conduct these reviews from their special standpoints 
for their special needs. A ready-made sausage or hamburger 
of consensus would surely please a gourmet much less than 
the bifteck hache suggested to him by the same supply of 
potential ingredients.
On Manpower
Most of the Conference contributors probably confer on 
the word "manpower" a much broader meaning than it had 
in earlier times—say, in World War II, when there was a 
well-known War Manpower Commission; or in the 1950s, 
when it became desirable to establish a Scientific Manpower 
Commission and to begin popularizing a companion word, 
"womanpower." The treatment in Professor Joseph J. 
Spengler's Conference paper of the cultural, psychosocial, 
demographic, and other factors conditioning the manpower 
outlook makes it clear that the "organism" and the "en 
vironment" comprising the "system" are actually difficult 
to differentiate in this case; that, moreover, even if a sharp
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discrimination were possible, any serious inquiry into the 
manpower outlook would necessarily entail inquiry into the 
larger context also, the conditioning and conditioned "en 
vironment." 1 Similarly, Dr. Paul N. Ylvisaker's sensitive 
survey of the contemporary scene indicates how hard it is, 
for example, to divorce the urban problems of segregation, 
alienation, and unemployment from the domestic issues 
associated with the Vietnam conflict. This speaker did, 
however, encounter one articulate objector to his counsel for 
Upjohn Institute to broaden its research sights, as the sum 
mary of the proceedings reveals (Part II); and this evidence, 
as well as the content of various other Conference contribu 
tions, explains the qualified phrasing of the topic sentence of 
this paragraph.
The other principal speakers also exhibited a predilection 
for the broad view. Thus, Dr. Arthur M. Ross refers in his 
paper to the goal of "full realization of the human 
potential," and Mr. Walter P. Reuther talks in a similar 
vein. At a minimum, this goal embraces development for 
nonwork and for leisure as well as for paid work. That is, it 
covers postemployment adjustment, or retirement, and 
education and training for self-satisfaction throughout life 
and for the maintenance of long term employability. Dr. 
Alfred C. Neal, who was sought by the program committee 
to represent the "business viewpoint" at the Conference 
directed his whole paper toward education—a minor and 
wholesome surprise. His definition of education, however, is 
comprehensive: "not only formal schooling but the lifelong 
learning process, including training on and off the job." 
Professor Paul W. McCracken, starting naturally with Sec 
tion 2 of the Employment Act of 1946, concentrated on the 
erratic nature of the public monetary and fiscal policies on
1. Use is made here of terminology due to W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain: The Origin of 
Adaptive Behavior, 2nd ed., New York, Wiley, 1960, pp. 36-41.
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which the stability of aggregate economic demand so critical 
ly depends. It is no wonder, then, that Professor John T. 
Dunlop, in the statement that he submitted in advance of the 
Conference, decries the "imperialism" of "manpower 
policy," which claims jurisdiction over general economic 
policy and education policy too.
Enlargement of the scope imputed to manpower, to which 
Dean William Haber's closing comments (Part II) also call 
attention, is understandable in light of the expansion of 
federal concern during recent years. In the 1950s, a stern 
challenge to the security and international prestige of the 
United States was perceived in Soviet advances in higher 
education, general economic capability, military prowess, 
and nuclear and space technology. Part of the response to 
this challenge is reflected in the National Defense Education 
Act of 1958, in the substantial increase of federal support for 
industrial research and development activity, and in other 
measures taken to strengthen the base of scientific and 
technical manpower. In the 1960s, the federal commitment 
widened dramatically with the sudden public confrontation 
of persisting problems of unemployment, regional distress, 
urban decay, old age, and poverty; with decisions to pursue 
space exploration, supersonic transportation, and other 
beckoning technical opportunities on a substantial scale; and 
with acknowledgment, in a political and social context 
restricting the supply of military manpower, that the loss of 
potential servicemen due to deficiencies in health and educa 
tion is unconscionably high. A substantial change has 
evidently occurred within a very short period in the public- 
private division of responsibility for manpower supply, 
development, and utilization—a circumstance noted in 
various Conference contributions and further explored in the 
final section of this chapter.
The comprehensiveness of the current federal meaning of 
"manpower," which necessarily influences usage in the
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nonfederal domain too, is visible, for example, in the 
Department of Labor's backup document for the April 1967 
Manpower Report of the President. (Both of these, inciden 
tally, were prepared in accordance with the Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962.) The first sentence 
of the "Introduction," echoing the phrase used by Dr. Ross, 
refers to "the fifth year of an active manpower 
policy—which seeks, as its ultimate goal, to enable every 
American to realize his full potential and to utilize it fully in 
his own and the Nation's interest." The objectives of this 
policy are declared to be three—"developing abilities, 
creating jobs, and matching workers and jobs." Implemen 
tation "has involved action in many fields, including educa 
tion, training, vocational rehabilitation, area and regional 
development, placement and other employment services, 
aids to worker mobility, and removal of discriminatory bar 
riers to employment." It has also involved collaboration 
with the lower governmental jurisdictions and with 
nongovernment groups—a matter also treated in the ter 
minal section of this paper. 2
The Labor Department's supplement to the 1967 Man 
power Report of the President refers to another term that 
has become increasingly synonymous with "manpower" in 
the broad current sense. It restates the federal goal as "fuller 
utilization of human resources." The words "human 
resources"—and other related terms, such as "human 
capital"—have become widely accepted or tolerated in re 
cent years despite their suspicious overtones of serfdom and 
slavery. The new respectability of these terms is attributable, 
in part, to the obviously growing federal "investment" in 
people—even though this "investment" is not evidenced in
2. The Department of Labor document, bound with the Manpower Report of the Presi 
dent, is actually a Report on Manpower Requirements, Resources, Utilization, and Train 
ing presented by the Secretary to the President in accordance with Section 107 of the 1962 
Act, as amended. The references in this paragraph and the next are to p. 1 of this Labor 
Department report.
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an altogether satisfactory manner in the national product ac 
counts, the most honored single quantitative register of 
economic activity. Another reason for rising respectability is 
more technical: It has recently become fashionable to take 
professional cognizance of the inability of a crude quan 
titative measure of labor input and a still less adequate 
measure of "physical" capital to explain exhaustively the 
recorded growth of output over the years. 3
At this point, it might be added that a new journal devoted 
to "human resources" has as its subtitle "Education, Man 
power, and Welfare Policies." An editorial note in the first 
issue makes this observation on the recent interpenetration 
of traditionally distinct domains:
When, at the beginning of the decade, the U.S. 
Department of Labor heralded "The Manpower 
Revolution of the 1960's," they [sic] referred to 
projected changes in the nation's labor force. As 
significant as these changes have been, however, 
the real manpower revolution can be found in two 
other areas: the unprecedented growth of federal 
involvement in the fields of education, training, 
and welfare; and the sharp expansion of research 
under the general rubric of investment in human 
resources. 4
The term "manpower revolution," incidentally, has also 
been prominently utilized in the title of 10 volumes of wide- 
ranging hearings generated during the 88th Congress by a 
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare. 5
3. With regard to this paragraph, see a 3-volume report on Federal Programs for the 
Development of Human Resources, Subcommittee on Economic Progress, Joint Economic 
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., especially Volume I, pp. 1-86.
4. Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1966, p. 3.
5. The hearings were held in 1963 (the tenth volume has a 1964 date). The contents of the 
volumes are listed in An Index to Hearings on the Nation's Manpower Revolution and to 
the Publications of the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965.
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The foregoing comments indicate the desirability of 
clarification of the meaning of "manpower"—the establish 
ment of its proper limits with respect to other categories, of 
its useful subcategories, and so forth. For ordinary speech 
and for many daily transactions, sharp definition is not at all 
critical, but greater precision and standardization are needed 
for the purposes of research, statistics, and law and for a 
wide variety of communications. "Common sense" and 
"practicality" tend to condone vague definition; so does 
pride among professional workers who welcome the recogni 
tion of manpower as a worthy research field, who see this 
recognition as a strategic step toward ultimate reintegration 
of the social disciplines or even as a gambit toward a new 
"humanism."
Whether or not a narrow "productionist" construction of 
manpower is preferable to a broader "consumptionist" 
orientation is hardly at issue for the moment. The import of 
what is being said here is that "taxonomy" or "typology" or 
"systematics" can contribute to the orderly progress and 
cumulative benefit of manpower research, that these are not 
dispensable Germanic methodologies best reserved for doc 
toral dissertations. They can help us, indeed, to make useful 
distinctions between manpower as "organism" and its 
multidimensional "environment"; to choose the appropriate 
microlevels and macrolevels of discourse and analysis; to ex 
pose to constant view the shifting interface between work 
and nonwork; to examine the changing fine-grain structure 
of work; to identify the many relevant physical and non- 
physical dimensions of the environment; 6 to detail the
6. It is easy to overlook the relevance of the foreign-domestic division of the environment 
when manpower developments and prospects are contemplated. Peaceful international 
transactions (e.g., the "brain drain" and other migrations) and military stimuli make direct 
and indirect contributions to labor supply that should not be neglected.
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modes, mechanisms, determinants, consequences, and loci 
of interaction of manpower and the environment. 7
On Forecasting
What has just been said about definition and methodology 
applies to studies of the manpower outlook as well as to 
manpower investigations relating to the present or the past. 
The more distant the forward time horizon, the more plastic 
do the categories that we distinguish become; and the wider 
and deeper is the part of the "environment" that obviously 
influences, and is in turn influenced by, the "organism." 
The relevant ambient circumstances ought to be given con 
sideration in any attempt at forecasting; and, if little or 
nothing is said about them, something about them is never 
theless implied.
While some of the contributors did spell out their major 
assumptions regarding the future environment, others left 
these conditioning and complementary circumstances 
unstated. An explicit forecast regarding manpower, 
however, always involves, willy-nilly, a compatible implicit 
forecast about virtually everything else. Thus, a minimum of 
assumption does not mean minimum implication. Of course, 
the content of the implicit component of a forecast is not 
necessarily intelligible to the maker, nor need it be fully ap 
preciated by anyone else. The forecaster himself may feel a
7. In addition to Professor Dunlop's comments (Part III), cited earlier, see R. J. Lampman, 
"Toward an Economics of Health, Education, and Welfare," Journal of Human 
Resources, Summer 1966, pp. 45-53. Also pertinent are the remarks of I.H. Siegel with 
respect to the study of "growth" in Capital Formation and Economic Growth, Princeton 
University Press, 1955, pp. 572-578; and with respect to the study of "technological 
change" and related concepts in "Conditions of American Technological Progress," 
American Economic Review, May 1954, pp. 161-177, and "Scientific Discovery, Invention, 
and the Cultural Environment," Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Journal of Research 
and Education, Fall 1960, pp. 233-248. Useful ideas may be found in the discussion of 
"realms" and "orders" by R.M. Maclver, Social Causation, New York, Harper Torch- 
books, 1964, pp. 269-290; and of "levels" by Mario Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity: Prob 
lems of Scientific Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 36-48.
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lesser burden in vaguely implying, rather than definitely 
foretelling, something about the "environment" of his 
target of explicit concern.
According to the two thematic questions, all the Con 
ference contributions were intended to illuminate the future 
as far as the 1980s. Differences in personality, philosophical 
commitment, experience, and so forth found expression in 
an expected variation of emphasis on elements of continuity 
and elements of flux. Opposite poles of opinion regarding 
constancy and change seem to be represented in the Con 
ference comments and the pre-Conference statements of 
Father Joseph M. Decker and Professor Louis Levine.
On the whole, a "responsible" conservatism and op 
timism tend to dominate the contributions, although the 
tone is typically not complacent. "Normal" assumptions are 
made about the avoidance of major wars or depressions. 
Dangers already evident or familiar are commonly ex 
trapolated, but they presumably remain manageable or are 
not regarded as insuperable. Little attention or weight is 
usually given to possible miscarriages of recommended 
policies—to their potential for contributing, say, to 
unintended social breakdown by a transmutation of quantity 
into quality. These general impressions, however, may 
reflect a predisposition or bias of the writer, for which the 
reader will want to supply correctives as he judges the 
materials for himself in his search through the book for the 
"goodies" that appeal to him.
Whatever the reader's own conclusion, he should 
recognize the pressure for "functional optimism" to which 
the "responsible" forecaster is subject. Measured opinions 
will usually be given of the future by the expert who has "no 
axe to grind," who has a scholarly orientation, who is not 
lobbying for sizable new grants or for political influence. 
Statements made by him "for the record" are "balanced,"
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keyed to the warrantable, to the plausible. His expressed 
views may well differ from his intuitive private hun 
ches—from the long shots that cannot be buttressed by pro 
fessionally respectable argument, that for one reason or 
another are not confided to the large invisible public. Fur 
thermore, the reality of present and past experience weighs 
heavily on a reputed expert who agrees to "stick his neck 
out." Like the inchworm that pokes into the unknown space 
around him, he remains firmly fastened to the known apple. 
Were he to assume catastrophic or revolutionary change in 
the environment as a basis for discussing the manpower 
future, he might no longer be regarded as responsible; or he 
might find his audience hopelessly diverted, confused over 
his failure to grasp what is really important in his own 
message.
The optimistic bias of responsible forecasting may be part 
ly instinctual, but it also has a rational source and it is rein 
forced by experience. Forecasts are obviously subject to er 
ror and to revision; and, more important, the future itself is 
subject to influence by deliberate, selective, and timely in 
tervention. Thus, the responsible forecaster's optimism ex 
presses a confidence that has a realistic basis; it is different 
from, and competitive with, passive complacency. It 
betokens the forecaster's sense of constructive involvement, 
direct or vicarious, in the shaping of the common future, his 
justified belief that objectionable prospects are in some 
degree correctable or avoidable. Below, more will be said 
about forecasts that contemplate instrumental intrusion; at 
this point, we wish only to observe that a sense of participa 
tion permits a forthright and clinical acknowledgment of the 
seamy side of the fabric of our future existence. Challenge, 
rather than depression, is the spirit appropriate to a reading 
of, say, Professor Spengler's exposition of 11 determinants 
of the manpower outlook, the description of welfare 
enclaves by Dr. Ross, Dr. Ylvisaker's reflections on the cities
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of the dreadful night, Professor Harry Malisoff's comment 
on the trials of the urban teacher and student, Mr. Edward 
A. Robie's and Dr. Walter E. Hoadley's remarks on 
managerial succession, or Mr. William Papier's appraisal of 
factors threatening to make government a sink of inefficien 
cy. One can look upon an emerging basilisk and turn to 
stone; one may instead attempt to slay it.
A few other characteristics of the forecasting art and of 
the milieu in which it is practiced should be noted. First of 
all, the world in which we operate as we look ahead is too 
much with us. It is noisy with misinformation, while also 
rich in information. In this world, unsure unconventional 
wisdom coexists with, or can even drive out, doubtful or 
doubted conventional wisdom. It is not easy to distinguish 
what is objectively and ascertainably true from what is sim 
ply believed or accepted as part of the "data base"; for 
glamorous journalism now frequently invades, smothers, or 
displaces serious scholarship. The new interdisciplinary 
style, furthermore, often has an antidisciplinary first impact 
and a slow constructive followup; and, in the vacuum of in 
tellectual authority that is created by the first impact, 
Gresham's law can extend its applicability to the realm of 
thought.
Language becomes extreme under the influence of jour 
nalism and with the collapse of established authority. Any 
phenomenon or trend may be rated as at least a 
"revolution" 8 or an "explosion." Exaggerated, half-true,
8. A word about the term "manpower revolution" itself is appropriate here. In the 
foreword to the report emerging from the 1963 Congressional hearings, it is stated (p. v) 
that, "in general terms, the revolution may be characterized as a shift from a blue collar to 
a white collar labor force"; that "this revolution has, of course, been under way for several 
decades"; and that, "in many respects, the shifts now occurring have been evolutionary, 
not revolutionary, the logical end results of forces set in motion by the industrial revolution 
in the 19th century." A correlation of all these ideas suggests that the word "revolution" is 
not really descriptive but obviously has the shock value of exaggeration. Confusion is add-
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unproved, or improvable commonplaces can become 
canonized by repetition. For example, it is widely asserted 
and accepted, with little or no qualification, that "the pace 
of technological change is accelerating"; that technology, 
"automation," and the computer are accomplishing a 
drastic net "labor displacement" and job "destruction"; 
that noncommodity employment opportunities are not really 
"productive" and not as valid economically as outmoded 
blue-collar tasks; that the "lag between invention and com 
mercial application" is all but disappearing. Many 
forecasters with professional qualifications, even "responsi 
ble" ones who are too impressionable, may be expected to 
become convinced that their own obsolescence is just around 
the corner as mechanical brains thrive, cavort, and 
reproduce.
Despite mathematical and other technical advances, 
forecasting remains largely "directional." It is still 
significantly true that the forecaster faces difficulty in 
foreseeing not only what will happen but also how much and 
when. Preventive or early corrective action is hard to take 
for such reasons, but other practical problems also persist 
and should not be underestimated. Thus, it is not always 
clear just what action is most appropriate, and political 
agreement to take this action cannot always be engineered. 
Besides, even the action itself has a quantitative aspect that 
may not be fully understood (how big a "dose" is needed?), 
and it has a time constraint for application that may be at 
variance with the time cycle of the decisionmaking 
machinery. These observations have a bearing on the fre 
quently expressed interest in "early-warning systems" and
ed, furthermore, by the reference in the conclusion of the report (p. 103) to the "manpower 
revolution" as "just in its beginning stages"! (See Toward Full Employment: Proposals for 
a Comprehensive Employment and Manpower Policy in the United States, Subcommittee 
on Employment and Manpower, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1964).
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information "clearinghouses" for cushioning the employ 
ment impact of technological change or plant shutdowns. 
They also have a bearing on the theory of organization and 
organizational change, which Professor Rensis Likert and 
others take up in Part II.
The frustrations just mentioned with respect to the quan 
titative and timing aspects of future problems and of future 
remedial actions are often stated in terms of * 'sabotage*' by 
competing wills and authorities. The idea that "we" know, 
individually or collectively, just what to do and when, that 
"we" can "plan rationally" for the future, without serious 
disappointment, is a very attractive one. Failures in achiev 
ing visions have to be charged then to the hostile or ignorant 
"others": to nature; to foreign nations pursuing their own 
"short-sighted" objectives; to the anonymous "vested in 
terests" or to identified "power structures" that persevere in 
stiff-necked or "antisocial" courses, that insist on acting in 
accordance with their perverse and narrow values and in 
terests. 9
At this juncture, we should distinguish explicitly the two 
basically different kinds of forecasts. The more familiar 
forecasts are presumably made by neutral or disinterested 
observers. The second kind involves the forecaster as an ac 
tor or as an agent, as a person committed to the realization 
(or to the frustration) of the prospect under consideration. 
Each of these categories includes varieties that likewise are 
worthy of professional discrimination and lay notice:
Within the first main class, two varieties should be 
differentiated: prediction (or prophecy), which
9. The Congressional report cited in the preceding footnote observes (p. 21) that "the 
future is not easily foreseen"; then reassures that "economic knowledge is presently ade 
quate to create employment and manpower policies capable of meeting and adjusting to 
any future development"; but, alas, pricks the bubble by adding "if only our will is equal 
to our knowledge." Economic knowledge may not yet be so precise, nor is it the only rele 
vant knowledge nor necessarily the highest knowledge; and the "will" may properly be 
dulled by other public and private values and interests that compete with concern for full 
employment and other manpower objectives.
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refers to unequivocal statements about what will 
happen; and projections, which refer to conditional 
(if-then) statements about the future, to the im 
plications of various assumptions that need not be 
(or may not prove to be) correct. Within the second 
major category, we distinguish two subdivisions: 
programming, relating to statements that the 
forecaster or his principal attempts to validate 
through manipulation of variables under direct 
control, through use of resources and powers under 
command; and propaganda, relating to statements 
to be fulfilled through influence on other decision- 
makers by communication of information or opin 
ion. 110
As the federal role in the manpower field expands, and as 
scholars become attracted to the enlarging opportunities to 
affect grand policy, the second class of forecasts—program 
ming and propaganda—acquires increasing importance. 
This class is important even now, and it is well represented in 
blueprints for the future produced and promoted under 
nongovernmental auspices. Skipping over the vast external 
literature, we note that Mr. Reuther's paper in this very 
volume expresses, as desirable prospects for the whole na 
tion, some of the goals of his own union; and these prospects 
are not expected to come automatically into being without 
deliberate organizational action and influence. "Our essen 
tial challenge over the next years and decades," he declares, 
on behalf of the larger society, "is not, as the phrase goes, to 
'adjust to change' but to direct it, to master it for human 
ends." He also speaks, in the title of a recent book (by Den 
nis Gabor), of "inventing the future."
10. See essay no. 10 in this volume; and I.H. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run 
Forecasting," Journal of Business, July 1953, pp. 141-156. For a comprehensive explora 
tion of varieties of forecasts from a different point of view, the reader may wish to consult 
Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture, New York, Basic Books, 1967.
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The feasibility of programming is a fundamental commit 
ment of modern civilization. Rightly or wrongly, today's 
leaders look, say, to technology for the solution of economic 
and other human problems, even the problems associated 
with prior technological achievements. It seems a shame that 
the honor of giving classic expression to this basic sentiment 
of the "Western" world-view should fall to Karl Marx, who 
proclaimed in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845) that 
"philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways, but the real task is to alter it."
On Public-Private Roles
As many Conference participants pointed out, the provi 
sion of services looms large in the manpower outlook; and 
government, especially federal government, will play an ex 
panding direct and supporting role in the development and 
employment of the required personnel. This growth of the 
federal economic presence will not, however, represent a 
simple displacement of other political jurisdictions or of 
private enterprise. Rather, it will reflect, in the main, the 
assumption or acquisition of federal responsibility for 
(a) the definition and supply of new widely-felt public needs; 
and (b) the design and implementation of "higher-systems" 
approaches that enlist the institutions and potentials of state 
and local governments and the private sector.
Proliferating federal manpower-related policy can be trac 
ed back in a literal-minded way to one sufficient ultimate 
source: the Constitution. Behind the current slogan of 
"creative federalism" and the superseded one of "partner 
ship," we find stated in the Preamble to the Constitution the 
enduring resolves to "provide for the common defense" and 
to "promote the general welfare." What is now called the 
improvement of "human resources" would be included 
under the latter aim. Defense has, of course, provided a 
much less arguable basis for federal policy than welfare over
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the years; and it has, accordingly, often served as the 
stronger ground for legislative enactments having a heavy 
welfare accent. Furthermore, the welfare objective has, until 
recently, been fostered, as a rule, through improvement of 
the productive system, rather than by the direct advancement 
of consumption standards and of the quality of living. With 
adoption of the Employment Act of 1946, however, a com 
prehensive master objective, economic "growth," has 
emerged, and this federal goal embraces both defense and 
welfare. Changing circumstances, furthermore, have 
favored in the past few years a franker confrontation of our 
economic and social inadequacies and a fuller acknowledg 
ment of the claims of consumption in the promotion of the 
general welfare.''
In defining and meeting "new widely-felt public needs," 
the federal government operates on at least two fronts under 
the welfare banner. Thus, it has to face new challenges in 
maintaining and improving the climate of domestic 
economic activity in the spirit of the Employment Act. Con 
ference contributors have referred to many such 
challenges—e.g., the avoidance of price-wage-productivity 
distortions, of substantial or uncontrollable inflation, of 
critical deterioration in the balance of payments, of strikes in 
the local public services (including government) and other 
sensitive industries (such as air and rail transport). On the 
second front, federal activity seeks to reduce the discomforts 
and blights of urban life, to overcome the disabilities of 
racial and other discriminations, to depollute and restore the 
physical environment, to upgrade health care, to strengthen 
elementary education, to raise the qualifications of workers 
through training, to enlarge the supply of specialized person 
nel, and so forth.
11. The preceding two paragraphs are based in part on a paper by I.H. Siegel and Edgar 
Weinberg on "Technological Change and Public,Policy," presented at the 1966 annual 
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and summarized in 
Technology and Culture, April 1967, pp. 318-319.
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Despite public debate on "demand" and "structure" in 
relation to unemployment, it is clear that federal action en 
compasses both. Indeed, "active manpower policy" is ad 
dressed to the structural limitations of workers themselves 
and of their environment, especially the labor market. The 
stimulation of aggregate economic demand through 
monetary and fiscal policy cannot dissolve all unemploy 
ment, but it provides a setting in which active manpower 
policy can function more effectively.
While much is said nowadays about possible constructive 
contributions of the federal government as an employer of 
"last resort," too little is said about its potential as employer 
(or financier) of "first resort." In acknowledging the new 
widely-felt needs that cannot be met in the first instance 
through private initiative and the conventional market 
mechanism, the government is actually developing new 
dimensions, new frontiers, of economic opportunity. 
However unglamorous, the exploitation of such new areas of 
service production and employment is just as vital to the 
future of the country as the conquest of outer space or the 
sea floor. Despite apocalyptic—or pseudo-Utopian—visions 
of subsidized mass idleness, work is essential to social ex 
istence and political cohesion; and the government has 
shown increasing interest in underwriting additional worth 
while employment that will also contribute to the continuity 
of our corporate life. As Mr. Reuther observes, work is a 
source of dignity, not only of economic sustenance; and Dr. 
Ross makes the same point. If work disappeared, an early 
rediscovery would be required to prevent the collapse of 
civilization—not only "as we have known it" but also any 
better version.
The federal government cannot, however, "go it alone," 
and it does not really try. It enlists, as the opening paragraph 
of this section notes, the participation of other levels of 
government and of private institutions. Social invention,
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which has an undeservedly poor reputation, really thrives in 
this relationship. Thus, in the realm of federal-nonfederal 
cooperation, the market mechanism is actually utilized very 
extensively outside the area reserved for political decision; 
new kinds of organizations (e.g., not-for-profit corpora 
tions, state technical-assistance agencies, and community- 
action agencies) have been founded; new varieties of incen 
tive contracting have been devised; and cost-effectiveness 
analysis and other managerial tools have been adapted and 
adopted for the improvement of resource allocation and of 
general operating efficiency. Bipartisan interest in federal- 
revenue-sharing and tax-credit schemes suggests that the 
fiscal basis of intergovernmental partnership is due to be 
strengthened in the future. This change would permit more 
effective programming or governmental planning, at least in 
principle.
In conclusion, we have reason to contemplate the man 
power future with confidence—indeed, with more con 
fidence as we show less complacency. There is reason enough 
to eschew complacency. As Professor McCracken em 
phasizes, the record of broad federal—or total- 
government—economic forecasting and policy leaves much 
to be desired. It appears, furthermore, that simplistic ag 
gregate fiscal gimmickry may not only prove unavailable and 
inadequate for spurring general economic activity and main 
taining high-level employment but could also interfere with 
the timely and balanced pursuit of appropriate private objec 
tives and of specific worthy public programs. Whatever the 
merits ascribable to cost-effectiveness analysis, operations 
research, and other comprehensive approaches, the proper 
harmonization of competing public-private, intrapublic, and 
present-future demands remains a difficult and uncertain 
business. It is also uncomfortably true that the dreams of 
"planners," if realized, can become the nightmares of "the 
people." More could, of course, be said to discourage com-
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placency, but then more would only have to be said to 
restore confidence in our future collective ability "to pro 
mote the general welfare"; and the reader would also be 
longer prevented from learning how the Conference par 
ticipants thought this historic objective might be advanced 
during the next two decades or so in the field of manpower.
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Guidelines for the Perplexed
Perspective and Setting
A basic assumption of this paper is that wage-price 
guidelines will, in one form or another, become a feature of 
our economic order, even if the specific venture begun in 
1962 terminates first, perhaps in a whisper rather than a 
bang. This prospect is here considered to be part of a more 
general trend—the evolution of our "mixed" economy into 
a "monitored" one, in which a widening spectrum of 
erstwhile private behavior will become subject to federal 
screening for social "responsibility."
Guidelines are not strictly economic, either in conception 
or execution, so our discussion also touches on noneconomic 
features of price-wage monitoring that should interest 
readers as "interdisciplinary" citizens. From the standpoint 
of citizenship, those aspects of a future monitoring system 
that are not yet irrevocably fixed or beyond the range of 
popular influence merit particular attention. Among these 
aspects are the degree of voluntariness, the explicit legal 
basis for "informal" controls, the mode of establishing na 
tional target figures, and the scope allowed to private deci-
This article is the revision of part of a longer paper prepared for presentation at the annual 
meeting of the Southern Economic Association in Atlanta on November 11, 1966. It was 
first published in Journal of Economic Issues, June 1967.
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sionmakers for variation around these targets. Alternatives 
to guidelines also have to be given due consideration.
The outlines of a monitored economy need not long detain 
us. 1 In the emerging dispensation, it appears that state and 
local governments will be much more subservient than they 
already are to federal initiative and finances, and the balance 
of power within the federal government will have shifted 
even more strikingly from the Congress toward the Presi 
dent. This trend is encouraged by the pervasiveness, even the 
paramountcy, of public concerns for effective national 
security and for nearly-full employment, toward the achieve 
ment of which federal action can make decisive contribu 
tions. 2 The scope and scale of technological change, actual 
and advertised, aggravate both concerns while also providing 
means for assuaging them. The Declaration of Policy of the 
Employment Act of 1946 provides a convenient framework 
for the design and implementation of federal programs per 
taining to jobs.
While progress toward the monitored economy is not 
widely endorsed as such, 3 it is abetted by common attitudes 
and by innumerable governmental decisions having specific
1. For additional remarks, see "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and 
Stabilization Policy" included in this volume; and P.B. Kurland, "Guidelines and the Con 
stitution: Some Random Observations on Presidential Power to Control Prices and 
Wages," in Guidelines: Informal Controls in the Market Place, ed. G.P. Shultz and R.Z. 
Aliber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 209-241.
2. International threats to our gold supply and to the strength of the dollar could provide a 
powerful future stimulus to adoption of public wage-price stabilization measures (especial 
ly if a satisfactory and timely reorganization of the world monetary system cannot be ac 
complished).
3. In the first of his recent Reith lectures, J.K. Galbraith has observed, particularly with 
reference to the United States, "where faith in free enterprise is one of the minor branches 
of theology, . . .evolution may well be a better source of socialism than ideological pas 
sion." He includes wage and price restraint among the examples of our government's ex 
panding economic role. He emphasizes the "strongly convergent tendencies as between in 
dustrial societies . . . despite their very different billing as capitalist or socialist or com 
munist." See The Listener, November 17, 1966, pp. 711-714.
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objectives that may seem to be unrelated or even to have an 
opposite import. When steps are discussed and taken to pro 
mote the national safety or the general availability of jobs, it 
may be natural to assign too little weight to conjectural 
negative long-run implications and to contemplate the par 
ticular intended benefits with too much optimism. 
Ideological erosion of the two-party system by "me-tooism" 
in domestic affairs and by bipartisanship in the international 
sphere is both a cause and effect of the general underap- 
preciation of the adverse concomitants of remedial action. It 
is both a cause and effect of complacency, consensus, and 
conformity, and of their identification with the "public in 
terest."
If the trend toward a monitored economy is indeed inex 
orable, the parameters of such an economy are, surely, also 
plastic. In looking ahead to, say, the 1980s, one need not be 
resigned to an unhappy rendezvous with destiny in 1984. The 
future can be invented—or prevented—in some degree, even 
in the social realm. Those who prefer what is nowadays 
disparaged as "Puritan ethic" to an inchoate but ominous 
"American gothic" need not yet despair. As citizens and by 
legal means, they can act, with some hope of success, to slow 
the trend toward guideline monitoring (by seeking occasional 
reversals and detours) and to channel the trend into more 
benign, and away from less liberal, paths. 4
The primary focus in this paper on the longer run hardly 
precludes acknowledgment of the current venture into 
guideline monitoring and the problems besetting it. Indeed, 
the present monitoring program is not assumed here to be 
dying or dead, even though any daily newspaper or weekly 
magazine so assures us. Accordingly, this paper is intended
4. Economists who missed or do not recall the brief preface to the second edition (1947) of 
Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York, Harper, may find it still 
worth reading.
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in part to be responsive to the challenge issued in the spring 
of 1966 by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad 
visers:
If we do not like the current voluntary controls, we 
need alternatives which are constructive and 
superior. All of us in government will appreciate 
your participation in helping us to find them. 5
Some of the suggestions made below, such as the one to 
reinforce stabilization guidelines by the issuance of "wage- 
deferment bonds," are surely pertinent to the present 
economic context. This, or any other, item shrugged off now 
as eccentric or impracticable may, nevertheless, contain a 
useful hint for the later redesign of guidelines. Furthermore, 
our comments on guidelines and their alternatives may prove 
helpful even to those who reject the "philosophical" 
premises.
Ingredients of Strategy
The rest of this paper is concerned with the double social 
aim of (1) slowing the trend toward permanent federal price- 
wage monitoring and (2) channeling this trendy in any case, 
in benign directions. In addition to the suggestions made 
below, more general ones are also pertinent, such as rein- 
vigoration of the two-party system, cautious preappraisal of 
proposed irreversible structural changes in government (for 
example, a four-year term for House members), encourage 
ment of the concept of states' responsibilities (entailing more 
adequate non-federal taxation for local needs) alongside the 
ritualistic insistence on states' rights, rejection of redundant 
or routine extensions of federal welfarism, vigilant assertion 
and exercise of Constitutional rights by individuals and
5. Gardner Ackley, "The Contribution of Guidelines," in Guidelines: Informal Controls 
in the Market Place, p. 78.
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organizations in their pursuit of lawful objectives, Congres 
sional insistence on its legislative role and its coordinateness 
with the Executive, and avoidance of unrealistic or sentimen 
tal commitments in the international arena that may be 
detrimental to the nation's internal cohesiveness and to its 
other long-run selfish interests.
Such statements as those above, of course, are easily 
dismissable as "nonoperational," as stating vague or naive 
objectives appropriate to a first civics text instead of stating 
the ways to achieve them. But objectives and perspectives do 
have to be stated before they can be elucidated, and they are 
certainly relevant to action. We should consider that even the 
enthusiastic activism of the cult of economics and politics a 
go-go is not sure of the routes zestfully plotted and of future 
destinations. Sometimes, as history repeatedly reminds us, it 
is better just to stand there and think a while than to do 
something that happens to have been recommended by an 
itinerant or casual expert; or by a " scholar-tician" privileged 
to sit for a spell at a console of state and to practice his 
curiosity at public risk, without a requirement to post a per 
sonal performance bond.
The ensuing discussion of wage-price stabilization em 
phasizes economic competitiveness and decentralization, 
policy flexibility, and the diffusion of information and 
understanding as means to slow the progress of wage-price 
monitorship and to channel it in benign directions. More 
specifically, five points are treated, the last one in some 
detail:
1. In the assortment of policies considered for 
stabilization, not only is it desirable to include 
timely tax increases, prudence in government 
spending, and the easing of certain supply bot 
tlenecks, but it also seems wise not to rule out 
categorically the adoption of legislated controls.
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2. Government "macropreachment" (Professor 
Dunlop's striking term), 6 so often disparaged as in 
effectual exhortation, is actually an instrument of 
instruction and leadership that should be used even 
more energetically to propagate the macro-truisms 
of wage-price stabilization and thereby to increase 
public understanding for fuller voluntary com 
pliance. Besides, the government already has 
economic and other levers it could quietly and fair 
ly manipulate with favorable wage-price effects.
3. Business, labor, and other groups opposed to 
Procrustean interpretations of guideline targets, to 
selective and discriminatory enforcement, and to 
apparent lapses in the "responsibility" of govern 
ment's own behavior should, within the law, 
vigorously make their positions known, court 
broader public support, and exploit the sensitivity 
of elected and appointed officials to criticism.
4. Deliberate and sustained efforts should be 
undertaken to (a) improve government statistics on 
productivity, prices, and wages, (b) enhance 
general awareness of the limitations of available 
statistics for stabilization purposes, despite the 
merits also possessed, and (c) encourage construc 
tion of comparable company measures for the sup 
port of more independent and better informed 
private decisionmaking.
5. Many additional adjustments and refinements 
are required in the determination and administra 
tion of guidelines, to assure more effective achieve 
ment of technical objectives in an environment that
6. J.T. Dunlop, "Guideposts, Wages, and Collective Bargaining," in Guidelines, pp. 
81-96.
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remains wholesome. This very general statement 
will be elaborated in the final part of this section.
On Formal Controls. With respect to the first of the five 
points listed, it is not necessary to stress the importance of 
choosing from a wide assortment of anti-inflation policies, 
but it is unfashionable for anyone to offer a kind word 
nowadays for formal controls. A kind word, however, is in 
order, even though persons of middle age and older seem 
generally to have concluded, on the basis of experience, that 
legislated price and wage curbs should be shunned as 
anathema. Such curbs are not necessarily less effective than 
the lately favored alternatives of governmental Canuteman- 
ship. They are not addressed any more foolishly to symp 
toms than guidelines are; and neither approach, of course, 
penetrates deeply into the underlying political and economic 
causes of inflation. 7 And do not guidelines, even more 
ludicrously than formal controls, encourage personification 
of pertinent economic forces, the identification of these 
forces with "good guys" and "bad guys"? Do they not 
facilitate overconcentration on the wage-price events of a 
few industries and companies that supposedly have unbri 
dled market power, while prices rise elsewhere with little 
notice?
Guidelines may have temporary or local staying effects, 
and they do have an educational potential not yet effectively 
developed, but foreign experience with them over a number 
of years still offers little reassurance for us. In USSR, where 
guideline principles were well understood in the 1920s and 
where central planning has from the start been a basic reality 
of economic life, both exhortation and rigid controls have
7. This is a good place to observe that inflation theory, related to guidelines but much 
broader in scope, still has gaps and lacks organic unity despite a long history of profes 
sional and lay preoccupation. See Martin Bronfenbrenner and F.D. Holzman, "A Survey 
of Inflation," in Surveys of Economic Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), Vol. 
1, pp. 46-107, especially the opening paragraph.
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generally failed to halt impressive price-wage-productivity 
distortions. 8 Experience in Western Europe, furthermore, 
does not encourage confidence in the efficacy of guidelines, 9 
and the Gilbert-and-Sullivan denouement that is now being 
enacted in Britain and elsewhere may reinforce earlier 
doubts.
Most important for us, however, is the fact that formal 
controls, resting on a basis of explicit law, afford certain ad 
vantages to aggrieved citizens—and also to the public at 
large. They do not necessarily prejudice the outlook for the 
American style—a continuing wide diversity in economic 
thought and action. We should be impressed that formal 
controls fit into a vaunted tradition of "laws rather than 
men," are supposed to be uniformly enforced, and are 
generally regarded as irksome. The last clause is especially 
important. Admittedly objectionable, formal controls are 
more likely to be amended or repudiated as they prove inade 
quate; and they are also more likely to be repealed when they 
have served their announced purpose, or when the cir 
cumstances that inspired their adoption have essentially 
changed.
This kind word for legislated controls should not be 
misconstrued as a recommendation—and surely not as a 
judgment that their imposition has been warranted in recent 
circumstances. Rather, this word is offered as a caution 
against the easy assumption that "whatever is, is right" and 
adequate, that guidelines once they have been invoked can
8. See I.H. Siegel, Soviet Labor Productivity (ORO-T-125, Chevy Chase, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Operations Research Office, 1952), pp. 19-20; and Isaac Deutscher, Soviet Trade 
Unions: Their Place in Labour Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1950), pp. 100-109.
9. See, for example, J.M. Edelman and R.W. Fleming, The Politics of Wage-Price Deci 
sions: A Four-Country Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965); Economic 
Council of Canada, Third Annual Review: Prices, Productivity and Employment (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, November 1966); and D.C. Smith, Incomes Policies: Some Foreign Ex 
periences and Their Relevance for Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, October 1966).
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really contain intense or prolonged inflationary pressure and 
would naturally be accepted as equitable despite uneven 
compliance. Living, as we do, in the most possible of all 
worlds instead of the best possible one, we have too few 
policy instruments to rule out formal controls in advance.
On Exhortation. With respect to the second of our five 
points, a kind word also seems to be necessary for exhorta 
tion. Government, especially democratic government, 
depends vitally on the verbalization of truths for all, even 
though these truths may lack obvious handles for all who 
should care. It is not always appreciated that every President 
who has served since adoption of the Employment Act has 
had to face the dilemmas of wage-price stabilization and to 
acknowledge in Economic Reports the familiar macro- 
constraints of noninflationary development. 10 Intellectuals 
who are glandularly disposed toward activism may be in 
tolerant of "macro-yak" by a nonfavorite president or on 
certain topics, or in manifestos or books other than their 
own. What is vaguely called "freedom," however, will cer 
tainly last longer, or be displaced less traumatically by a 
Hegelian variety, if use of the jawbone as an instrument of 
public instruction keeps a much higher priority than its use 
as a weapon of force.
This is far from claiming that Executive macropreachment 
can comprise a total policy. Rather, in helping to slow the 
decay of contemporary-style "freedom" or to make the im 
pending order more tolerable, exhortation can play an im 
portant political and economic role. Monitoring, as we have 
already seen since 1962, tends to require some hectoring; 
what begins as earstroking can end as browbeating and even 
worse. It would be foolish, therefore, to overlook the con 
tribution that macropreachment can make toward establish-
10. Appendix A of Guidelines: Informal Controls in the Market Place omits reference to 
guideline talk in the Truman Economic Reports (both annual and midyear).
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ment of a basis of public understanding of the common 
necessity, toward creation of the conditions of voluntarism 
and consent. The internalization of external constraints is 
certainly a preferable alternative to the open application of 
government sanctions against a sullen majority or a sizable 
stiff-necked minority. Internalization is related to 
Puritanism and to creeds held in even lower esteem, such as 
communism, but it is also the essence of education and en- 
culturation. Men still should raise a standard to which the 
wise and honest, and the confused, can conceivably repair 
even if the event is no longer believed to be in the hands of 
God.
The probability that methodical macropreachment would 
reduce the need for stern or ill-tempered administration of 
guidelines should not be ignored either during the remaining 
lifetime of the present venture or before any other monitor 
ing effort is formulated. Indeed, it is fair to conjecture: 
Whatever the informal controls may have accomplished 
since 1962 could probably have been accomplished, with the 
aid of more intensive macropreachment and with fewer 
dramatic "confrontations," by a system even less formal 
than the informal guidelines. Instead of proclaiming and en 
forcing general price-wage standards, the federal govern 
ment might do just as well by (1) acting as a self-interested 
monopsonist and (2) more purposefully using in the broader 
interest the legal powers it already possesses as a creditor, 
guarantor, debtor, underwriter, co-financier, or policeman 
of antitrust. It could quietly face the steel, aluminum, and 
copper industries and other suppliers as a hard customer. It 
could influence construction prices by speeding or delaying 
outlays for deferrable projects. It has a large variety of pro 
grams and roles, and it reaches into every significant in 
dustry and every geographic area. It could more deliberately, 
even more "responsibly," affect the supply of, and demand 
for, the scarcer services (for example, in the health field) and
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the prices at which they are provided. Serious and sustained 
advertisement of the price-wage-productivity macro-truisms 
could meanwhile be contributing to a favorable public 
climate for labor-management discussions and pricing deci 
sions.
In retrospect, historians of the current guideline venture 
may, of course, decide that what the preceding paragraph 
proposes was essentially the strategy that had been pursued. 
They will see more clearly that the public collisions of 
government with industry and labor were actually very few. 
They may record that these collisions had far less decisive ef 
fect than the unexciting and hardly publicized day-to-day ac 
tions of government and private officials. Can we learn this 
lesson in advance and use it to slow the transition to a 
monitored economy or to render that economy more benign?
On Private Vigilance. Our third point refers mainly to the 
private posture regarding guidelines. (We say "mainly" even 
though state and local governments do not necessarily have 
to relax into roles as federal satellites and can still compete 
meaningfully and appropriately with federal power in service 
of the public. This possibility should be understood although 
the word "government" is often used, in this paper as 
elsewhere, as if the different political jurisdictions really 
make up a monolithic system, or as if only the federal power 
is pertinent.) The actions and positions of individuals and 
organizations can surely influence the shape of a guideline 
system, affect its administration, and condition its evolution 
and viability.
The definition of social "responsibility," it is worth 
remembering, is not yet an exclusive federal prerogative. 
Private groups so minded can continue to uphold and prop 
agate a concept that tolerates unequal achievement with 
equal opportunity, that contemplates wide diversity of 
economic behavior in pursuit of private advantage within a
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framework of evolving law and with due regard to the com 
mon weal. Furthermore, government behavior itself still is, 
and ought to remain, subject to review, criticism, and rebuke 
by the citizenry; and the standard of "responsibility" ap 
plied by "the people" need not be the same as the one 
fostered by whatever public officials happen to be in charge.
The monitor, in short, can still be monitored, but private 
economic and political muscles have to be exercised diligent 
ly and regularly if atrophy is to be avoided. In particular, 
private groups may wish to insist on flexibility in wage and 
price determinations, with bargaining assigned its familiar 
role though tempered by macropreachment. This flexibility, 
of course, can prove algebraically compatible with the 
establishment of, and more uniform adherence to, national 
norms. Private groups, furthermore, ought to find reassur 
ing the apparent effect of their earlier adverse reactions to 
jawbone weapon-play in the administration of the current 
guideline program. Official reliance on jawbone "yak-tion" 
has obviously become the rule, even though the dramatic ex 
ceptions have a lingering psychological impact.
On Statistics and Education. The fourth point relates to 
needs for information and knowledge (we shall skip T.S. 
Eliot's third category, wisdom) respecting productivity and 
other concepts pertinent to wage-price stabilization. The 
universal tolerance of low-grade "verbal" algebra tends to 
obscure an unfortunate gap in our statistics: the lack of 
structurally unbiased index numbers of productivity, wages, 
and prices meeting the rigorous requirements of "literal" 
algebra.' l Such measures are not easy to construct, especially 
because of their data demands; but how many people in 
terested in guidelines even know about their conceptual 
relevance and would care about their unavailability? The
11. See I.H. Siegel, "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index Numbers," 1965 Pro 
ceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical 
Association, pp. 369-372.
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relatively few technically-informed people are too busy, as a 
rule, worrying about more conspicuous gaps or theoretical 
flaws in the supply of relevant statistics; or they are engaged 
in advocacy and have necessarily accepted for their purposes 
the information that is at hand; or they believe, or for other 
reasons may be willing to assure their principals, that 
available series, including indexes based on crudely deflated 
aggregates, are good enough as "first approximations" (sec 
ond ones never seem to be made!) and that variant measures 
usually yield tolerably similar numbers.
The general shift of professional interest since the 1930s 
from microeconomics toward gross economic phenomena, 
toward national economic accounts, toward other aggregate 
measures, and toward federal fiscal policy has also tended to 
deflect attention from needs for better statistical building 
blocks. If productivity, price, and wage statistics were 
available for more industries, even if they did not meet the 
rigorous requirements of "literal" algebra, both government 
and private decisionmaking would surely.be benefited. In 
principle at least, such information would facilitate average 
compliance with national price-wage criteria despite 
deliberate interindustry variation.
The continuing wide diffusion of decisionmaking capabili 
ty in economic affairs would be favored by the availability 
not only of more and better industry statistics but also of 
more and better company indexes. If companies had bat 
teries of measures concerning their own productivity, price, 
and wage performance, they could make nimbler explora 
tions of the opportunities for wage-bargaining and price- 
setting around any formulated national targets. If the con 
struction of such measures could also take account of the 
principles of "literal" algebra, then companies would ac 
quire precision tools for decision.
It may be feared, of course, that the systematic develop 
ment of company measures would enhance the danger that
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federal finesse of existing private power to make economic 
determinations will occur. Our thought, however, is that 
these statistics would not necessarily be revealed, that they 
would have the same status as accounting and managerial 
records normally not published. Even countries that started 
with central planning have become increasingly interested in 
the merits of economic decentralization, the workability of 
which requires the availability of coordinate statistics for dif 
ferent levels of aggregation. Happily, what has been called 
"planning" in the United States has typically envisaged con 
tinuance of a traditional decentralization; and the contribu 
tion of company data to the continued diffusion of decision- 
making power in an economy that improves in total stability 
has not gone unrecognized. 12
The outstanding limitations of the national data base for 
the purposes of price-wage stabilization should be made bet 
ter known. Indeed, a federally-funded educational program 
would be worth far more than the trivial cost involved; and it 
deserves consideration as a government effort together with 
more systematic and sustained macropreachment. The pro 
gram should aim at upgrading the sophistication not only of 
the public at large but also of special groups concerned with 
wage and price decisions.
Everyone, it seems, wants to be different in the same way, 
and the custodians of decision and their oracular janissaries 
do not appear exceptional in this regard. Could it not be 
made fashionable to acknowledge major data gaps and the 
theoretical difficulties of meaningful measurement? More 
attention would then be given by the press, government of 
ficials, and business and labor executives to needs for
12. A statement issued by the National Planning Association just before celebration of the 
first decade of-the Employment Act might be recalled here: "We need better private plan 
ning by each group to avoid a centrally directed economy. Better planning must be based on 
better statistical data and estimates." See Gerhard Colm, ed., The Employment Act: Past 
and Future (Washington, DC, 1956), p. 83. Many companies, of course, have statistical 
and economic facilities for the guidance of management.
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statistical remedy. A more wholesome attitude would 
develop toward estimation of the direction and magnitude of 
the difference between preferred measures and computable 
or available compromises. A desirable enterprise would find 
encouragement: the construction of at least provisional na 
tional measures that are technically more appropriate for the 
joint and co-equal consideration of productivity, wages, and 
prices.
In short, if guidelines seem necessary, an appreciation that 
the size of the national data base is not a sign of robustness 
and relevance ought to be promoted. A more energetic quest 
for improvement of the statistical supply has to include ap 
propriate research on the less tractable problems of concept 
and measurement and the enhancement of public under 
standing of the true state of the art. An educational effort 
would keep fresh the difference between a mistake and a 
mystique and help us to leaven technicism and quantification 
with common sense. This effort would seem attractive on 
cost-effectiveness grounds.
Toward Guideline Improvement. 1 * The fifth point, as in 
dicated earlier, will be treated at some length. The sugges 
tions that follow are not at all exhaustive, but they should 
suffice to indicate the variety of aspects from which the 
determination and administration of wage-price guidelines 
might be reexamined, with some advantage to the current ex 
ercise and with even more advantage to a future design. 
Comments already made about statistical needs remain perti 
nent, but they will not be repeated in this section.
The first suggestion offered under the fifth point is far- 
reaching in its practical implications: To consider payment 
of non-negotiable, low-interest "wage-deferment bonds" as
13. Based in part on "Productivity Measures and Forecasts for Employment and Stabiliza 
tion Policy."
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government compensation for the inflationary loss of pur 
chasing power sustained by persons whose wage increases in 
the same year have not exceeded the guideline percentage. 14 
This kind of compensation would remedy the injury suffered 
by the "good guys" at the hands of "bad guys," or suffered 
through operation of the economic forces that the latter per 
sonify; and its availability might also encourage the govern 
ment to behave more "responsibly" in an inflationary set 
ting. Unlike escalation adjustments in wages for cost of liv 
ing, the issuance of bonds does not translate immediately in 
to added pressure on prices. Perhaps the term of the bonds 
or the interest rate could be set so as to defer heavy redemp 
tions to a period of uncertain or declining aggregate 
economic demand.
Adoption of this idea might reinforce acceptability of 
another, which is sound in principle but can be implemented 
only roughly: To set any annual guideline criterion for wages 
at the more conservative of two projected figures, one reflec 
ting the year's expected productivity change and the other 
reflecting the anticipated longer-term (say, five-year average) 
trend. For inflation control, of course, projections, especial 
ly for the short term, are much more pertinent than the 
record of past economic performance, which has been em 
phasized instead in the current guideline venture. For a 
period in which annual productivity gains are slackening, the 
availability of wage-deferment bonds would make it easier 
for unions to accept the more conservative wage adjustment 
here suggested. (Incidentally, if a productivity decline is pro 
jected for a particular year, a zero, rather than negative, 
wage adjustment would be "conservative.") It might further 
be suggested that the productivity projections used for 
guidelines be the same as, or compatible with, the ones used
14. At the Atlanta meeting on November 11, 1966, the author included the alternative of an 
equivalent income-tax deduction.
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by the Council of Economic Advisers in its other work—say, 
in anticipating changes in the Gross National Product and 
the major components thereof.
Consistent with the preceding two thoughts is the next sug 
gestion under the fifth point: The government should con 
cede that bargained wage increases may properly go beyond 
the general wage criterion, but it should also use appropriate 
means to discourage (a) automatic translation of 
ultraproductivity wage gains into price increases in the same 
year and (b) automatic mimicry of such wage gains 
elsewhere. In the regime that seeks fuller employment with 
minimal inflationary leakage, that wishes to avoid formal 
controls yet achieve the macro-conditions of price-wage 
stability, that also prizes flexibility in private decisions and 
variation in results, the discouragement of (a) and (b) may 
require additional machinery for discussion and reporting to 
supplement macropreachment, the use of monopsony and 
other power, and the issuance of wage-deferment bonds. 
Macropreachment should be broadened to include insistence 
on hard bargaining by management; franker acknowledg 
ment of the special difficulties posed by union power and 
union rivalries; recollection of the relevance of marginal pro 
ductivity to regional, intercompany, and interindustry pay 
differentials, even for the "same" work or occupation; and 
assertion that improvement in the outlook for income securi 
ty itself warrants moderation in the quest for higher re 
muneration by business and labor.
Another suggestion under the fifth point is easy to imple 
ment, would simplify guideline discussion in general, and 
would assist administration from the national level down to 
the company level. It requires: Restatement of the wage- 
productivity-price relationship in an algebraically equivalent 
way that focuses on totals— thus, the percentage payroll rise 
should be no more rapid than the expected rise in real out 
put. Such a revision makes clear the wide latitude that exists,
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not only in the economy at large but also in individual in 
dustries and companies, for flexibility within the guidelines. 
Only the totals have to be kept in balance: hills that pile up in 
some places should also mean hollows elsewhere. A wage 
"creep" or "drift" reflecting, say, the transfer or upgrading 
of employees can be adjusted in the job mix. The grant of an 
unusually high pay increase to certain classes of workers 
should mean a more modest average increase for the rest. If 
part of a payroll rise represents a deliberate cost-of-living ad 
justment, the same funds cannot, of course, be available for 
compensation on other grounds in addition—even produc 
tivity.
In the reconsideration of guidelines, additional attention 
should be given (1) to the width of the sector in which pro 
ductivity performance is relevant and (2) to the scope of the 
incomes to be covered. As for the width, one may wonder 
why, say, agriculture should be taken into account as well as 
the non-agricultural industries in the establishment of a pay- 
rise criterion intended to apply to only some workers engag 
ed in only a part of the latter sector. As for the scope, 
perhaps it is desirable to seek a total "incomes policy," 
rather than just a wage-moderation policy, stipulating, say, 
that the rise in total value added, expressed in current 
dollars, should not exceed the expected gain in real net out 
put. This standard would emphasize, for example, that since 
blue-collar workers are not responsible for the total output 
of a firm, attention should not be confined to their compen 
sation only. Furthermore, if the cost-push mechanism is 
deemed plausible, then "irresponsible" profit inflation has 
to receive as much attention when it occurs as "irresponsi 
ble" wage inflation does when it is not occurring but is only 
feared. Incidentally, our total-income criterion need not im 
ply a constant division between wage and other income.
Finally, a restatement of the national wage-productivity, 
or income-productivity, objective in terms of aggregates
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should facilitate coordination of guideline efforts with other 
programs that are also intended to keep prices generally 
stable. Specifically, the restatement below exposes a com 
mon policy frontier along which the Council of Economic 
Advisers, the other Executive agencies, and the Federal 
Reserve need to cooperate continually. It points toward an 
all-season, master criterion for countering both cost-push 
and demand-pull inflationary pressures. Thus, avoidance of 
cost-push inflation requires that payrolls or total factor costs 
(preferably for the whole economy) rise no faster than the 
real net output (of the economy or the greater part 
thereof). 15 Meanwhile, the quantity theory of money, which 
relates to the classical demand-pull situation, roughly 
prescribes that the growth of the money supply and the ex 
pected gain in real output should remain in balance. The 
composite policy standard becomes this: To maintain 
general price stability by keeping the annual percentage 
growth in the money supply within the anticipated rate of ex 
pansion for real output, which in turn should govern the rate 
of increase for payrolls or total factor payments (expressed 
in current dollars).
With the conclusion of this brief agenda for guideline 
review, we also bring to a close our exercise in the formula 
tion of a posture toward price-wage monitoring in general. 
The above discussion has touched on both more formal and 
less formal alternatives to, and variants of, a guideline pro 
gram; on the need for government, as well as private, 
"responsibility" in behavior; and on the key contributions
15. Control of cost-push pressures also requires that long-term supply bottlenecks be eased 
while less fundamental inflation-suppressing remedies are applied. Persistent increases in 
the cost of services that, year in and year out, figure significantly in the rise of the consumer 
price index make it harder for workers to accept small pay adjustments in the "public in 
terest."
For a brief recent discussion of the Council-Federal Reserve interface, see John Stark, 
"Coordination of Monetary Policy: Unfinished Business," George Washington Law 
Review (December 1966), pp. 318-328.
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that information and education could make to voluntarism 
and diversity in private action and to flexibility in ad 
ministration. Stress has been placed on macropreachment, 
which ought to become a still more prominent feature of any 
future continual stabilization effort. The founders of our 
Republic did not believe in "systems so perfect," according 
to T.S. Eliot's wonderful line, "that no one will need to be 
good." It is to be hoped that the next guideline program or 
any alternative monitoring system will also be conceived in 
the same tradition of instrumental imperfection and of 
dependence on the informed and voluntary cooperation of 
the citizenry for achievement of the common good.
Postscript
The editors have kindly granted an opportunity to add a 
brief comment acknowledging the latest Economic Report of 
the President, published after this paper was submitted. The 
1967 Report has some features that are obviously reassuring 
to the viewpoint here expounded—that the trend toward a 
monitored economy should be moderated and should also be 
influenced in favor of the personalistic values still generally 
prized. Sources of uneasiness, however, remain.
On the positive side, the guideline discussion of 1967 af 
firms the 1962 objective of education, rather than prescrip 
tion; reflects a sensitivity to charges, made especially in 
business circles, of high-handedness and hubris; and avoids 
setting out a new numerical productivity beacon to replace 
the light that failed. The role of a Greek chorus, rather than 
economic scenestealer, is reassumed, at least temporarily. A 
tactic of didactic is adopted—with homely homily, 
pedestrian pedantry, and even two quotations from the 
Eisenhower Reports.
The major remaining sources of concern can always be 
reduced to the single one of uncertainty as to which values
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will be subordinated, denigrated, or jeopardized when the 
mandate of the Employment Act is vigorously interpreted. 
The tortured sentence comprising Section 2 of the Act gives a 
sufficient hint that national objectives may conflict and that 
the assignment of priorities may properly differ or change. 
The rules of the economic game no longer seem fixed to the 
private players once the precedent of strong, but selective, 
Executive intervention is established.
Equally or more pertinent are the ambiguity of the current 
position of the professional adviser, the Delphic qualities of 
the advice he can give in public to his principal, and the in- 
definiteness of his message to eager readers. The 1967 
Report, like those for 1962-1966 and unlike those of the early 
Truman and Eisenhower eras, separately identifies the con 
tribution of the Council from the President's own statement 
to the Congress. The guideline talk in the professional con 
tribution is discursive, metes out praise and blame in a man 
ner more appropriate to the President himself, is susceptible 
of excerpting in defense of "irresponsible" behavior, and 
courts charges of "political" involvement and dis- 
ingenuousness. Prudence, after all, does temper an adviser's 
choice of what to talk about in public, how to say it in the 
presence of millions of listeners, and what to ignore. Could 
not professional assistance on behalf of informal price-wage 
stabilization be rendered best if the President's "consultative 
and advisory body" 16 serves as his "spooksman" rather than 
spokesman?
16. This term was used by the first triumvirate in describing itself in the First Annual 
Report by the Council of Economic Advisers (not the first of the President's annual reports 





and Forecasts for Employment
and Stabilization Policy
The Story in Brief
This paper explores certain aspects of the meaning, 
measurement, supply, quality, and use of productivity 
statistics in the light of policy requirements concerning 
employment and wage-price stabilization in our evolving 
economy. It touches on some of the many conceptual, 
technical, and practical problems that merit wider attention 
in our changing environment. Such problems must be ap 
preciated by public and private policymakers and by pro 
gram administrators as well as by the constructors and 
various users of productivity measures.
Two points should be made first about the economic con 
text of this paper:
1. The strong interpretation of the Employment Act of 
1946 in recent years has already conferred new 
importance on labor-productivity time series, 
including forecasts.
Reprinted from Sar A. Levitan and Irving H. Siegel, eds., Dimensions of Manpower 
Policy: Programs and Research, Copyright © 1966, by The Johns Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, MD.
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2. The recent trend toward strong interpretation is likely 
to become confirmed as our "mixed" economy 
continues to shade into a "monitored" one.
With respect to interpretation of the Employment Act, a 
reminder is needed that the language is heavily qualified and 
may therefore be read (as it has been by different Economic 
Advisers to the President) with varying emphasis. The tor 
tuous Teutonic sentence that comprises the Act's Declara 
tion of Policy (Section 2) does provide a federal charter for 
directing public and private policy toward fuller employment 
with reasonably stable prices; but the law assumes no uncon 
ditional obligation, sets no priorities, and gives no unhedged 
pledge of jobs. Just before the familiar terminal words, 
"maximum employment, production, and purchasing 
power," we find the infinitive "to promote"—rather than, 
say, "to guarantee." Furthermore, although the law is fre 
quently miscalled the "Full Employment Act," the adjective 
"full" is nowhere used, and no criterion for "maximum" is 
offered.
The second of the two points refers to the emerging 
economic order. In the future, we may expect federal 
prestige, laws, regulations, and market power to be marshal 
ed still more systematically for the exertion of "countervail 
ing" force. More positive, though selective, use will be made 
of governmental tools, with due but elastic regard for our 
democratic traditions, to induce "responsible" private 
behavior in a widening range of productive activities and 
business situations.
The discussion that follows suggests several ways in which 
the productivity information base might be strengthened to 
assist the future formulation and execution of employment 
and stabilization policy:
1. Improvement, as opportunities permit, in the scope and 
quality of the corpus of productivity information for in-
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dividual industries, industry combinations, and larger 
economic sectors.
2. Support of further research into stubborn problems of 
concept and meaning—including test computations, where 
feasible, to disclose the direction and magnitude of the dif 
ference between (a) preferred measures and (b) the available 
or derivable ones that have to be used as substitutes.
3. Promotion of the design, construction, and testing of 
algebraically consistent index numbers that are especially 
suitable for joint analysis of changes in productivity and 
other economic variables, such as wages and prices.
4. Encouragement of: (a) experimentation with produc 
tivity forecasting, since explicit outlook estimates are often 
much more appropriate than routine extensions of past 
trends; and (b) related research efforts to anticipate the 
nature, extent, and implications of technological and other 
important changes.
5. Maintenance, insofar as practicable, of "flexible" 
governmental and public attitudes toward "official" pro 
ductivity statistics and measurement techniques that cannot 
qualify as definitive.
6. Stimulation of further company interest in the con 
struction of measures, trends, and forecasts of productivity 
as well as other variables relating to company operations.
7. Extension, at modest cost in comparison to obtainable 
benefits, of the education of policymakers, administrators, 
analysts, the press, and the general public with respect to the 
character and limitations of available and normally derivable 
productivity statistics.
This statement of needs neither overlooks nor is intended 
to disparage past accomplishments in the labor-productivity 
field; and it does not mean that data outside the immediate
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realm of productivity measurement are less deserving of con 
tinual attention. The lifetime of the Employment Act has in 
deed been a period of great progress in economic statistics; 
but productivity work has not been especially favored and its 
various prunings have hardly been intended to assure 
robustness. The realm of productivity measurement is aided 
in some degree, on the other hand, when improvements are 
made in other statistics that are utilizable in pertinent in 
direct methods of estimation (e.g., price deflation). But it 
could be aided much more if significant improvements were 
made along other lines, as indicated in the preceding seven 
statements.
The Productivity Nexus
The developing need for more and better labor- 
productivity tools for policy is clearly reflected in the 
Employment Act. Productivity, in the present context, 
means the ratio of production to employment (man-hours or 
persons, unweighted or weighted in some appropriate way); 
and these are two of the three variables mentioned in the 
concluding phrase of the Declaration of Policy, already 
cited. Productivity also enters into the practical definition of 
"purchasing power," as the promulgation of explicit "wage- 
price guideposts" in the 1962 Economic Report of the Presi 
dent illustrates. Finally, productivity forecasts have a place 
in the discharge of the presidential responsibility to report 
annually the "current and foreseeable trends in the levels of 
employment, production, and purchasing power" (Section 
3).
At this point, a necessary distinction between "verbal" 
and "literal" algebra should be noted. The mere cancellation 
of words in such identities as " production =employment x 
productivity" or "wages =unit labor cost x employment x 
productivity" is not a sufficient criterion for the construe-
Productivity, Employment & Stabilization (1966) 203
tion of suitably matched index numbers. Ideally, com 
patibility in a more "literal" sense—in the detailed data, for 
mulas, and weights—is also required. Since these more ex 
acting requirements can rarely be met, however, it is 
desirable, at least, to appreciate their nature and the risks in 
volved in substituting an available and seemingly equivalent 
measure for a preferable but unavailable one.
Though commonly neglected, the distinction between 
"verbal" and "literal" algebra in index-number measure 
ment is not a technical trifle. Policymakers, administrators, 
and specialists in nonproductivity fields, even those who 
consider themselves "practical," ought to know or care that 
algebraic operations help to determine the meaning and ap 
propriateness of alternative productivity measures, that dif 
ferent plausible sets of operations may lead to significantly 
different productivity numbers, that different numbers may 
counsel different decisions, that absence and ignorance of 
the most suitable alternative productivity measure may 
foreclose consideration and choice of the most warranted 
course of action. "Practical" people cannot really afford to 
rely on the mere names of series, on symbols, and on form, 
and to show indifference to content. 1
Uneven Recognition of Needs; Uneven 
Prospects of Remedy
As our mixed economy progressively becomes a monitored 
one, in which the federal government exercises a more 
positive and a wider coordinating role, the creation of more
1. For further discussion of "verbal" and "literal" algebra, see three items by I.H. Siegel: 
Concepts and Measurement of Production and Productivity (Washington: U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 1952); "On the Design of Consistent Output and Indexes for Productivity 
Measurement," in Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961). pp. 23-41; and "Systems of Algebraically Consistent Index 
Numbers," 7965 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the 
American Statistical Association, pp. 368-72.
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and better productivity statistics and outlook estimates will 
very probably proceed at a rate that is far less than satisfac 
tory. The expansion in supply and the advance of quality 
may be much too limited for the demands placed on the na 
tional data base. The popularity of macroeconomic series- 
watching already tends to favor certain broad aggregates and 
general economic indicators over detailed measures. Easy 
reliance on these comprehensive measures leads to neglect of 
their conceptual and technical flaws and their incomplete ap 
propriateness to many of the uses to which they are put. 
Their apparent adequacy diverts attention from re 
quirements for other pertinent and detailed series, especially 
building blocks. Indeed, a preoccupation with aggregates 
and a complacent widespread acceptance of "verbal'* 
algebra may make it appear that buildings no longer have to 
be built by experts, or with bricks or similar elemental 
materials, and that, therefore, little need exists for the cre 
ation and improvement of such materials and for the careful 
drafting of specifications and blueprints.
Inattention to the basic shortage of productivity building 
blocks is easy to document (although some of the more ex 
perienced students of economic affairs do occasionally file 
pointed reminders). It is remarkable that only a few scattered 
references were made to labor productivity by the in 
dividuals, organizations, and users of statistics canvassed in 
1965 by the Joint Economic Committee for views on im 
provements required in the federal information base. 2 The 
1967 Budget, furthermore, shows a trivial increase in expen 
ditures for "salaries and expenses" of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for 1966 over 1965 and for 1967 over 1966 "for im 
proved statistics and statistical research on employment and 
unemployment, wages, prices, and productivity." 3 A related
2. U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Improved Statistics for Economic Growth, 
July 1965.
3. The Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1967, p. 299.
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newspaper item reports a proposed "boost" from 30 to 35 or 
37 in the number of industries covered by separate produc 
tivity indexes of the Bureau. 4 Practically no reference was 
made to statistical needs with respect to productivity in the 
papers presented at the symposium celebrating the twentieth 
aniversary of the Employment Act in February, 1966.
Whatever is added to the existing stock of productivity in 
formation by federal agencies (including, incidentally, the 
industry data of the Bureau of the Census) will be most 
welcome, but the gains will very likely be much too small and 
come much too late to satisfy any purist. The nature, scope, 
and rate of progress affecting published industry and sector 
statistics will doubtless be restricted, as in the past, by 
technical difficulties of concept and measurement (as in the 
service industries), by proper differences of opinion among 
experts as to priorities, by the costs (in time, money, and 
scarce statistical manpower) of data compilation for new 
series (especially for making algebraically consistent 
measures for particular analyses), and by the proliferation of 
competing demands for available funds. Private organiza 
tions, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
will presumably add to the supply of historical series, but 
their contribution can hardly prove decisive in view of the 
growth and diversity of foreseeable needs.
Plentiful opportunities for theoretical, analytical, 
managerial, and educational advances will be afforded by 
the challenges of policy to the confined data base. The con 
struction of test measures and projections, the elaboration of 
econometric models, and the empirical study of production 
functions could yield some productivity-information 
bonuses. Additional companies, furthermore, may find suf 
ficient reason to prepare indexes of production, labor input, 
productivity, and unit labor costs as guides for internal
4. Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1966.
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operations and planning, 5 but these indexes will most prob 
ably not be published. Individual government agencies will 
surely expand their measurement programs for managerial 
purposes too. 6 The stage will be set for a continuing project 
that merits governmental acceptance on cost-benefit 
grounds—enhancement of the sophistication of the various 
classes of users, the press, and the general public with regard 
to the character, applicability, and pitfalls of available pro 
ductivity statistics and with regard to the properties of more 
suitable special-purpose measures (including forecasts).
The Employment Act has served as a focus for orderly ef 
forts to improve the statistics needed for coordinating public 
and private policy in the interest of economic expansion with 
reasonable price stability. In the 1940s and 1950s, "gaps" in 
productivity and other statistical areas were widely adver 
tised—for example, by the Joint Economic Committee in 
cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget. 7 In the 1958 
Economic Report of the President, prepared when the 
federal economic role was far less activist, a special appendix 
dealt with problems of productivity measurement. In the 
1962 Report, which promulgated the wage-price guideposts 
as informational rather than directive, the limitations of pro 
ductivity statistics again were frankly addressed. In subse 
quent Reports, as the guideposts acquired doctrinal force, 
the caveats became muted despite their continuing ap 
plicability to available statistical gauges. A mellow 
restrospective chapter in the 1966 Report, reviewing the first 
two decades of the Act, points to notable improvements,
5. See, for example, J.W. Kendrick and Daniel Creamer, Measuring Company Productivi 
ty ("Studies in Business Economics," No. 89; New York: National Industrial Conference 
Board, 1965).
6. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Measuring Productivity of Federal Government Organiza 
tions, 1964; and its War on Waste, December 31, 1964.
7. Statistical Gaps, a Committee Print, was issued in 1948. Also noteworthy are the Joint 
Economic Committee's Hearings on Economic Statistics, 1954, and Hearings on Employ 
ment and Unemployment Statistics, 1955.
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especially in the timely processing of an increasing number 
of widely used "economic indicators"; but it also notes that 
"our data are not completely satisfactory" and cites produc 
tivity and fringe benefits among the areas "where there are 
important gaps and weaknesses," remediable "only by ex 
pansion of our statistical programs."
In 1962, a Presidential Commission reported on produc 
tivity and other statistical needs expressed to it by the Coun 
cil of Economic Advisers and other organizations and in 
dividuals. An explicit interest in industry series was 
registered by the Council: "its analyses of ... economic 
developments would be greatly aided by better statistics on 
employment and hours for major industrial sectors, which 
could be used in conjunction with gross national product and 
other output estimates to determine shifts in productivity." 
The Council also "indicated that one of its most urgent 
statistical needs is for better data on hours worked in all ma 
jor sectors of the economy as a prerequisite for early and 
reliable estimates of productivity changes." 8 In the long run, 
it is to be hoped, even immediate statistical requirements of 
the Council may be partially accommodated!
In 1965, while the Council still had its old needs for pro 
ductivity information, it acquired an additional context in 
which to restate them. A Council member, addressing the 
Federal Statistics Users Conference at the end of October, 
noted that "rough, global figures" had proved adequate for 
public economic policy relating to reduction of the gap be 
tween actual and potential employment. Successful reduc 
tion, however, rationalized a shift of primary interest to 
specific spheres in which "we need to strengthen our 
knowledge substantially"—productivity, as well as prices
8. President's Committee to Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Measur 
ing Employment and Unemployment, 1962, pp. 39 and 94.
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(domestic and export), capacity, job vacancies, and fringe 
benefits. 9
The Growing Federal Role
What are the pertinent features of the evolving environ 
ment in which productivity is assuming new significance, 
regardless of the state and adequacy of the information at 
hand? A trend toward a "monitored" economy, even in 
"peacetime," is indicated by recent domestic events, and 
also by earlier developments in Great Britain and Western 
Continental Europe. 10 Emergence of a new pattern, a new 
"style," is discernible—although detours, inconsistencies, 
and reversals are also to be expected in the transition from a 
"mixed" economy, as competitive forces and as the flux of 
international affairs continue to register their effects.
Two characteristics may be said to differentiate the 
monitored economy from the mixed economy. In the latter, 
the central government already demands a sizable share of 
the national product and already has a wide assortment of 
powers relating to taxes, money and credit, resource 
development, welfare, and markets. Thus, it already 
possesses a capability of influencing private economic deci 
sions significantly and selectively. More important, through 
impact on both aggregate demand and the supply of critical 
resources, it can also influence the general tempo of 
economic activity and the total volume of employment. The 
monitored economy is distinguished, first, by the use of 
government prestige and power (in our case, through the
9. See reference to remarks of Otto Eckstein in The American Statistician, December 1965, 
p. 2.
10. See the various essays in E.G. Hickman (ed.), Quantitative Planning of Economic 
Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965); and J.M. Edelman and R.W. Fleming, 
The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis (Urbana, University of Il 
linois Press, 1965).
Productivity, Employment & Stabilization (1966) 209
presidential office) to define a comprehensive master objec 
tive or small cluster of dominant "national goals," to set 
"targets" relating thereto, and to pursue these aims 
preferably by the manipulation of available "instrumental 
variables" and by "exhortation" of the private sector. The 
second distinguishing characteristic is the governmental 
disposition to achieve the collaboration deemed essential to 
the "national interest" or the "public interest" by going 
beyond general exhortation to threats, sanctions, and the 
mobilization of public sentiment against recalcitrant private 
groups.
In the monitored economy, formal detailed "planning" is 
not attempted for society, although quantitative and other 
simplified forecasting "models" may be used as aids in 
public and private policy design. Heavy stress continues to 
be placed there on private initiative and money incentives, 
and wide latitude remains for freedom of economic choice 
and action. The national output retains its dominant con 
sumer orientation, at least in "peacetime." Indeed, if the 
monitored economy is successful in sustaining growth, an ex 
tra welfare bonus becomes available to the population 
through more complete and more continual access to goods 
and services produced in greater abundance.
While traditional cultural values are strained in the 
monitored economy, the spine of dominant ideology could 
remain intact. The changes would tend to be regarded as ra 
tional or necessary modifications in the rules of the game in 
response to new challenges. On the whole, the people may 
seem, like Macbeth following the dagger, to be marshaled 
where they were already going. The targets indicate general 
directions, rather than personal quotas, and gains in material 
welfare could go far to compensate for any felt deprivation 
in the realm of intangibles. Projections that are judged 
desirable are expected to derive a self-fulfilling impetus from 
the responses of the private sector, and corrective private
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responses are expected to be induced by the announcement 
of national prospects regarded as objectionable. In addition, 
government has to "plan" its own complements to such 
private responses, which may not be deemed sufficient for 
attainment of established national targets.
The roots of the emerging U.S. version of the monitored 
economy are ramified and deep, traceable without exaggera 
tion back to the Constitutional Convention—long before our 
system even became recognized as "mixed." If specific 
historical tributaries are to be singled out, first importance 
must be assigned to the experience and to the threat of wars 
and recessions—emergencies that fundamentally jeopardize 
personal and national security, that accordingly provide oc 
casion for the enactment and exercise of extraordinary 
federal powers, and that also tend to focus and fix federal 
leadership in the Presidency. 11
Employment Act as Integrating Framework
The Employment Act of 1946, passed in an atmosphere of 
concern that the economic sluggishness of the 1930s might 
return after World War II, provides a handy and "logical" 
matrix for coordinating federal policies with each other and 
with those of lower levels of government and the private sec 
tor. The turgid single sentence that constitutes the Declara 
tion of Policy is nowadays being interpreted, as already 
noted, as a charter for strong federal monitorial action
11. In recent years, Congressional hearings and the reports of such groups as the 
President's Commission on National Goals, the Committee for Economic Development's 
Commission on Money and Credit, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the American 
Assembly, and the National Planning Association have helped to modify professional, 
business, and public attitudes concerning master objectives and the potentials for 
government-private cooperation. Earlier contributions have been made, of course, by the 
Economic Reports of the President—and also by the widely advertised concepts of "part 
nership" and "shared responsibility" of the Eisenhower era, which are forerunners of the 
current "creative federalism." Precedents were provided before World War II in the 
reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee and of such New Deal agencies as 
the National Resources Committee and the Works Progress Administration.
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rather than as a negotiated baseline of bipartisan unanimity. 
A reconciliation of the Employment Act and the older 
Federal Reserve Act, which provides another, but less com 
prehensive, approach to the same sorts of national goals, re 
mains to be effected in the future. A contribution to this rap 
prochement is offered at the end of this paper.
One of the major recent strides toward a monitored 
economy within the framework of the Employment Act in 
volves the adoption and policing of guidelines for relating 
wages to productivity and restraining prices. Introduced in 
the 1962 Economic Report of the President, the 
"guideposts" have since been energetically enforced to 
frustrate industry intentions to raise steel, copper, and 
aluminum prices. Government intervention has included 
threats to use "monopsonistic" market power and to release 
materials stockpiled for military emergency. Redistribution 
or withholding of federal contracts has been threatened in 
other instances—for example, in an effort to restrain con 
struction wages—and federal intercession helped to undo 
cigarette price increases in 1966.
In 1964, furthermore, fiscal policy was used boldly to ex 
pand total economic demand and thereby reduce unemploy 
ment. A drastic tax reduction that had been wistfully con 
templated for many years was daringly executed at the Presi 
dent's request by an agreeable Congress. Growth was spur 
red as the potential economic energy previously wound into 
the progressive rate structure became quickly converted into 
the kinetic energy of private spending. The popularity of this 
tax cut and the President's own prestige facilitated subor 
dination of "market" decisions by industry leaders to the 
Executive's interpretation of the national interest.
To add concreteness to our discussion, we refer to various 
passages in the preface to the 1965 Economic Report of the 
President. For our purpose, it does not matter that some of
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the assertions are, and must remain, arguable, despite the 
wide advertisement of a "new economics." The Employ 
ment Act is interpreted there as a "mandate" for pursuit of 
"full employment" and certain other supporting objectives: 
"rapid growth, price stability, and equilibrium in our 
balance of payments." The consistency of these goals, even 
of their "mutually reinforcing" character, given "proper 
policies," is considered to have been proved by experience. 
The President also stated that he regards "the goal of over 
all price stability as fully implied in the language of the 
Employment Act."
Lauding "the imagination, prudence, and skill of our 
businessmen, workers, investors, farmers, and consumers" 
for their fundamental contributions to "our basically private 
economy," the President observed that an important ingre 
dient had been added since 1960 "to invigorate private ef 
forts." This ingredient is positive government policy, which 
provides "the vital margin of difference" for "steady, but 
noninflationary, growth." Indeed, 1964 marked "the first 
time our Nation cut taxes for the declared purpose of 
speeding the advance of the private economy toward 'max 
imum employment, production, and purchasing power/ " 
The President pledged new efforts to eradicate joblessness in 
accord with his interpretation of the Act: "The promise in 
the Employment Act of job opportunities for all those able 
and wanting to work has not yet been fulfilled. We cannot 
rest until it is."
With respect to wages and prices, the President appealed 
to "the sense of public responsibility of our labor leaders 
and our industrial leaders to do their full part." He com 
mended the wage and price guideposts to these leaders and to 
the public. He cautioned that he would "maintain a close 
watch," would "draw public attention to private actions 
which threaten the public interest," and would ask "for
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special, detailed analysis of price or wage increases in key 
sectors of the economy."
With respect to job opportunities, the President placed 
prime reliance on "fiscal and monetary measures," but he 
also recognized certain structural problems that would have 
to be met in other ways. In addition to referring to proposals 
for manpower training and for strengthening the U.S. 
Employment Service, he noted that an "active manpower 
policy" is being developed "to reduce human costs, raise 
productivity, and make possible full employment without in 
flation."
Forecasting Productivity and Technology
The hazards of forecasting changes in productivity and 
technology will add to the frustrations already encountered 
in historical measurement as federal policy demands a wider 
variety of explicit estimates of the future. The follies com 
mitted in academic as well as journalistic discussions of the 
prospective impacts of, say, research and development ac 
tivity and of "automation" cannot modify the government's 
increasing requirement for better appraisals, and they hardly 
assure significant or rapid improvement in techniques or in 
judgment. Earlier public and private efforts to forecast 
technological change and its implications (e.g., by the Na 
tional Resources Committee and the Twentieth Century 
Fund) as well are more recent efforts (e.g., by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics) do suggest useful study approaches. Among 
other things, they alert us to the importance of distinguishing 
stages that have different economic significance: invention, 
engineering development, innovation, and widespread ac 
ceptance. Even within the last of these phases, which may 
seem relatively well defined, a valuable lesson may be learn 
ed through reflection on the persisting and extending 
economic significance of an "old" invention such as the
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automobile in a period so rich in "new" inventions. Cliches 
such as the "accelerating pace of technological advance*' ob 
viously require fine-grain scrutiny in the interest of for 
mulating relevant policy.
Since productivity outlook depends on technological and 
other contingencies, it may always seem foolhardy to at 
tempt more than a "conservative" extrapolation or minor 
modification of past trends. Planning for action, public and 
private, tends to discount talk about an "accelerating pace," 
especially if errors of overcommitment of resources are 
penalized more heavily than errors of undercommitment. 
But experimentation with explicit—detailed and time- 
specific—productivity forecasting is surely desirable. Fur 
thermore, since implicit forecasts of productivity are being 
generated whenever forecasts are made in studies that focus 
specifically and explicitly on related variables, the produc 
tivity implications should be recognized. Such implicit pro 
ductivity forecasts merit explicit formulation for comparison 
with, or for replacement of, figures derived in some other 
manner.
Whatever the vocabulary one prefers, it is desirable to dif 
ferentiate two kinds of forecasting and two subclasses within 
each. 12 These distinctions acquire new importance with the 
enlargement of governmental interest in employment levels 
and price-wage relationships. One major forecast category 
refers to outlook statements made by an objective or neutral 
outsider—an observer who does not try to affect what he an 
ticipates. The second category refers to outlook statements 
that immediately involve the forecaster or his principal as an 
actor—statements that are intended to be fulfilled through 
the exertion of direct or indirect influence. Within the first 
main class, two varieties should be differentiated: prediction
12. See I.H. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run Forecasting," Journal of 
Business, July 1953, pp. 141-56. This paper was prepared in the course of a study made 
under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund.
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(or prophecy), which refers to unequivocal statements about 
what mil happen; and projection, which refers to condi 
tional (if-then) statements about the future, to the implica 
tions of various assumptions that need not be (or may not 
prove to be) correct. Within the second major category, we 
distinguish two subdivisions: programming, relating to 
statements that the forecaster or his principal attempts to 
validate through manipulation of variables under direct con 
trol, through use of resources and powers under command; 
and propaganda, relating to statements to be fulfilled 
through influence on other decisionmakers by communica 
tion of information or opinion.
If a policymaker has complete control over relevant 
variables and the environment, all varieties of forecast are 
equivalent; and, if he can, therefore, make reliable predic 
tions or prophecies, these cease to be of interest to him and 
no longer need to be made. In the more usual case, projec 
tions, preferably more than one alternative, are devised; and 
the persons or organizations having an interest in applica 
tions and outcomes pursue the one deemed "best" or most 
likely of realization through programming and propaganda. 
It is clear that, for the advancement of national goals, public 
and private decisionmakers engage in projection, program 
ming, and propaganda activities. The federal role of 
"higher-system" monitor depends in some degree on the 
prestige and credibility of official forecasts. Interactions and 
dynamic effects that are induced by federal programming 
and propaganda should ideally encourage fulfillment of 
desirable forecasts (those in the "national interest") and in 
hibit or counter forecasts of events deemed objectionable.
Interest in forecasting has increased greatly in recent 
years, but it favors the broad economic indicators (e.g., na 
tional price indexes) and such aggregates as the gross na 
tional product and its major components. The shorter run 
seems to attract special attention, and there is an unwar-
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ranted tendency to interpret past good estimates as evidence 
of the improvement of forecasting art without reference to 
the specific circumstances involved and to the many past 
failures. The review of forecasting performance, however, is 
a wholesome activity that is becoming more evident. On the 
other hand, distinctions like those noted above among 
varieties of forecasts are still far from fully appreciated. 13
Productivity forecasting in particular seems to be a weak 
and neglected art—certainly in comparison to the art of 
estimating the future population and labor force, which are 
also important factors in the manpower-requirements 
outlook. Perhaps, because the average annual increase in 
output per man-hour computed for, say, the private sector is 
numerically small, the task seems easy and the consequences 
of error seem minor. 14
Let us look briefly at some approaches to productivity 
forecasting. Econometric forecasts are hard to make because 
productivity need not be significantly related in given periods 
to, say, investment in plant and equipment, the growth or 
supply of educated manpower, or expenditures for research 
and development. Even production and employment do not 
move together in the short run, and the long-run divergence 
is not stable from industry to industry. 15 "Naive" forecasts,
13. On this paragraph, see, for example, Victor Zarnowitz, "How Accurate Are the 
Forecasts?" Challenge, January-February 1966, pp. 20ff.; statement of G.H. Orcutt in Im 
proved Statistics for Economic Growth, pp. 102-5; George Jaszi, Lawrence Grose, and 
Maurice Liebenberg, Forecasting with Judgmental and Econometric Models: A Case Study 
(Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1965); D.B. Suits, "An Econometric 
Forecast of the Outlook for 1965," 1964 Proceedings of the Business and Economic 
Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, pp. 18-21; A.M. Okun, "A Review of 
Some Economic Forecasts for 1955-57," Journal of Business, July 1959, pp. 199-211; P.A. 
Samuelson, "Economic Forecasting and National Policy," in The Employment Act: Past 
and Future (Washington: National Planning Association, 1946), pp. 130-34; and Business 
Week, January 15, 1966, pp. 19-20.
14. See remarks by Samuelson, "Economic Forecasting and National Policy," p. 133.
15. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long-Run Forecasting"; an unsigned article on 
"Productivity: Key to Price Stability," Challenge, January-February 1966, pp. 24-25; and 
various papers included in Manpower Implications of Automation (Washington: U.S. 
Department of Labor, December 1964).
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which assume the persistence of an observed past rate of pro 
ductivity increase, also lack realism. Judgmental forecasts 
naturally differ according to the knowledge, intuition, com 
petence, and temperament of the students making them. Re 
cent experience with forecasts of the employment implica 
tions of "automation," to which we have already referred, 
should warn us how erratic judgment may be when not 
tempered by an appreciation of history, an interest in 
statistical and other evidence, a sensitivity to the difference 
between technical feasibility and economic practicality, and 
a concern for the eternal distinction between scholarship and 
journalism.
Productivity Factor in Employment 
and Production Outlook
The more deeply one is involved in forecasting manpower 
and output prospects, the more troublesome becomes the 
problem of choosing appropriate productivity factors. Naive 
forecasts are often made; for example, the figure for the last 
year or the average for a recent period is commonly ac 
cepted. But a seemingly conservative approach need not lead 
to realistic results, since annual productivity change is not 
smooth, and an occasional decline may be experienced. Fur 
thermore, even past multiyear averages vary according to the 
length and the character of the period selected. Close 
students of productivity are reluctant to forecast accelera 
tions in the annual rate of increase16 or are content with only
16. In Measurement of Technological Change (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 
July 1965), Solomon Fabricant, the leading student of U.S. productivity, stated that there 
is no "good basis for supposing acceleration, in recent years, in the rate of technological 
change" (p. 23). Fabricant prefers to estimate such change by means of a productivity in 
dex for capital and labor combined, although he also cautions against belief that "there is 
or ever will be a single simple measure." (Formulas for productivity referring to all 
economic inputs combined were presented by Siegel in Concepts and Measurement of Pro 
duction and Productivity.)
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small upward adjustments in the rate—despite strong con 
trary propaganda aimed at influencing public policy.
This is an appropriate place at which to state that our 
society courts needless dangers through (1) neglect of the 
gaps and the more easily remediable defects in productivity 
information, (2) only patchy support of nonjournalistic 
research into the nature and implications of technological 
currents and prospects, and (3) inadequate attention to 
needs for general education on these matters for the respon 
sible exercise of the functions of citizenship. Government 
manpower policy could be forced massively in the wrong 
direction in the absence of sufficient and more or less objec 
tive information for distinguishing between a new era and a 
new error. A worthy objective of public instruction is to en 
dow "the people" (including bureaucrats) with enough 
"sophistication" to detect the gist of a message embedded in 
noise even before, say, a National Commission on 
Technology, Automation, and Technological Progress 
conies into being, deliberates, and prepares a report. The dif 
ficulty of achievement does not diminish the importance of 
dedication to such an objective, especially in a democracy.
Informed students and practitioners recognize and 
acknowledge many limitations in techniques and data that 
bedevil manpower forecasting. The 1965 Manpower Report 
of the President, for example, observes (p. 52) that "projec 
ting future manpower requirements is inherently a difficult 
and hazardous undertaking, in view of the endless variety of 
technological, economic, political, and other events which 
may affect these requirements." An outstanding productivi 
ty authority, having had occasion recently to note the ex 
istence of aggregate productivity measures based on two sets 
of labor-input data (i.e., "establishment" and "labor force" 
figures) that do not always agree, further observed: "For 
some purposes, . . . the difference is a bit of a nuisance, and 
this is one of the sources of our problems, the fact that we
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don't have really very good basic statistics even on employ 
ment and hours of work." 17
For at least three reasons, it would be desirable to project 
manpower requirements industry by industry (ideally, within 
an input-output framework) and then aggregate the results, 
but this approach can be pursued only part of the way. 
Detailed forecasting would permit averaging of the errors 
that arise in component estimation; allow finer examination 
of the prospects of particular categories of workers and of 
specific occupations; and preclude intrusion of an algebraic 
factor that occasionally distorts aggregate productivity 
magnitudes when these are derived directly. The authority 
cited above comments thus on the paucity of industry pro 
ductivity series:
Nobody is preparing current statistics on produc 
tivity by individual industries covering a substantial 
number of industries. I do not know why there 
should be such a lack of vital statistics. We need to 
know more than just the average, or the figures for 
just a few highly aggregated industrial groups. We 
need to have some idea of the spread among dif 
ferent industries. 18
Aggregate productivity estimates are frequently used in 
forecasting "growth," which is commonly represented by 
gross national product or private-sector output expressed in 
supposedly "constant" prices. The productivity figures are 
applied to labor projections in this case. In the 1965 
Economic Report of the President, it is observed (p. 92) that 
the rapid rise of productivity during the long expansion "is 
typical of a period of improving utilization rates" and "does 
not provide clear evidence that the long-term trend of pro 
ductivity growth has changed." On the other hand, sustain-
17. Fabricant, Measurement of Technological Change, p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 21.
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ed expansion favors higher rates of investment and the in 
troduction of advanced production processes, and these 
changes, according to the Report, should contribute to a 
"gradual" rise in the productivity trend although the net 
quantitative impact "defies careful measurement."
The occasional anomalous divergence of an aggregate pro 
ductivity measure from the figures for components is only 
one of the many impediments to accurate forecasting. It is 
also a source of confusion in the administration of wage- 
price policy, as will be noted again later. Thus, it is possible 
for a measured rise (fall) of productivity in the private sector 
as a whole to exceed (be less than) the indicated productivity 
gains for the farm and nonfarm components of the sector. 
Moreover, an observed anomaly of this sort may disappear 
upon revision of the output statistics after it has been "ex 
plained"! The "effect of intersector manpower shifts," as 
this type of distortion19 is designated in the 1963 Manpower 
Report of the President (p. 72), is normally positive and 
hence welcomed as a source of national productivity gain. 
But it can also be a source of puzzlement (and mischief), 
especially if it is not shown as a separate "effect." Algebraic 
bonuses, alas, cannot be distributed twice in the form of pay.
Productivity Factor in Wage-Price Policy
Government efforts to establish personal, puritanical "in 
ner checks" on wages and prices once thought to be deter 
mined by market forces add to the burden on existing pro 
ductivity series and on forecasting techniques. The dif 
ficulties surrounding establishment and administration of 
guides for "responsible" wage and price decisions have fre-
19. The same kind of phenomenon can occur in the computation of single-industry produc 
tivity measures from industry-wide output and labor series, the only data normally 
available. Unfortunately, the absence of company or plant data precludes avoidance—or 
analysis—of this possible distortion in productivity estimation for industries.
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quently been discussed by students fearing an evolution into 
coercion of an initially voluntary system before its eventual 
collapse. Some of the critics of "jawbone" controls have 
become keenly aware of conundrums of productivity 
measurement and interpretation that impede reasonable 
determination and fair and sound application of guideposts.
As early as 1958, the President and the Council cautioned 
in the Economic Report that "wage increases that go beyond 
prospective productivity gains are inconsistent with a stable 
price level." The word "prospective" indicated that outlook 
is more relevant than trend; that any trend estimate 
employed in price-wage deliberations is actually to be regard 
ed as a "naive" forecast. The statement as a whole has a 
more satisfactory tone, furthermore, than the guidepost ver 
sion included in the 1965 Report, which seems to insist "that 
the percentage increase in total employee compensation per 
man-hour be equal to the national trend rate of increase in 
output per man-hour." This kind of statement may 
gratuitously encourage emergence of a new questionable 
concept—a guaranteed annual wage increment equivalent to 
the guidepost productivity percentage. Widespread expecta 
tion of such an annual rise, reinforced by an annual increase 
for federal workers in conformity with guideposts relating to 
the private sector, 20 could easily undermine a national policy 
of quasi-voluntary restraint. The language of the 1966 
Report, comparable to that of the 1965 Report, also seems 
less satisfactory than the wording of the 1958 statement cited 
above.
Another feature of the 1958 Report is the general stress on 
improvement of federal statistics, including productivity. In
20. A statement made in a National Planning Association publication, Looking Ahead, 
February 1966, p. 7, ignores the inflationary potential (both direct and indirect) of annual 
increases for federal workers in accordance with private-sector expectations: "The 
guidelines gain in persuasiveness when the Federal government adheres to them with respect 
to Federal workers."
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a special appendix on productivity, temporary and minor 
discouragement was given to the emerging cause of guideline 
specification—by the inclusion of (1) two sets of productivi 
ty measures for the private economy and its two major com 
ponents and (2) an extensive account of "problems of 
measurement and meaning." Among the problems mention 
ed were: the theoretical multiplicity of plausible productivity 
measures, the dependence of meaning on the data and 
methods actually used, the danger that an aggregate produc 
tivity measure may lie outside the range of the measures for 
components, the frequent need to substitute "gross" output 
data for desired "net," the nebulosity of output indicators 
that have to be derived by means of vaguely relevant 
deflators (as in the case of the service industries and research 
activity), the multiplicity of conceivable labor-input con 
cepts, and the nonequivalence of labor series for hours 
remunerated and hours worked.
The 1962 Economic Report of the President, which ex 
plicitly advanced the guidepost concept "as a guide rather 
than as a rule for appraising . . . behavior," acknowledged 
existence of measurement problems and of difficulties of 
choice among alternative indexes that may disagree. It noted 
that year-to-year fluctuations in productivity change com 
plicate the selection of a trend, and that the part of change 
reflecting variation in capacity utilization should be isolated 
from trend. It also made the important point that, when 
comprehensive productivity measures are used as "bench 
marks" for wage adjustment, allowance has to be made for 
the changes they reflect in occupational composition and in 
grades.
In 1965, a former chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers made reference to many inadequacies of the 
statistics in his strongly critical commentary on the
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guideposts. 21 He felt that the price criterion would require 
every company to know its own industry's productivity trend 
in relation to aggregate experience. The present and prospec 
tive condition of the public information base, however, rules 
out such comparisons:
The productivity indexes now being published, 
besides being often out of date, lump together a 
great variety of products. In time, more detailed 
and more current indexes of productivity will 
doubtless be constructed, but there are limits to 
what is statistically feasible. Even if measures of 
this type become available for each of a thousand 
or ten thousand industries, much confusion or 
perplexity will still remain.
Among the additional "puzzles," he too refers to the danger 
that the wage guidepost may suggest general entitlement to a 
wage increase already "granted" in part through payments 
reflecting an increase in average skill composition of the 
work force.
Another informed student, answering an inquiry of the 
Joint Economic Committee in 1965, pointed to a timeliness 
gap in the reporting of data on fringe benefits, requested an 
increase in the number of industries represented by in 
dividual productivity indexes, and called for comparable 
coverage of the hourly earnings and productivity measures. 
"It would then be possible," he observed, "to estimate unit 
labor costs for a larger number of industries and, 
hence, ... to identify the extent to which cost pressures 
develop because of higher labor costs and conversely." 22
21. A.F. Burns, "Wages and Prices by Formula?" Harvard Business Review, March-April 
1965, pp. 55-64.
22. Jules Backman, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Improved Statistics for 
Economic Growth, pp. 2-3.
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Suggestions on Guidelines
We conclude this essay with four suggestions, the first of 
which is to consider afresh the theoretical and statistical re 
quirements of an ideal guidelines system. An improved 
system should be available for later "peacetime" periods in 
which guidepost monitoring may seem appropriate and in 
which "policy escalation" to formal wage and price control 
is unwanted. Important insights for improvement would be 
afforded by a patient test of the numerical differences be 
tween (1) available pertinent indexes that merely satisfy the 
verbal algebra and (2) ad hoc indicators for the same 
variables constructed according to the principles of literal 
algebraic consistency. A productivity measure derived from 
aggregate information for an industry, a combination, or a 
large sector need not be arithmetically equivalent to a pro 
ductivity index designed for use in conjunction with others 
for wages and prices. Comparisons should also be sought, of 
course, for alternative wage and price measures.
The second suggestion is to consider the use of explicit 
productivity forecasts (preferably "predictions") in wage- 
price guidelines when future quasi-voluntary efforts may 
again seem warranted. Availability of both annual and 
longer term forecasts would be desirable, with the more con 
servative of the two figures serving as the preferred guide for 
decisions in a particular year. These figures, however, should 
be the same as, or compatible with, those used or implied in 
estimation of the gross national product, its major com 
ponents, and other key variables in the Economic Report of 
the President.
Third, "real" wages deserve attention as well as 
"nominal" wages in the definition of any future guidepost 
policy. Unfortunately, wholesale prices seem to be of much 
more interest than consumer prices in the discussion of infla-
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denary prospects. If consumer prices were introduced into 
the stabilization criterion (for adjustment of the nonfringe 
component of wages), greater official notice would have to 
be given to, say, the type of long term inflation that has ac 
tually been occurring in the services. Persistently rising prices 
of services (which account nowadays for much of the 
average employee's budget) stimulate new wage demands, 
handicap cooperative union leaders, and typically lie beyond 
the reach of federal monopsony power. Of course, cost-of- 
living adjustments could not reasonably be superadded to 
those based on productivity when consumer prices rise 
significantly—if equity and inflation control are to be pur 
sued jointly.
Finally, the wage guidepost should be restated in an 
algebraically equivalent form that is simpler and has certain 
clear analytical and administrative advantages. It does not 
seem to be generally appreciated that the usual criterion for 
assuring control of unit labor cost is the same as the follow 
ing guide: that the percentage increase in payrolls should not 
exceed the percentage increase in volume of output. (If the 
second of the suggestions made in the preceding paragraphs 
were adopted, the word "prospective" should be introduced 
before "percentage increase in the volume of output.")
This restatement makes it easier to understand what to do 
in the face of intersectoral shifts, changes in skill and oc 
cupational mix of the work force, and the persistent in 
creases in living costs. 23 Furthermore, it dramatizes the ad 
jacency of the domains of the Federal Reserve Act and the 
Employment Act of 1946, for monetary policy too em 
phasizes the role of prospective increases in output. Accor 
ding to the traditional formula for restraining inflation, "the
23. The criterion might also be adjusted to refer to "real" payrolls—to give another, more 
explicit meaning to the concept of maximum "purchasing power" embodied in the 
Employment Act.
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growth of the money supply must be held to a rate that ap 
proximately corresponds to the expected rate of growth in 
real output of goods and services." 24 A common border is 
thus identified between the informal guidepost approach and 
the conventional approach deemed more appropriate to con 
tainment of diffused and increasing inflationary 
pressures—the classic "demand-pull" situation.
24. "Guidelines Won't Do It Alone," Business Week, January 15, 1966, p. 148.




